Email provider privacy depends on who can read your stored messages, which laws apply to the operator and its servers, and what information an account leaves behind. A low price or an encrypted connection answers only part of that. This comparison puts those questions beside each provider’s published terms and technical documentation, with source excerpts in the profiles below.
The Privacy Impact score is my weighted comparison of six attributes. It is not a security audit, a probability of surveillance, or a guarantee of anonymity. Geography and ownership can compensate numerically for readable mail. Advertising, AI data use, log retention and breach history are outside the total. Read the encryption column and the profile before choosing a provider. The audit prompt explains how to apply the same rules to another service.
Functionality (custom domains, catch-all, IMAP, storage) and pricing are kept in a separate appendix: they matter for picking a provider but they aren’t privacy.
iCloud Mail, Gmail, Outlook.com, Yahoo Mail and AOL Mail are assessed individually using their US consumer configurations. Their regional contracts and business editions can differ.
Research spans May through November 2026. The November 14 revision corrects selected findings and scoring; it does not mean every policy was retrieved again that day. Dates in the evidence distinguish historical incidents and source checks. Archive dates identify saved versions, including local copies made in November.
Acronym glossary
- E2EE. End-to-end encryption. Only sender and recipient can read the message; the provider cannot.
- Zero-access encryption. Provider stores ciphertext only and holds no key that can decrypt it.
- PGP / S/MIME. Standards for encrypting individual messages with user-managed keys.
- 5 / 9 / 14 Eyes. Intelligence-sharing alliances. 5 Eyes: USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. 9 Eyes adds Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway. 14 Eyes adds Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden.
- CLOUD Act. US law addressing disclosure of data under a covered provider’s possession, custody or control, including data stored abroad. Incorporation and server location alone do not settle its application.
- DPA. Data Processing Agreement. GDPR contract naming the provider as processor acting on customer’s instructions.
- GDPR. EU General Data Protection Regulation.
- DSA. EU Digital Services Act, which imposes transparency-reporting obligations.
- Catch-all. Mailbox that receives mail for any address at a custom domain, including ones that don’t exist.
- IMAP / SMTP / POP3. Common open protocols for receiving (IMAP/POP3) and sending (SMTP) mail. Support lets compatible third-party clients access the mailbox.
Contents
Ranking
Lower scores mean fewer penalties under this rubric. See the detailed comparison for the attributes behind each total, or the scoring framework for the weights. Click a provider to read its short verdict, then open its findings or sources as needed. Click any column header to re-sort.
| Provider | Privacy Impact |
|---|---|
| Proton Mail | LOW3 |
| Tuta | LOW3 |
| cock.li | MEDIUM4 |
| Mailfence | MEDIUM4 |
| Neomailbox | MEDIUM4 |
| Kolab Now | MEDIUM5 |
| Mailbox.org | MEDIUM5 |
| CounterMail | MEDIUM6 |
| Eclipso | MEDIUM6 |
| Infomaniak kMail | MEDIUM6 |
| mail.de | MEDIUM6 |
| Posteo | MEDIUM6 |
| StartMail | MEDIUM6 |
| Systemli | MEDIUM6 |
| Vivaldi Mail | MEDIUM6 |
| GMX | MEDIUM8 |
| Hostpoint | MEDIUM8 |
| Inbox.eu | MEDIUM8 |
| Migadu | MEDIUM8 |
| Murena Mail | MEDIUM8 |
| Runbox | MEDIUM8 |
| WEB.DE | MEDIUM8 |
| Disroot | HIGH9 |
| Mailo | HIGH9 |
| Riseup | HIGH9 |
| Seeweb | HIGH9 |
| Forward Email | HIGH11 |
| Gandi Mail | HIGH11 |
| iCloud Mail | HIGH11 |
| Iroco | HIGH11 |
| Thexyz | HIGH11 |
| Zoho Mail | HIGH11 |
| Combell | HIGH12 |
| Fastmail | HIGH12 |
| Gmail | HIGH12 |
| Raidboxes | HIGH12 |
| Soverin | HIGH12 |
| HEY | HIGH13 |
| Lavabit | HIGH13 |
| Outlook.com | HIGH13 |
| PrivateMail | HIGH13 |
| Rackspace Email | HIGH13 |
| Titan | HIGH13 |
| Hushmail | HIGH14 |
| MXroute | HIGH14 |
| Mythic Beasts | HIGH14 |
| Namecheap Private Email | HIGH14 |
| PolarisMail | HIGH14 |
| Purelymail | HIGH14 |
| Yahoo Mail | HIGH14 |
| AOL Mail | CRITICAL15 |
Out of scope (discontinued or otherwise excluded from scoring):
- Skiff: built-in E2EE provider acquired by Notion and sunset entirely in 2024.
- CTemplar: Iceland-hosted OpenPGP provider that shut down on 2022-05-26 (founder cited the inability to “guarantee our security claims”).
- Autistici/Inventati: shut down all services on September 18, 2026. Its seizure history and closure are covered in Out of scope.
- OnMail: Edison Software’s ad-free mailbox, closed on 2025-07-31. Its parent’s revenue came from selling purchase data pulled out of the mail its apps read.
- Greenhost: Dutch host that sued GCHQ; it sells no mailbox on its own: email ships bundled inside a web-hosting package.
- Pobox: merged into Fastmail on 2024-11-12.
pobox.comredirects there now, so scoring it would count Fastmail twice. - Alias and relay services: SimpleLogin, addy.io, Firefox Relay, DuckDuckGo Email Protection. A complement to a mailbox host, not a replacement for one.
- Self-hosting: requires a separate assessment of your infrastructure, encryption and ability to keep mail available.
To score a provider not listed here, use the audit prompt at the end of the article.
Comparison
Lower scores reflect the preferences in this rubric. The component scores matter more than small differences in the total. The full scoring rubric is at the end of the article. Click any column header to re-sort.
| Provider | Operator jurisdiction | Hosting | Message protection | Accountability | Signup / payment | Privacy Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proton Mail | Switzerland | CH / DE / NO | Default bodies + attachments; subjects visible | Report; judicial notice by authorities | Tor + cash / Bitcoin | LOW3 |
| Tuta | Germany | Germany | Default, including subjects | Report + canary | Free + Tor; gift-card upgrades | LOW3 |
| cock.li | Seychelles (provisional) | RS / RO (provisional) | None; disk encryption only | Report + canary, both historical | Free + Tor | MEDIUM4 |
| Mailfence | Belgium | Belgium | Optional browser OpenPGP | Report + canary | Tor + Bitcoin / Litecoin | MEDIUM4 |
| Neomailbox | Undisclosed; Swiss law (provisional) | Switzerland | Optional browser OpenPGP | Report + stale canary | Bitcoin; minimal signup data | MEDIUM4 |
| Kolab Now | Switzerland | Switzerland | Optional webmail OpenPGP; server-held keys | Request reports | Identified paid account | MEDIUM5 |
| Mailbox.org | Germany | Germany | Optional Guard; server decryption | Request report | Tor + cash; pseudonyms | MEDIUM5 |
| CounterMail | Sweden | Sweden | Client-side OpenPGP; headers visible | No counted artifacts found | Invitation; cash-transfer route | MEDIUM6 |
| Eclipso | Germany | Germany | Optional device-side OpenPGP | Request report | Anonymous Freemail; Tor not stated | MEDIUM6 |
| Infomaniak kMail | Switzerland | Switzerland | Optional server-side OpenPGP | Notification commitment | Identity + phone required | MEDIUM6 |
| mail.de | Germany | Germany | Optional Mailvelope / inbound public-key encryption | Request report | Anonymous free registration | MEDIUM6 |
| Posteo | Germany | Germany | Optional password-protected storage | Request report | Cash; no identity required | MEDIUM6 |
| StartMail | Netherlands | Netherlands | Optional PGP / password-protected vault | Request report | Bitcoin on annual plans | MEDIUM6 |
| Systemli | Germany | Germany (provisional) | Password-protected storage; server decryption | Public disclosure promise; no counted artifacts | Free + Tor; invitation | MEDIUM6 |
| Vivaldi Mail | Norway | Iceland (provisional) | Optional server-side OpenPGP | No counted artifacts found | Free; recovery email + reputation | MEDIUM6 |
| GMX | Germany | Germany | Optional Mailvelope; metadata visible | Entity-level request report | Identifying signup data | MEDIUM8 |
| Hostpoint | Switzerland | Switzerland | None; provider-readable | No counted artifacts found | Identified paid account | MEDIUM8 |
| Inbox.eu | Latvia | Latvia | None; advertised feature is TLS | No counted artifacts found | Identity + phone required | MEDIUM8 |
| Migadu | Switzerland | France | None built in | No counted artifacts found | Bitcoin by arrangement | MEDIUM8 |
| Murena Mail | France | Finland + Germany backups | Optional Mailvelope | No counted artifacts found | Free; recovery email required | MEDIUM8 |
| Runbox | Norway | Norway | External PGP only | Request report | Cash / crypto; signup details | MEDIUM8 |
| WEB.DE | Germany | Germany | Optional Mailvelope; metadata visible | Entity-level request report | Identity + phone required | MEDIUM8 |
| Disroot | Netherlands | Netherlands | External PGP only | No counted artifacts found | Free; confirmation email | HIGH9 |
| Mailo | France | France | Optional OpenPGP | No counted artifacts found | Name + date of birth requested | HIGH9 |
| Riseup | USA | USA (provisional) | Password-protected storage; server decryption | Published canary | Free + Tor; invitation | HIGH9 |
| Seeweb | Italy | Italy; European facilities | Optional webmail PGP | No counted artifacts found | Business identity required | HIGH9 |
| Forward Email | USA | USA | Password-encrypted database; server decryption | Notification commitment | Paid; USDC via Stripe | HIGH11 |
| Gandi Mail | France | France + Luxembourg | External encryption only | DSA report | Identified paid account | HIGH11 |
| iCloud Mail | USA configuration | International, including USA | Optional S/MIME in Apple Mail | Reports + notice with exceptions | Phone + accurate signup data | HIGH11 |
| Iroco | France | France | External PGP only | No counted artifacts found | Tor blocked; SEPA + identity | HIGH11 |
| Thexyz | Canada | Classic: USA; current Email: Canada marketed | Scored Classic: optional Mailvelope | No counted artifacts found | Crypto announced; identity recorded | HIGH11 |
| Zoho Mail | USA configuration | USA configuration | Optional S/MIME on Mail Premium | Notification commitment | Identified paid configuration | HIGH11 |
| Combell | Belgium | Belgium + Netherlands | None; disk encryption only | No counted artifacts found | Identified paid account | HIGH12 |
| Fastmail | Australia | US copies; optional NL primary | External PGP / S/MIME only | Report + notification | Paid; no anonymous route documented | HIGH12 |
| Gmail | USA configuration | Worldwide, including USA | None in consumer Gmail | Reports + notice with exceptions | Free; phone sometimes required | HIGH12 |
| Raidboxes | Germany | Germany marketed; provisional | PGP advertised; custody unverified | No counted artifacts found | Identified paid account | HIGH12 |
| Soverin | Netherlands | Netherlands | None for live mailbox | No counted artifacts found | Phone required | HIGH12 |
| HEY | USA | USA | Provider-held database keys | Notification; retired canary | Card + name + backup email | HIGH13 |
| Lavabit | USA | USA (provisional) | Optional storage encryption | No counted artifacts found | Requirements not established | HIGH13 |
| Outlook.com | USA configuration | International, including USA | Provider-managed message protection | Reports + notice with exceptions | Accurate signup data required | HIGH13 |
| PrivateMail | USA | USA | Optional client-side OpenPGP | Explicit non-notification | Crypto, including Monero | HIGH13 |
| Rackspace Email | USA | USA (provisional) | None; provider-readable | Historical report + notification | Card billing | HIGH13 |
| Titan | Cayman Islands; Singapore law | USA (provisional) | None; provider-readable | No counted artifacts found | Partner-dependent billing | HIGH13 |
| Hushmail | Canada; US parent | Canada | Server-side PGP in webmail | Explicit non-notification | Card billing | HIGH14 |
| MXroute | USA | USA (provisional) | None documented | No counted artifacts found | Cards / PayPal | HIGH14 |
| Mythic Beasts | UK | UK | None; subject lines logged | No counted artifacts found | Identified paid account | HIGH14 |
| Namecheap Private Email | USA | USA (provisional) | None documented | Notice for covered EEA transfers | Bitcoin; accurate signup details | HIGH14 |
| PolarisMail | Canada | Canada | Optional server-side S/MIME | Disclosure without notice permitted | Identified paid account | HIGH14 |
| Purelymail | USA | USA | Conditional password protection | No counted artifacts found | Phone for trial; Stripe billing | HIGH14 |
| Yahoo Mail | USA configuration | International, including USA | None; content analysis permitted | Reports + notice with exceptions | Phone verification required | HIGH14 |
| AOL Mail | USA; Italian parent | USA assumption; countries undisclosed | None; AI-provider sharing permitted | Historical report; no notice found | Name; phone/email verification | CRITICAL15 |
Proton Mail protects stored message bodies and attachments with zero-access encryption, but subjects and routing metadata remain accessible to the provider. cock.li illustrates why the total needs that qualification: favorable geography and anonymous access can offset the absence of zero-access encryption. Its disk-seizure history also shows that an operator outside an intelligence alliance can still face cross-border legal demands.
Mailbox.org supports encrypted mail through Guard, whose server decrypts messages during use. mail.de offers optional Mailvelope and public-key inbound encryption. Posteo protects its storage key with the account password while preserving ordinary IMAP access. Check both key custody and activation steps; an available feature does not describe every message in a default account.
iCloud Mail supports optional S/MIME in Apple Mail, while ordinary stored mail remains accessible to Apple. Fastmail, Gmail, Outlook.com and Yahoo Mail publish government-request information and notification policies without making ordinary stored mail inaccessible to their operators. AOL Mail republishes a historical report but has no verified current notification commitment. The profiles keep those tradeoffs visible; company-wide request counts are not directly comparable with mailbox-only totals.
Provider profiles
Each provider has a short verdict, a collapsible score breakdown, and a separate evidence section. Optional features and provisional jurisdiction assignments are identified in the breakdown.
Proton Mail
Privacy Impact: LOW3
Proton protects stored message bodies and attachments from provider access. Subject lines remain visible, and ordinary mail exchanged with other providers needs PGP or password protection for end-to-end encryption.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Proton Mail, operated by Proton AG, Geneva, Switzerland; primary shareholder is the non-profit Proton Foundation
- URL:
proton.me/mail - HQ jurisdiction: Switzerland (outside 14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Switzerland, Germany and Norway; the latter two receive the same hosting penalty as other German- and Norwegian-hosted providers OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Stored message bodies and attachments; subject lines and routing metadata remain accessible to Proton. Ordinary external mail is not end-to-end encrypted unless PGP or password-protected mail is used GOOD0
- Government-access posture: Annual transparency report; the cited policy assigns judicial notification to Swiss authorities, not Proton. No provider notification commitment or warrant canary is credited here BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Tor onion site for signup; no personal data required; Bitcoin, bank transfer, and cash all accepted GOOD0
- Funding stability: Non-profit foundation as primary shareholder; operating since 2014; explicitly “no VC, no exit” structure GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Proton AG at Route de la Galaise 32, 1228 Plan-les-Ouates, Geneva, Switzerland. Privacy policy: “The Services are operated by Proton AG (the ‘Company’, ‘We’), domiciled at Route de la Galaise 32, 1228 Plan-les-Ouates, Geneva, Switzerland.” Source: Proton Privacy Policy [archive].
European hosting. The hosting locations cited for this comparison are Switzerland, Germany and Norway. Switzerland and Norway are outside the EU. The hosting score includes Germany and Norway, independently of Proton’s Swiss headquarters. Source: Proton Mail Privacy Policy [archive].
Zero-access storage has a defined scope. Proton protects stored message bodies and attachments, including ordinary incoming mail after processing it. Its support page states: “Subject lines in Proton Mail messages are not end-to-end encrypted”. Subjects remain accessible to Proton; ordinary external mail also lacks end-to-end protection unless the correspondents use PGP or password-protected messages. Source: How Proton Mail messages are encrypted [archive].
Transparency report and notification. Proton reports 9,301 Mail legal orders in 2025, of which it contested 988. Foreign authorities must use Swiss legal-assistance procedures. The general privacy policy assigns notification to the authorities; that is not a commitment by Proton to notify the user. Sources: Transparency report [archive] and Proton Privacy Policy [archive].
Tor + anonymous signup. Privacy policy: “It is not necessary to provide personal information in order to create an Account.” Onion signup: “you can now sign up for your Proton account directly on our onion site, making it even easier for anyone to use Tor to bypass censorship and set up a Proton account.” Source: Updated Tor site [archive]. Payments: “Aside from Payment card and PayPal, you can pay for a Proton subscription with Bitcoin, Bank transfer, and even Cash.” Source: Manage payment methods [archive].
IP logs minimized. “By default, we do not keep permanent IP logs in relation with your Account.” Kept temporarily for spam/abuse, or permanently if user opts in to authentication logging. Backups retained max 30 days. Account deletion: “Your account and all its data will be permanently deleted from our systems.”
DPA available for business accounts. “Proton Mail has a Data Processing Agreement (DPA) with business users detailing the specific rights and obligations of each party, as required for GDPR compliance.” GDPR Article 27 representative: Proton Europe sàrl, Luxembourg. Source: Business GDPR [archive].
Non-profit foundation structure. “Proton services are operated by Proton AG, a Swiss corporation whose primary shareholder is the non-profit Proton Foundation based in Geneva, Switzerland.” Founded 2014 after a public crowdfund of $500k+ from 10,000 backers; “We do not have venture capital investors, and our non-profit structure requires us to permanently put people before profits while protecting against takeover attempts.” Source: About [archive] and Foundation [archive].
Tuta
Privacy Impact: LOW3
Tuta encrypts stored mail, including subject lines, and supports free registration over Tor. End-to-end protection for outside recipients requires its shared-password workflow. You must use Tuta’s clients; it does not provide IMAP or POP access.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Tuta (formerly Tutanota), operated by Tutao GmbH, Hanover, Germany
- URL:
tuta.com - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany (ISO 27001 data centers) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Default encrypted storage for bodies, attachments and subject lines, plus calendars and contacts. Messages between Tuta users are end-to-end encrypted; outside recipients need the shared-password workflow for that protection. Sender/recipient addresses remain visible GOOD0
- Government-access posture: Bi-annual transparency report; explicit warrant canary (never received NSL/FISA/gag order); no explicit user-notification commitment OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Free tier: no personal information or billing identity required; Tor registration supported. Paid upgrades also have a third-party cash/crypto gift-card route through Proxystore GOOD0
- Funding stability: Founded 2011; “wholly owned by Matthias and Arne” (the founders); no outside investors GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Tutao GmbH at Deisterstr. 17a, 30449 Hanover, Germany; German GmbH, register HRB 208014 Hanover. Source: Imprint [archive].
German hosting. “All data in Tuta is stored end-to-end encrypted on our own servers in ISO 27001 certified data centers in Germany.” Source: GDPR-compliant email [archive].
Subject lines encrypted too. Business page: “Our encryption protects your emails, attachments, and subject lines as well as calendars and contacts.” Privacy policy: “All user data is stored end-to-end encrypted in Tuta (except for email addresses of users as well as senders and recipients of emails).” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Bi-annual transparency report + warrant canary. “Tuta (formerly Tutanota) has never received any National Security Letters or FISA court orders, and we have not been subject to any gag order by a FISA court. We have never placed any backdoors to our encryption and have not received any requests to do so.” And: “The Transparency Report is updated every six months. The warrant canary is always up to date. If there was any request stated above, we would immediately take down the canary.” Source: Transparency report [archive]. No explicit user-notification clause found.
Minimal IP logging. “By default, Tuta does not log IP addresses when you login or when you send an email.” Mail-server logs retained 7 days but contain “no customer IP addresses”.
Tuta permits free registration without a phone number or other personal information, including over Tor. That free configuration meets both signup criteria in this comparison. Direct paid billing uses card, PayPal or SEPA; Tuta also documents cash and cryptocurrency purchases of gift cards through Proxystore. The reseller route is separate from direct checkout. Sources: Privacy Policy [archive]. See Anonymous email: Create an email address without a phone number archives: 1, 2.
Outside recipients can read end-to-end encrypted mail through Tuta’s shared-password workflow. Ordinary SMTP exchanges do not have that protection. No IMAP/POP: explicit choice. “We do not offer IMAP as it would only work if we sent decrypted data to your device. Instead we have built our own open source desktop clients, which store your data encrypted.” Source: Security [archive].
TOTP + U2F hardware key. “Yes, Tuta supports two-factor authentication with U2F and TOTP.” No SMS 2FA documented.
DPA available. “Tuta provides an Order Processing Agreement with legally binding data protection guarantees to help you demonstrate your compliance with GDPR.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Founder-owned, bootstrapped since 2011. “Tutao GmbH, the company behind Tuta, was founded in 2011 by Arne Möhle and Matthias Pfau who knew each other from studying together at FHWD university in Hanover, Germany. To this day, the company is wholly owned by Matthias and Arne, and is not liable to anyone else.” Source: Tutanota not a honeypot [archive].
cock.li
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM4
Free mail with Tor access and no required real-world identity. The operator can read stored messages, and the jurisdiction and hosting assignments rely on historical statements and network evidence.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: cock.li; no legal entity is named in any cock.li document; the transparency report is signed “Vincent Canfield”
- URL:
cock.li - HQ jurisdiction: Provisional: Seychelles, outside 5/9/14 Eyes. The jurisdiction appears exactly once in the provider’s own material, in the 2022Q1 transparency report: “cock.li received and responded to two verified orders for user metadata enforceable in our jurisdiction (Seychelles)”. The Terms of Service contain no choice-of-law clause at all, only a ban on “Conducting any activity that breaks the laws in which cock.li is governed” GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Not stated by the provider, whose only hardware claim is “Cock.li owns 100% of its server hardware”. Both MX records resolve to
37.120.193.125, which RIPE registers as M247-Serbia, “M247 Ltd Belgrade”, country RS; the web host sits at193.239.85.202in RO-M247RO, country RO. Serbia and Romania are both outside 5/9/14 Eyes, but the network records do not establish physical storage or backup locations GOOD0 - Zero-access encryption: None, and refused as a category. Front page: “Cock.li doesn’t read or scan your e-mail content in any way, but it’s possible for any e-mail provider to read your e-mail, so you’ll just have to take our word for it.” Full-disk encryption defends the disks against removal, not the mail against the operator, and PGP is recommended but entirely user-supplied, with no webmail integration of the kind GMX ships BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Two of three. A public directory of received legal process plus a PGP-signed warrant canary, but no user-notification commitment anywhere, and a privacy policy that is unqualified about compliance: “Cock.li complies with every legal order for user information under the jurisdictions which are applicable.” Both published artifacts have drifted well past their own stated cadence OK+1
- Anonymous signup: “Cock.li does not require personally identifiable information to register for the service”, with onion services published for HTTP and separately for webmail, IMAP, POP and XMPP, and the explicit guidance “To avoid providing cock.li personal information, use Tor or a VPN, and follow basic OPSEC guidelines.” The service is free, so there is no payment trail to anonymize in the first place GOOD0
- Funding stability: Donation-funded and independent since 2013, never sold, no advertising, and by its own account no one paid for the first eleven years. Thirteen years clears the rubric’s ten-year bar, though the winter of 2024 was a self-declared near-death GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
One jurisdiction, no entity, no governing law. cock.li names no company anywhere on its site. The single jurisdictional statement it publishes is in the PGP-signed transparency report: “In Q1 2022 (-ish) cock.li received and responded to two verified orders for user metadata enforceable in our jurisdiction (Seychelles) on behalf of French authorities.” Source: cock.li transparency report, 2022Q1 [archive]. The Terms of Service, last modified 2018-05-19, have no choice-of-law, venue or arbitration clause; the closest they come is the ban list entry “Conducting any activity that breaks the laws in which cock.li is governed” and the disclaimer “This service is provided as-is with no warranty, express or implied.” Source: Terms of Service [archive]. Like Neomailbox, this service leaves the operator’s legal identity difficult to establish from its published documents.
Hosting inferred from network registration. No cock.li page states where the servers are. Resolving the service on 2026-09-01 puts both mx1.cock.li and mx2.cock.li at 37.120.193.125, in a RIPE inetnum registered netname: M247-Serbia, descr: M247 Ltd Belgrade, country: RS, and cock.li itself at 193.239.85.202, netname: RO-M247RO, country: RO. These records identify address allocations. They do not establish where mailbox disks, proxies or backups physically sit. Serbia and Romania are the provisional hosting assumptions used here; both sit outside the named intelligence alliances. Hosting was German until roughly 2016, which the seizure record below dates for us.
Zero-access encryption is not offered, and the refusal is argued. The front page states: “You can’t. Cock.li doesn’t read or scan your e-mail content in any way, but it’s possible for any e-mail provider to read your e-mail, so you’ll just have to take our word for it. No ’encrypted e-mail’ provider is preventing this: even if they encrypt incoming mail before storing it, the provider still receives the e-mail in plaintext first, meaning you’re only protected if you assume no one was reading or copying the e-mail as it came in.” The recommendation that follows is user-side: “When possible, you should use X.509 or GPG with your mail correspondents”, plus “You should also download and delete your mail from our servers regularly, which alone is almost as good as encrypting your mail.” Source: cock.li home [archive]. What does exist is disk-level: “Cock.li owns 100% of its server hardware and your information is encrypted server-side at all times”, and transport is best-effort, not guaranteed: “If an E-mail is sent through cock.li to a mail server that it cannot establish a TLS connection with … this E-mail will be transmitted over the internet without encryption.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
December 2018: an order arrived, and only ciphertext left. cock.li’s status page, now offline and readable only in the archive, logged the event as it happened: “All web, mail, and XMPP services are down due to an ongoing legal search order. Services will remain offline until the activities have finished. Thanks to full disk encryption on every server, no user data is at risk.” The follow-up of 2018-12-20 names the instrument: “Some time during the week of 9 December, Cock.li’s datacenter received an EIO from the Romanian government, at the behest of the German government. The order demanded a mirror image of Cock.li’s disks, which was executed by the datacenter.” The datacenter pulled one disk at a time to mirror the array without downtime, crashed the server, and cock.li at first read it as a hardware fault. Its closing update states: “Due to cock.li’s security setup which includes full-disk encryption on every server, no user data was at risk at any time. Only encrypted data was recovered.” Source: cock.li Status Page, incident of 2018-12-13 [archive]. The host received the order, and cock.li learned of it afterwards. Autistici/Inventati reported a similar sequence in 2004.
December 2015: the same kind of order, before the encryption. Three years earlier, after a hoax bomb threat sent through the service closed the Los Angeles schools, German authorities took a disk from cock.li’s Hetzner server in Bavaria. Joseph Cox, reporting for Motherboard on 2015-12-21, quotes Hetzner’s message to the operator, “We have a confiscation order for the disks of your server, but we were allowed to leave one of them installed, due to the fact that you have a Raid1 setup”, and Vincent Canfield’s assessment of what was on it: “They literally have the SSL private keys of cock.li and all mail content.” Source: Joseph Cox, *Cock.li Email Server Seized After LA Bomb Scare, Admin Says*, Motherboard, 2015-12-21 [archive]. cock.li moved off German hosting and adopted full-disk encryption after this. These incidents document different outcomes before and after cock.li adopted full-disk encryption. They do not establish how it would respond to every future demand.
A transparency archive and a canary, both behind their own schedules. cock.li publishes the orders themselves rather than a statistics page. The /transparency/ index lists twelve folders of received process dated 2015-11-03 to 2018-05-29, one of them named 2018-05-29-oij-subpoena-REJECTED, alongside the single quarterly report file dated 2022-04-09. That report promised a cadence: “Moving forward cock.li will continue disclosing any enforceable legal orders in either direct publish or this quarterly report format.” Nothing has been added since. The canary is PGP-signed and carries a Bitcoin block hash for freshness, stating “Cock.li has never received a legal order enforceable in its jurisdiction for user data”, and setting its own rule: “Until further notice, THIS CANARY SHOULD BE UPDATED EVERY 72 HOURS. Under no circumstances should we let this canary go 96 hours without an update.” Retrieved on 2026-09-01 it was still stamped “20 August 2026 13:43:36 UTC”, twelve days into a ninety-six-hour limit. Source: Warrant Canary [archive]. cock.li pre-empts the reading itself: “Failure to update this canary does not mean cock.li has received a gag order.” Both artifacts count toward the score because both are published; a reader who treats a lapsed canary as no canary should count one artifact here instead of two and score accordingly. What is missing outright is any notification commitment: no page promises to tell an affected account holder anything, and the law-enforcement section of the abuse page is still marked under construction.
Signup requires no real-world identity, but logs remain. “Cock.li does not require personally identifiable information to register for the service. To avoid providing cock.li personal information, use Tor or a VPN, and follow basic OPSEC guidelines.” Registration keeps an address, a hashed password, an IP, a user agent and timestamps; connection logs are “48-72 hours of IMAP and SMTP log information”; HTTP access logs carry IP and user agent with no stated retention period. Erasure deletes registration data after a 30-day security hold, keeping only the address string to stop re-registration and to purge restores. There are no password resets: the Terms devote a section to the subject whose entire body is the word “NONE.” Both quotes from the Privacy Policy and Terms above. Because the service is free there is no billing identity at all, which is a structurally different thing from Proton Mail’s cash option: nothing is anonymized because nothing is collected.
Thirteen years, two wallets, and one near-death. cock.li has been “mostly alive since 2013” and reports “User count: 1M+”. Funding is two published crypto wallets: SERVICESAFU for operating costs, TEAMSAFU for the people, described as “cock.li’s operating expense and rainy day fund” and a way “supporting the people that develop and maintain cock.li”. Source: Donate [archive]. On 2024-11-12 the service declared a RED ALERT: “A combination of these illegal tactics have become so serious that the site is now in grave danger”, from a “small team of 3-5 people” of whom “no one directly involved has ever been paid in 11 years”. It fell to orange on 2024-12-16 and to green on 2025-04-04. The funding score measures ownership and duration. The alert describes an operational risk that the score does not measure. Financial reporting has also been dropped: “After failing to provide these updates for a few years, we eventually decided that because the successful management of this fund is obvious on the ‘block chain’, public reports are redundant and unnecessary extra work.”
One thing that was not a seizure. In June 2025 two tables from cock.li’s retired Roundcube webmail database were stolen and offered for sale, covering "~1,023,800 users, everyone that logged into webmail since 2016" plus roughly 93,000 contact entries. cock.li states that passwords, message contents and IP addresses were not in the leak, attributes the flaw to a Roundcube version it had long since left behind, and pulled the software entirely: “Cock.li will no longer be offering Roundcube webmail.” Its update states: “Cock.li should not have been running Roundcube in the first place.” Source: Service Update Log [archive]. This is an application compromise rather than a government-access event, so it does not touch the score, and shows why storage encryption and webmail security need separate assessment.
Mailfence
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM4
Belgian mail with optional OpenPGP encryption in the browser. Encrypted private keys are stored in the account, while ordinary messages and mail metadata remain accessible to the service.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Mailfence, operated by Mailfence - ContactOffice Group sa, Brussels, Belgium (BE 0466.241.584)
- URL:
mailfence.com - HQ jurisdiction: Belgium (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Belgium: “Our servers are located in Belgium (Europe) and we have full control over them. We do not use an intermediary or subcontractor to manage them and we do not allow any third-party access.” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in OpenPGP in the browser for bodies and attachments. The server stores a passphrase-encrypted private key; that does not itself give Mailfence the decryption key. Subjects and routing metadata remain visible OK+1
- Government-access posture: Biannual transparency report at transparency-report-and-warrant-canary [archive] (Jan 2026 update covering H2 2025: 21 user-identification requests, 9 disclosed per valid Belgian court orders; 249/114 cumulative since launch); explicit warrant canary (“Mailfence being a Belgian company, cannot receive and has never received any US National Security Letters or FISA court orders … We have never placed any backdoors in our hardware or software”, last updated April 9 2026); no explicit written commitment to notify users when legally allowed; only the observation that “Belgium does not have any equivalent to the US NSL (National Security Letter) and gag order”. Two of three → OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Tor explicitly supported (“Can I use Tor browser to access Mailfence webmail? Yes.”) but no .onion service (a 2017 plan stated “we do plan to provide a Tor hidden service. However, this currently is not in our priority list.”; still not shipped 9 years later); Bitcoin + Litecoin + PayPal + wire transfer accepted (no cash); external recovery email + chosen username required, no real-name verification (“do not use your first name or last name for your username or email address” is the provider’s own anonymity guidance). GOOD0
- Funding stability: ContactOffice Group SA founded 1999, Mailfence product launched November 2013; bootstrapped: “We are not a traditional startup with a high burn rate. Nor do we have third-party financial investors that want to make profit by forcing us to sell our company”; dual revenue (Mailfence subscriptions + white-label licensing to “more than 600.000 accounts” at universities and corporations); 15% of Ultra-tier revenue donated to EFF and European Digital Rights. GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Mailfence - ContactOffice Group sa, Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 47b, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium (BE 0466.241.584). ToS: “the secure email service Mailfence, referred to as the ‘Service’, provided by: Mailfence - ContactOffice Group sa Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 47b B-1050 Brussels - Belgium BE 0466.241.584”. Privacy policy: “Mailfence is a service provided by the Belgian company ContactOffice Group SA and as such it is subject to Belgian law.” Sources: Terms [archive] and Privacy [archive].
Belgian servers, fully self-operated. Secure-email page: “Locally hosted and total control over our servers — Our servers are located in Belgium (Europe) and we have full control over them. We do not use an intermediary or subcontractor to manage them and we do not allow any third-party access.” Source: Secure email [archive].
Belgian law, Brussels courts. ToS: “This agreement is governed by Belgian law. The courts located in Brussels, Belgium shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise.” Source: Terms [archive].
Encryption-at-rest model and OpenPGP scope. Encryption-at-rest blog (Feb 4 2025): “While lots of applications implemented block-level encryption (or full-disk encryption), we opted for store-level encryption. … even when mounting (i.e. turning on) the server hard drive, all user data remains encrypted. It is only when a user calls an email (or file.) that that specific data is decrypted; store-level encryption allows for advanced key management with more control (multiple keys for multiple stores).” Threat model: “to prevent a strong adversary from cracking-down a private key, the default length of every generated key pair has been set to 4096 bits (generated with strong entropy).” Homepage: “Encryption happens in the browser. It is impossible for anyone (including us) to read your emails along the line. Fully inter-operable with any OpenPGP service.” But the metadata gap is explicit: “your email provider and Mailfence know when the emails were sent to or from you, as well as other meta-data (to/from email addresses, messages subjects and sizes, IP addresses, etc.).” Sources: Encryption at rest [archive], Threat model [archive], Mailfence [archive], FAQ [archive].
Biannual transparency report; warrant canary. Transparency post: “this information will be updated every half year” and Jan 2026 latest update: “Between the 1st of July 2025 and 31st of December 2025, Mailfence has: 1. received requests for user identification in 21 cases. 2. provided user identification because of a valid Belgium court order in 9 case.” Cumulative through 30 June 2025: “received requests for user identification in 228 cases. provided user identification because of a valid Belgium court order in 105 cases.” Warrant canary on the same page: “Although a gag order is legally not possible in Belgium, we still publish a warrant canary. Mailfence being a Belgian company, cannot receive and has never received any US National Security Letters or FISA court orders. We also have not been subject to any gag order by a FISA court. Finally, we have never placed any backdoors in our hardware or software and have not received any requests to do so.” (last updated April 9, 2026). Source: Transparency report and warrant canary [archive]. No standalone user-notification commitment; the ToS only states: “The Service will not monitor, edit or disclose any personal information about you (including your credit card information) or your use of the Service, including its contents, without your prior permission unless required by the Belgian laws.”
Tor + crypto + minimal-identity signup. FAQ: “Can I use Tor browser to access Mailfence webmail? Yes.” Anonymous-email blog: “you can easily access your Mailfence account through Tor … Emails sent using Mailfence webmail do not include the source IP address (X-Originating-IP) for privacy reasons. When you sign up and/or log in via Tor, Mailfence (or other intermediaries) will only see your Tor exit node (the last point in the anonymous communication chain). Your real IP address will not be exposed.” And: “When creating your email account, do not use any personal information. Do not use your first name or last name for your username or email address. Also, avoid using a recovery address that can be linked back to you.” Sources: FAQ [archive] and Send email anonymously [archive]. Payment methods: “Credit card (Visa and Eurocard/Mastercard) … Bitcoin. Litecoin. PayPal. Wire transfer: contact support for more information.” Cash is not accepted. No .onion hidden service exists; a 2017 staff reply (preserved on tor-talk mailing list, 2018-08): “Yes, we do plan to provide a Tor hidden service. However, this currently is not in our priority list.”
IP logging without published retention. Privacy policy: “We collect IP addresses, message-ID’s, sender and recipient addresses, subjects, browser versions, countries and timestamps.” No specific IP-log retention period is published; the only dated retention is the 45-day deleted-message backup: “We retain backups of deleted messages and documents for 45 days. … After 45 days, data will be permanently deleted from all our systems.” Source: Privacy [archive].
Account-deletion data retention. Privacy policy: “Account deletion — Should you close your account, all data will be permanently deleted 30 days after the legal expiration date (i.e. the Belgian law imposes 365 days after account closing). … We do not delete your account before the legal expiration date because users often ask to reopen their account after having closed it themselves.” Effective deletion timeline ~395 days. Inactivity rule: “Free accounts are suspended after 7 months of inactivity and totally deleted 5 months later. Paid accounts are not deleted as long as payments are received.”
Catch-all on custom domains; alias caps shared across domains. KB: “8. Optional: To set up a catch-all address for your domain, select any of the existing addresses in the catch-all column.” Catch-all is implemented by designating an existing user/alias as the destination for unmatched mail (not a wildcard alias entry). Domain caps: 2 custom domains on Entry, 7 on Pro, 10 on Ultra. Per-account alias caps: Base 10, Entry 50, Pro 100, Ultra 200. Sender-only configuration is supported: “After validation of DNS SPF and DKIM entries, if you prefer to use addresses based on your domain exclusively for sending emails, not for receiving, please go to your account Settings → Account → Personal Data → Edit and add the desired sender addresses.” Receive is all-or-nothing per domain: “All e-mails sent to any address of your domain name arrive on our servers: it’s not possible to transfer only certain selected addresses.” Sources: Custom-domain KB [archive], Custom-domain how-to [archive].
IMAP / SMTP / POP3 supported on paid tiers (Entry+). FAQ: “Paid accounts have POPS, IMAPS and SMTPS access. The settings are: POPS server: pop.mailfence.com … port: 995 (SSL); IMAPS server: imap.mailfence.com … port: 993 (SSL); Please note that simultaneous IMAP connections are limited to 20; SMTPS server: smtp.mailfence.com … port: 465 (SSL)”. Free and Base do not include IMAP/POP/SMTP. ActiveSync is supported on Entry, Pro, Ultra.
2FA: TOTP only. “The technical term is Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP).” Backup codes are generated at setup. WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware-key support and SMS 2FA are not documented. Source: 2FA [archive].
Mobile access. The 2021 launch blog (Jan 14 2021, Patrick De Schutter): “We are incredibly thrilled to announce that the Mailfence mobile app is officially going out of beta. Our mobile app was developed as a progressive web application (PWA).” Published in both the iOS App Store (id1628808776) and Google Play (com.contactoffice.mailfence).
DPA available; provider statement on keeping user data internally. GDPR page: “Mailfence Data Processing Agreement — In order for your organization to comply with GDPR, we provide a Data Processing Agreement.” And: “Mailfence has a strong policy to keep user data internally. We do not disclose any information to outside parties and do not use Google Analytics trackers.” Sources: GDPR [archive] and Secure email [archive].
ContactOffice Group since 1999; Mailfence since November 2013; bootstrapped. Company page: “We launched the company in 1999 and are among the pioneers of cloud software in Europe.” KB: “Mailfence is a service operated by ContactOffice Group sa. We are not a traditional startup with a high burn rate. Nor do we have third-party financial investors that want to make profit by forcing us to sell our company. We are in it for the long run.” Dual revenue stream: “To pay our bills, the team sells private label versions of its software to universities, service providers and corporations all over the world.” And: “we pledge to donate 15% of all income of the Ultra plan to foundations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the European Digital Rights Foundation.” Sources: Company [archive], Who are we KB [archive], FAQ [archive].
One disclosed regional incident. March 2020 Russian SMTP block: “Mailfence SMTP servers are gradually being blocked by Russian based email services. … Some weeks ago, we received an official request to Submit a Notice of Commencement of Collaboration with Roskomnadzor’s … Acknowledging their request would oblige us to provide information about our users, violating our Terms of Rule and the federal Belgian laws. We, therefore, did not respond to their request.” Source: Email servers blocked Russia [archive]. No customer-data breach documented.
Neomailbox
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM4
Swiss-hosted mail with optional browser-based OpenPGP and Bitcoin payment. The current terms do not establish incorporation or ownership. Its August 2026 canary was still overdue at the November check.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Neomailbox. The sole entity named on the site is Amadeus IT Solutions, in the Terms of Use. No address, canton, register number or officer is published anywhere, and the site has no About or Impressum page
- URL:
neomailbox.com - HQ jurisdiction: Provisional: Not disclosed by the provider. The ToS is “a binding legal agreement between you and Amadeus IT Solutions” governed by “the laws of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland”. That governing law is the provisional proxy here; it does not establish incorporation GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Switzerland, per “All Secure Email and Private Surfing accounts are hosted in Switzerland, an independent and high privacy jurisdiction” GOOD0
- Zero-access encryption: No default zero-access storage. Mailboxes sit on encrypted disks, and the webmail offers client-side OpenPGP as an opt-in; without it, “your email is protected from surveillance only while in transit between your email program and our servers” OK+1
- Government-access posture: A transparency page promising monthly updates, disclosing one release of customer information in the service’s lifetime and carrying explicit canary wording; no user-notification commitment appears in the Privacy Policy or ToS OK+1
- Anonymous signup: “We do not collect or require any Personal Information when you create an account”, and Bitcoin is accepted without mandatory personal signup details; transactions can still be linked; Tor is neither supported nor blocked in any provider document OK+1
- Funding stability: Ownership is unverified. The current terms name Amadeus IT Solutions but provide no registration details or shareholders; the private-ownership classification is provisional OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
One entity, named once. The Terms of Use open: “These Terms of Use (’the Terms’) are a binding legal agreement between you and Amadeus IT Solutions (‘Amadeus’, ‘we’, ‘us’, or ‘our’).” Governing law: “These Terms shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, without regard to its conflict of law provisions.” Source: Terms of Use [archive]. The Privacy Policy names no controller at all, opening only “This privacy policy sets out how Neomailbox collects, processes, and uses your Personal Information.” The Contact page offers support@neomailbox.com and nothing else: no postal address, no phone, no entity. Site navigation runs Overview, Services, FAQ, Blog, Contact, Terms, Privacy and Transparency, with no About or Impressum page in it.
Swiss hosting, OpenBSD, encrypted disks. “All Secure Email and Private Surfing accounts are hosted in Switzerland, an independent and high privacy jurisdiction” and “Hosted at a premium secure data center in Switzerland” on “Fast, load-balanced servers running OpenBSD”. The FAQ on storage: “Yes, all mailboxes are stored on encrypted disks on the servers. Thus, even if physical security to the servers was to be compromised, the attackers would not be able to get at any of the data on the disks as it is all encrypted.” The algorithm is not stated. Sources: Secure Email [archive] and FAQ [archive].
OpenPGP is opt-in, and the FAQ says what happens without it. The webmail “provides secure webmail access to your mailbox, including client-side OpenPGP encryption for end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging”, but the same FAQ is candid about the default: “your email is protected from surveillance only while in transit between your email program and our servers. If the message originated from or is sent to an address outside Neomailbox, then it may pass through the Internet as clear text, unless you use OpenPGP.”
A canary that has to be read for its date. The transparency page: “The following statement is true on August 1st, 2026: Neomailbox has in the past released customer information regarding one account to the Swiss authorities to aid in a criminal investigation. Except for this one instance, Neomailbox has never released customer data to any government agency or any other entity. This statement will be updated on the 1st of every month. Exercise caution if this page disappears, changes significantly in content, or is outdated.” Source: Transparency [archive]. Checked again on November 14, 2026, the page still carried the August 1 statement despite promising monthly updates. It is stale evidence of past disclosures, not a current assurance. The score counts the published report and canary under the artifact-counting rule below.
No personal data at signup; Bitcoin accepted. Privacy Policy: “We do not collect or require any Personal Information when you create an account” and “we also offer the option of payment via Bitcoin for increased customer privacy. If you subscribe using Bitcoin, you don’t have to reveal any personal details when signing up for a Neomailbox account.” The policy names PayPal and the retailer Lemon Squeezy, LLC as payment processors. Tor support is not documented. Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
SMTP logs can remain for six months. The Privacy Policy states: “We may keep logs of SMTP traffic for up to 6 months for performance analysis and abuse prevention. Anonymous surfing logs are wiped every 10 minutes.” Account-deletion retention is not stated. Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Domains are the provider’s, and the ToS says so. The ToS disclaims continuity for provider-owned addresses: Neomailbox “is not obligated in any way to provide continuity of access to an email address at any domain that is registered by Neomailbox”. A domain you own lets you move the address to another host. The same terms say Neomailbox does not keep regular mailbox backups, so recovery requires your own copies.
Kolab Now
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM5
Swiss-hosted groupware with optional webmail OpenPGP and a published request report. Its own documentation acknowledges server-held keys. Turning on TOTP authentication disables access through external mail and calendar protocols.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Kolab Now, operated by Apheleia IT AG (renamed from Kolab Systems AG on 2019-12-05), Bern, Switzerland (Trade register CH-036.3.053.227-3)
- URL:
kolabnow.com - HQ jurisdiction: Switzerland (outside 14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Switzerland: “The servers live in a rack in Bern, Switzerland, behind 3 sets of locks to which only Kolab Now employees has the key” GOOD0
- Zero-access encryption: Hardware-level at-rest encryption (“heavy set of hardware encrypted IBM storage canisters … this means that data at rest is encrypted”); webclient OpenPGP with server-stored keys, explicitly acknowledged as not true E2EE: “the webclient is letting the server hold a copy of the public / private keys … Providing true end-to-end encryption can only really be achieved by client encryption”. The stated server-side handling differs from browser-side OpenPGP with a passphrase-encrypted key backup. OK+1
- Government-access posture: Transparency report published as annual blog posts (cadence irregular: “For the sake of transparency we used to report on our interactions with authorities every year. Unfortunately we have missed a few of those reports”); Jan 13 2026 post covering 2025: “Administrative Requests: 5 … In 2025, we have received 5 such requests of which we rejected 1. Retroactive Metadata Requests: 0 … All Data Requests: 0 … Live Interception Requests: 0”; ToS clause “there will be no access to your data by third parties without a duly authorized warrant issued by a Swiss judge”; no warrant canary; no written notification commitment. One of three (just an irregular TR) → BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Tor support / blocking not stated anywhere on Kolab Now’s docs; Bitcoin suspended (“We suspended the possibility to pay via bitcoin a while ago and are still working on re-enabling it”); current payment is PayPal / credit card / bank transfer only; KB requires “name and optionally an address” for billing. BAD+2
- Funding stability: Operating since 2013 (“Operated in Switzerland since 2013”); corporate parent renamed from Kolab Systems AG to Apheleia IT AG on 2019-12-05; bootstrapped; ToS: “You are our customer. All of the Service is paid for by your monthly fee. There are no third party revenue streams, no selling of advertising or personal data” and KB: “The roadmap of kolab Now is laid out by the team. No venture capital investments.” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Swiss entity. ToS: “Welcome to Kolab Now, provided by Apheleia IT AG (‘we’), a software freedom company from Bern, Switzerland that is focused on the development of Open Source technologies for collaboration.” KB footer (every page): "© Apheleia IT AG 2019 - 2026 © Kolab Systems AG 2013 - 2019." Trade register listing on the open-source community site: “Apheleia IT AG Trade register CH-036.3.053.227-3”. Sources: Terms of Service [archive], FAQ [archive], kolab.org [archive].
Bern data center, Apheleia-controlled. KB: “Kolab Now is running on high-end equipment located in a data-center in Bern, Switzerland.” And: “The servers live in a rack in Bern, Switzerland, behind 3 sets of locks to which only Kolab Now employees has the key.” Homepage marketing: “Not in the ‘cloud’, but on our infrastructure, hosted right here in Switzerland.” Sources: What does Kolab Now run [archive], Kolab Now main page [archive].
Swiss law, Zurich courts. ToS: “These terms are subject and governed by the substantial laws of Switzerland with the exclusion of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods dated April 11, 1980. Disputes arising under or in connection with this Agreement shall be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Zurich, Switzerland. Mandatory legal venue for consumer contracts is reserved.” Source: Terms [archive].
At-rest encryption + explicit non-E2EE admission for webclient PGP. KB: “These hypervisors are ‘fat’ in that they each have quite a few CPU sockets with multi-core CPUs, and are fully stuffed with RAM. These are some enterprise-grade systems — they even come with a chassis, and they are connected to a heavy set of hardware encrypted IBM storage canisters (this means that data at rest is encrypted).” And the encryption KB summary: “Kolab Now has configured Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), data in transport is encrypted with SSL/TLS, and all systems are HMS encrypted.” On the webclient OpenPGP: “The web client provides the option of encrypting emails through PGP asymmetric keys. As other similar solutions, e.g. the use of browser add-ons like Mailvelope, the webclient is letting the server hold a copy of the public / private keys, which brings another level of security considerations into play. Providing true end-to-end encryption can only really be achieved by client encryption.” Specific symmetric-cipher / key-length details are not stated by Kolab Now’s primary pages. Sources: What does Kolab Now run [archive], Encryption KB [archive], Onboarding KB [archive].
IP-log retention. 2018 GDPR blog post: “we keep the following logs for up to six months (but no more) — think of this information as the same type of metadata a telecommunications provider would be required to retain. — Successful and unsuccessful login attempts, including source IP address, — Mail submissions, including source IP address, — Mail received, including sender address.” ToS reinforces: “We will only keep the minimum of logs and debug information necessary to ensure that we can improve the service and resolve issues that may have occurred.” Sources: Short-form GDPR compliance [archive], Terms [archive].
Account-deletion retention. GDPR blog post: “When data is deleted it can not be recovered. Please make sure that you have saved all data (messages, contacts, etc..) that you need before pressing the red button.” Residual record post-termination: “This data is reduced to a customer number and an anonymous version of the transaction (customer number and a UUID) at the point of termination of the account.” Specific retention window for the residual customer-number/UUID record is not stated.
Transparency report (annual blog posts, irregular cadence). Latest: “Administrative Requests: 5 … In 2025, we have received 5 such requests of which we rejected 1. Retroactive Metadata Requests: 0 … All Data Requests: 0 … Live Interception Requests: 0 … In 2025 we received zero such requests.” Cadence caveat: “For the sake of transparency we used to report on our interactions with authorities every year. Unfortunately we have missed a few of those reports.” No dedicated /transparency URL: reports live on the blog. Source: Transparency reporting 2026-01-13 [archive].
The withdrawn legal-framework page. Until at least August 2019 the site carried a page titled “The Swiss Legal Framework for Kolab Now” that explained the law behind these numbers: “we are subject to the surveillance framework 780.1 Bundesgesetz betreffend die Überwachung des Post- und Fernmeldeverkehrs (BÜPF) as part of Swiss telecommunications law.” It described three kinds of requests, and the transparency posts still report under these names. Administrative requests (“sometimes referred to as ’telephone book requests’”) can be made “to the provider directly by the police” and are “the only kind of request that does not require a judge to approve such a request”. Retroactive metadata rests on a statutory mandate, “Switzerland has a legal requirement for six months data retention by the provider”, the same six-month window as the log-retention block above, and requires police, prosecutor and judge to agree. Live interception follows the same path. The page also pointed at Swiss law’s own “requirement to notify you in case you have been the target of any such request”, a statutory rule rather than a provider commitment. It was removed in the site’s 2020 rebuild (the URL returned a 404 by February 2020 and later only a JavaScript shell without the text) and it returns a 404 today, so it documents what the provider once said, not a current commitment. Quotes are from the last capture holding the text. Source: The Swiss Legal Framework for Kolab Now, 2019-08-20 Wayback capture .
No notification commitment in writing; ToS narrower than blog claim. Blog reassurance: “Our terms of service state there’s basically no way for anyone to get any access to your data without us also being able to talk about the fact it happened.” But what the ToS actually says is narrower: “there will be no access to your data by third parties without a duly authorized warrant issued by a Swiss judge”, i.e. a Swiss-warrant requirement, not a user-notification commitment. No clause explicitly commits Kolab Now to notify users when legally allowed. No warrant canary on the site.
Tor: not stated. Bitcoin: suspended. No statement about Tor support or blocking on Kolab Now’s pages. KB Payment System: “you can make payments to Kolab Now using PayPal, Credit Card and Bank transfers.” Blog (2020): “We suspended the possibility to pay via bitcoin a while ago and are still working on re-enabling it. The first iteration of the new HKCCP will not include support for bitcoin payments but it lays the technical foundation to do so with a reasonable investment of development resources.” Cash not mentioned. Sources: Payment system [archive], Future of Kolab Now Part II [archive].
Signup identifying data. Blog (2018): “this typically still leaves your record of purchase, in the form of the account information you provided such as your name and optionally an address.” Onboarding KB: “In the Personal information tab the external email address needs to be set what is important in case you ever forget your password.” Whether truthful-name verification is enforced is not stated.
Custom domains + catch-all. Pricing KB: “As it was before with the group accounts, the first private domain in the new, unified account type is free. For each extra added domain, there is a fee of CHF 0.50 pr. domain/month.” MX takeover required: “MX records contain information about the receiving email servers for the domain. Since your groupware is hosted with Kolab Now, the following MX records should be considered for your domains: MX 10 mx01.kolabnow.com. MX 10 mx02.kolabnow.com.” External-domain aliases forbidden: “Kolab Now supports the use of multiple aliases and identities, however we do not allow external aliases from domains that are not linked to our servers, or domains that are not under our users’ control (e.g. gmail.com, hotmail.com or yahoo.com).” Catch-all is a per-domain manual single-address alias: “If you are using your private domain, you can create a catch-all yourself by logging in to the Cockpit. Create an alias for the desired user account that you want to receive all mails with. Use catchall@yourdomain.tld and repeat for any additional domains you may have associated with your Kolab Now account.” Sources: Pricing FAQ [archive], DNS settings [archive], Aliases [archive], Catch-all [archive].
IMAP / SMTP / POP3 + DAV + ActiveSync. KB: “Yes, Kolab Now provide POP3 access, although we advice users to connect via IMAP.” ToS: “The standard package includes SSL secured access via HTTP, POP, IMAP, CalDAV, CardDAV, and WebDAV. Optionally, users can also connect their mobile devices via ActiveSync.” Source: Does Kolab Now provide POP3 [archive].
2FA is TOTP-only AND disables all non-web clients. “2FA at Kolab Now involves the password prompt and a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) algorithm. The preferred provider of the TOTP is Aegis Authenticator … For iOS users … TOTP Authenticator.” And the gotcha: “User accounts that have 2FA enabled in the subscription will only be able to use the web client. All other clients will be blocked at the IMAP, POP, ActiveSync, CalDAV, CardDAV and WebDAV level.” WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware-key support not documented; SMS is referenced only as a possible future per-action confirmation, not as a 2FA factor. Source: Two-factor authentication [archive].
Migration via Audriga partner. KB: “Moving your current emails and data to Kolab Now can be done with the help of our partner, Audriga. … The prices for the migration are as follows: 8 CHF per box/user for email migration only (fully automatic) 15 CHF per box/user for full groupware migration (assisted, timing depends on availability). Alternatively, you could move all your existing mail to Kolab Now yourself using the IMAP protocol.” Source: Migration KB [archive].
Pricing (May 2026, post-March-2025 unification). Per KB pricing table: “User Mailbox (incl. 5 GB storage) – 5.00 CHF/month; Groupware features add-on – 4.90 CHF/month; ActiveSync add-on – Free; Added storage (per 1 GB) – 0.25 CHF/month; Shared folder – 1.00 CHF/month; Distribution list – 1.00 CHF/month; Extra domain (first domain free) – 0.50 CHF/month”. Trial only: “All Kolab Now accounts are free for the first month.” Wallet-based billing: “When a payment is due, the amount of the payment due will be deducted from your account balance.” Sources: Pricing FAQ [archive], Future of Kolab Now Part II [archive].
No native mobile app: standards-based. Homepage: “Synchronize Email, Contacts, Calendars and Tasks with Android & iPhone · Use third party clients such as Thunderbird, Outlook, eM-Client, Apple Mail, Apple Calendar”. ActiveSync + CalDAV + CardDAV + IMAP only.
Operating since 2013; subscriber-funded; no VC. ToS effective-date footer: “Since: 2013-07-25 — Updated to replace MyKolab.com by Kolab Now on 2015-01-26 — Updated to replace Kolab Systems AG with Apheleia IT AG on 2019-12-05”. Funding posture: “You are our customer. All of the Service is paid for by your monthly fee. There are no third party revenue streams, no selling of advertising or personal data.” And: “The roadmap of kolab Now is laid out by the team. No venture capital investments.” Recent operational events disclosed publicly: March 2026 hardware migration to new Bern servers (completed Mar 24 2026 with minor cert/DNS issues); March 3 2026 outbound-spam incident from compromised user accounts; Nov 6 2024 hypervisor reboot; Jan 17 2022 four-hour CalDAV/CardDAV/WebDAV outage from misconfigured log rotation. No customer-data breach disclosed; no shutdowns. Sources: Migration day [archive], What's going on [archive].
Mailbox.org
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM5
German mail with pseudonymous signup and cash payment. Guard encryption is optional and decrypts messages on the server during use; it does not keep plaintext away from an active provider session.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: mailbox.org, operated by Heinlein Hosting GmbH, Berlin, Germany
- URL:
mailbox.org - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany (Berlin data centers) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in Guard PGP/S/MIME; the private key is stored encrypted on the server and Guard decrypts messages server-side during use. Incoming-mail encryption requires configuration OK+1
- Government-access posture: Public transparency report (annual, since 2021); no explicit user-notification commitment found; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Operator-run Tor exit node + Tor hidden service; pseudonyms accepted at signup; cash-by-post, SEPA, PayPal, bank transfer GOOD0
- Funding stability: Family business, self-funded since 1992, no acquisition history GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Heinlein Hosting GmbH at Schwedter Straße 8/9B, 10119 Berlin, Germany (per the Data Protection Notice [archive] and imprint [archive]).
German hosting, no foreign transfers. Pricing page: “Server location in Germany … We operate our services exclusively in redundant data centres in Berlin”. Source: mailbox.org/en/prices/ [archive].
Guard decrypts on the server. The activation guide states: “Received encrypted messages are decrypted on the server, provided you possess the private key.” A separate password protects the stored private key. This is server-side PGP under this rubric; using a local client with a private key kept off the service is a different configuration. Source: Activating mailbox Guard [archive].
Tor + anonymous signup. KB: “To open a mailbox account, we require you to provide a first and last name. However, since we do not verify this information at any point, you may choose any pseudonym.” Source: kb.mailbox.org/…/anonymous-new-registration/ [archive]. Plus: “To support anonymous Internet usage … we operate our own Tor exit node in our data center” and a v3 onion service for SMTP/POP3/IMAP/XMPP. Source: kb.mailbox.org/…/using-the-tor-exit-node-from-mailbox/ [archive].
Cash payment accepted. Pricing FAQ: “Cash by post (By letter and EURO banknotes only - no cheques)” and “Cash deposit into our bank account”. Source: mailbox.org/en/prices/ [archive]. Crypto: not stated.
Transparency report published annually. 2025 report: “In 2025, a total of 74 official requests for information were sent to mailbox”, with rejection statistics. Source: mailbox.org/en/news/transparency-report-2025/ [archive]. Notification policy and warrant canary: not stated.
Tight log retention. Privacy notice: web server / IMAP / Suite logs erased after 4 days; SMTP / spam-filter logs erased after 7 days. Source: mailbox.org/en/data-protection/ [archive].
German law, Berlin courts. ToS §15: “The law of the Federal Republic of Germany … shall apply”. Source: mailbox.org/en/t-cs-cancellation-policy/ [archive].
Family-owned, self-funded since 1992. Company page: “mailbox.org is operated by the family business Heinlein Support GmbH … whose origins go back to the year 1992” and “launched under the new brand mailbox.org in 2014, entirely self-funded”. Source: mailbox.org/en/company [archive].
CounterMail
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
Swedish mail with client-side OpenPGP for bodies and attachments. Headers remain unencrypted, new accounts require an invitation, and the public documentation does not identify the operating company.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: CounterMail, operated by an undisclosed Swedish entity (no legal name, organisationsnummer, or registered address published on the site; founder publicly named as Simon Persson in third-party press only)
- URL:
countermail.com - HQ jurisdiction: Sweden (14 Eyes member, EU/GDPR); “Our company is based in Sweden, we have our jurisdiction here in Sweden and we follow the Swedish laws” OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Sweden: “CounterMail’s secure servers are located in Sweden” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Built-in OpenPGP for body + attachments (RSA-4096); private key stored under a password-derived identifier and encrypted with a password-derived AES key (“We do not know your password. We are not capable of accessing your account with the password hash we possess”); full-disk encryption on mail servers, but headers (From/To/Subject/Date) and folder names are stored unencrypted by CounterMail’s own admission GOOD0
- Government-access posture: Posture statement only: “Countermail will not accept an order from any organization or investigative agency that is outside Sweden”; no published transparency-report numbers (the FAQ-titled “Transparency Report?” is a posture statement without numerical request counts); no warrant canary; no user-notification commitment BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: No .onion address; Bitcoin disabled for new accounts since 2024-06-18 (“All types of Crypto payments will be stopped before the end of this year”); cash wire transfer + prepaid Visa/Mastercard still accepted (one anonymous-payment route survives); invite-only since 2020-11-01; payment data deleted after 14 days; no real-name requirement; Tor not blocked but no .onion service OK+1
- Funding stability: Self-described independent / no investors / no government funding (“we don’t want to get dependent of any third party company for funds”); public launch 2009-2010 per provider’s own changelog; 15+ years operating GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
No legal entity disclosed. Every footer on countermail.com reads only "©2021 CounterMail.com. All rights reserved."; no organisationsnummer, no registered address, no VAT number is published on the Privacy / Terms / About / Contact pages. The founder is publicly named in third-party press only: “My name is Simon Persson, and I am the founder of Countermail. I’m 40 years old, I live in Stockholm, Sweden.”. Source: Unfinishedman.com interview archives: 1, 2. A direct Bolagsverket näringslivsregister lookup would be required for definitive entity confirmation. Sources: Privacy [archive], Terms [archive], About [archive], Contact [archive].
Swedish servers + Swedish jurisdiction. About page: “CounterMail’s secure servers are located in Sweden.” Source: About [archive]. Changelog 2020-02-15: “Our main server is located in Sweden.” Source: Changelog [archive]. FAQ #74: “Our company is based in Sweden, we have our jurisdiction here in Sweden and we follow the Swedish laws. We will never take orders from anyone outside Sweden, if we began to violate our promise to our users, our users would leave us and our company would go bankrupt.” Source: FAQ #74 [archive].
Built-in OpenPGP zero-access for body + attachments, but headers and folder names plaintext. Privacy policy: “Email data (body & attachments) are always stored in encrypted form.” Source: Privacy [archive]. FAQ #56 scope statement: “The following data is not encrypted (in stored emails): Header-fields like From, To, Subject, Date, and Folder names. The reason for this is that the SMTP & IMAP protocols can not handle encrypted headers or foldernames” and “The private PGP keys are stored anonymously, this means that we are unable to determine which private key belongs to a specific user… This means that we can’t give out any private key even if someone forced us.” Source: FAQ #56 [archive]. Algorithm: “We are using a strong encryption protocol called OpenPGP, with 4096 bits encryption keys to protect your data.” (Homepage) and the encryption FAQ states: “Our encryption is done locally on your computer, before anything leaves your computer”. Source: Encryption FAQ [archive]. Full-disk encryption on the mail server: “Our server have full disk encryption, which uses extra CPU and harddrive resources”. Source: Services [archive].
CounterMail’s key-protection paper describes two separate steps: a password-derived identifier locates the private-key package, and a password-derived AES key decrypts it on the client. Password authentication is not the encryption algorithm. Source: CounterMail - protection of the private OPENPGP Key [archive].
No IP logging: restated repeatedly. Privacy: “No IP-logging, our server does not log IP-addresses.” FAQ #56: “We do not log IP-addresses by ourselves, so we can not provide IP-addresses for any of our email accounts.” Changelog 2025-11-06: “we NEVER logged any user IP-addresses during our 15 year history and NEVER been able to give anyone any user IP-addresses, because it’s NOT possible to do in our system.”
Posture statement, not a transparency report. FAQ #56: “Countermail will not accept an order from any organization or investigative agency that is outside Sweden. If we get a valid court order from the Swedish police and a Swedish prosecutor we can only provide them with meta-data, at maximum.” No periodic report with numerical request counts is published. No user-notification clause. No warrant canary.
Account-deletion retention. FAQ #58: "(1)=removed within 24h, this include emails and contacts and all other info we have in our database for your account." Free Trial accounts cannot be deleted on demand: “If you have a free Trial account, it will be deleted automatically after 12 months. You can NOT delete a free Trial account on demand.” Payment-record retention: “Countermail store your payment information for 14 days, after this period they are automatically deleted.”. Source: Terms §6 [archive].
Bitcoin disabled for new accounts since 2024-06-18. Changelog 2024-06-19 entry: “We have disabled Bitcoin payments for new accounts because of new more complicated laws in our country… All types of Crypto payments will be stopped before the end of this year.” Source: Changelog [archive]. Cash wire transfer + prepaid Visa/Mastercard remain documented in FAQ #7 (“ALT 1: Buy a prepaid VISA/Mastercard… ALT 2: Use Bitcoin… ALT 3: Do a cash wire transfer (bank transfer)”. Source: FAQ #7 [archive]). Stripe credit card + bank transfer also listed on the Services page.
Public registration is closed; invitations remain documented. The pricing page carries the text “IMPORTANT! Service is closed for new registrations!” Source: Services [archive]. The same pricing page links an invitation route, and the invitation FAQ states: “The registration now requires an invitation code.”. Source: FAQ #258 [archive]. FAQ #258 also caps user count: “We will not take on more than 20k users. So we have a queue for the invites.”
No catch-all on any tier. FAQ #25: “We do not allow catch-all addresses, due to abuse. Using a catch-all address is never good, because you will receive much more spam emails. If you need multiple incoming forwarders, you can create identities for your domain instead of using a catch-all.” Custom domains are a $15 one-time bolt-on, MX-takeover only: “The DNS MX-record must point to our server, otherwise you are violating our terms of use and the domain will be deleted from your account.” Source: FAQ #25 [archive].
2FA: TOTP + proprietary USB keyfile. Changelog 2018-06-12: “Added support for Two Factor Authentication (our own mobile app for iOS and Android) and support for TOTP Two Factor (Google Authenticator).” USB-key webmail-only: “Use it as a keyfile … The keyfile consists of 512 random bits”. Source: USB key [archive]. WebAuthn/FIDO2: not stated. SMS 2FA: not stated in CounterMail’s own materials (a Cloudwards review claim is uncorroborated).
Independent funding; no investors. FAQ #258: “we don’t want to get dependent of any third party company for funds… we are not required to hire people from any big fund raiser, and we are not required to follow some special requirements created by a fund raiser.” Changelog 2021-02-23: “we have never get paid or sponsored by any authorities/government.”
Operating since 2009-2010. Homepage news sidebar lists “2009-11-21 Open website for Beta-testers” and “2010-05-24 Opened up for all !”. FAQ #250 (2019): “we started our service between 2009-2010, so it’s more than 10 years.” Changelog 2025-11-06 references “our 15 year history.” Third-party reviews give 2008 (domain-registration year); CounterMail’s own statement is treated as primary.
Documented incidents. Changelog 2021-02-23 (“Its hard for smaller companies to withstand a full blown government attack combined with a bug from the server manufacturer”: SuperMicro firmware bug + DDoS); 2021-10-24 large DDoS; 2023-03-31 datacenter relocation; 2025-11-03 corrupt-filesystem incident (“First time this happened in our 15 year history”). No user-data compromise has been disclosed in CounterMail’s own materials. Source: Changelog [archive].
Eclipso
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
German mail with free anonymous registration and optional OpenPGP. Eclipso describes encryption on the user’s device and a passphrase-protected private key stored in the account; ordinary mail is not encrypted this way automatically.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Eclipso Mail Europe, operated by eclipso.net. Claus-Peter Beringer (sole proprietorship), Bayreuth, Germany
- URL:
eclipso.eu - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany (“All servers are located exclusively in Germany”) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in OpenPGP in webmail and apps, including Freemail; S/MIME also available. Eclipso describes encryption on the user device and stores a passphrase-protected private key in the account. Ordinary mail is not automatically protected OK+1
- Government-access posture: Annual transparency report (“Der eclipso Transparenzbericht erscheint jährlich”); foreign-authority requests refused on jurisdictional grounds; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Freemail: no personal information, phone number or billing identity required. Tor support is not documented; paid checkout uses PayPal, Klarna/Sofort or prepayment OK+1
- Funding stability: Owner-managed sole proprietorship since 2003 (Claus-Peter Beringer); “independent, owner-managed German internet company”; no investors, no acquisitions documented GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by eclipso.net. Claus-Peter Beringer, Grubstr. 9b, 95445 Bayreuth, Germany. AGB: “eclipso Mail Europe ist ein Dienst von eclipso.net - Claus-Peter Beringer, Grubstr. 9b, 95445 Bayreuth, Deutschland”. Source: AGB [archive].
German servers, no foreign transfers. About: “Owner-managed, based in Germany. All servers are located exclusively in Germany - under German law and EU-GDPR.” And: “Your emails, contacts, and files are stored exclusively on servers located in Germany. No transatlantic data transfers, no copies in foreign data centers.” Source: About [archive]. Business page: “Your data is stored exclusively in German high-security data centers. No US servers, no Cloud Act risks.” Source: Business [archive].
German law, Bayreuth jurisdiction. AGB: “Für die von eclipso Mail Europe … abgeschlossenen Verträge … gilt ausschließlich das Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” and “Ausschließlicher Gerichtsstand … ist … 95445 Bayreuth”. Source: AGB [archive].
Eclipso describes OpenPGP encryption on the user device, with a private key protected by a passphrase and stored in the account for access across devices. A server copy of an encrypted private key does not establish server-side plaintext access. The feature protects selected PGP messages; the documentation does not establish zero-access encryption of every ordinary message in the mailbox. Sources: PGP [archive].
Annual transparency report. “Der eclipso Transparenzbericht erscheint jährlich” and “Anfragen von ausländischen Polizeidiensten und Behörden lehnen wir mit Hinweis auf die geltenden Gesetze ebenfalls ab und verweisen prinzipipiell an deutsche Behörden.” And: “Auskünfte zu Verkehrs- und Metadaten werden ausschließlich auf Basis richterlicher oder staatsanwaltlicher Anordnung erteilt.” Source: Transparenzbericht [archive]. No user-notification commitment and no warrant canary in the documents reviewed.
Eclipso permits registration without personal information and offers a free mailbox without a phone number. The anonymity credit here applies to Freemail. Paid checkout lists PayPal, Klarna/Sofort and prepayment; the reviewed pages document no cash, cryptocurrency or Tor route. Sources: Datenschutz [archive], Free email [archive].
Account inactivity retention; AGB/privacy disagree on window. Privacy notice (Pkt. 8): “Wird ein Benutzerkonto für die Dauer von 365 Tagen nicht genutzt, erfolgt eine automatische Sperrung des Benutzerkontos. Nach Ablauf der Frist von insgesamt längstens 455 Tagen nach dem letzten Login wird das Benutzerkonto aufgelöst.” User-initiated deletion: “nach Ablauf der Frist von insgesamt längstens 90 Tagen nach Deaktivierung das Benutzerkonto aufgelöst, sämtliche Daten zu diesem Benutzerkonto werden endgültig gelöscht.” The older AGB sets the inactivity window at “insgesamt längstens 395 Tagen nach dem letzten Login”, a documented inconsistency between the two contracts. Sources: Datenschutz [archive] and AGB [archive].
2FA: TOTP only. 2FA page: “Two-factor authentication (2FA) ensures that only you can log in - even if your password is ever compromised.” And: “Use any TOTP-compatible app: Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, Authy, FreeOTP and many more. Free to choose - works on iOS and Android.” No WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware key, no SMS 2FA documented. Source: Two-factor authentication [archive].
DPA included with Business tier. Business page: “DPA according to Art. 28 GDPR included, German servers, highest security standards.” And: “the DPA is mandatory and automatically included. You can view and download your copy of the DPA in the central settings at any time.” Source: Business [archive]. The DPA text itself is not publicly published outside of the customer account.
Owner-managed since 2003. About: “We are an independent, owner-managed German internet company with one clear goal: secure, private communication for everyone. Founded in 2003 by Claus-Peter Beringer - because no existing email provider met his privacy standards, so he built one himself.” Source: About [archive]. No outside capital, no acquisitions documented.
Infomaniak kMail
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
Swiss-hosted mail with optional server-side message encryption. Registration requires identifying details, while the provider commits to notification of legal requests unless prohibited.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Infomaniak kMail / Mail Service, operated by Infomaniak Network SA, Les Acacias (Geneva), Switzerland; majority-owned (voting rights) by the Infomaniak Foundation since 13 May 2026
- URL:
infomaniak.com/en/ksuite/service-mail - HQ jurisdiction: Switzerland (outside 14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Switzerland: “All data transmitted by the Customer to Infomaniak is stored and hosted exclusively in data centres in Switzerland which are the property of Infomaniak” GOOD0
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in per-message OpenPGP: encryption happens server-side on a single click; “Private keys never leave Infomaniak’s infrastructure” and “Encryption is not natively integrated at Infomaniak”; the provider performs encryption and retains the private keys OK+1
- Government-access posture: No published transparency report; ToS commits to “Inform the Client of said request, unless the law expressly prohibits us from doing so”; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: ToS requires real first/last name, physical address, and a valid mobile phone, and may demand Infomaniak Check identity verification (passport / ID / driver’s license / selfie); no Tor support documented; PayPal/cards/PostFinance/Twint/prepaid only; no crypto, no cash BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded in 1994; parent Infomaniak SA has been listed on SIX since October 1, 2026. The Infomaniak Foundation retains majority voting control, but the publicly listed company category applies OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Infomaniak Network SA, Rue Eugène-Marziano 25, 1227 Les Acacias (Geneva), Switzerland (Commercial Register CH-660.0.059.996-1, CHE-103.167.648). Source: Legal notice [archive].
Swiss data centers, owned by Infomaniak. Special Conditions Article 7.1: “All data transmitted by the Customer to Infomaniak is stored and hosted exclusively in data centres in Switzerland which are the property of Infomaniak.” Product page: “data is exclusively located in Switzerland” and “The email infrastructure is replicated in several data centers located in Switzerland and managed exclusively by Infomaniak.” Sources: Mail Service Special Conditions [archive] and Service Mail [archive].
Swiss law, Geneva courts. TCU Article 22.3: “Any dispute relating to this contract … shall be governed exclusively by Swiss law, the exclusive place of jurisdiction being Geneva, subject to recourse to the Federal Court in Lausanne.” Source: General Terms [archive]. Note: TCU 1.2 makes the French versions of the contracts authoritative; the English wording is “indicative”.
Opt-in encryption, server-managed keys: explicitly not zero-access. Service Mail FAQ: “Encryption is not natively integrated at Infomaniak. This function blocks certain essential professional functions such as email indexing (and thus searches). It is nevertheless possible to encrypt your messages via an email client (such as Thunderbird) and the Mail Service using OpenPGP.” Encryption announcement: “Infomaniak has developed an encryption system based on recognised standards (OpenPGP, ECC, AES-256-GCM)… Encryption is activated in a single click when writing an email.” And: “Unlike end-to-end encryption systems that can lead to loss of access to data, Infomaniak strikes the right balance between robust security and continuity of access. Private keys never leave Infomaniak’s infrastructure. Passphrases that protect keys are never stored in clear text and are only decoded on the fly during an authenticated session.” The feature applies to outbound mail; inbound and previously-stored mail are not retroactively encrypted by it. Sources: Service Mail [archive] and Email encryption news [archive].
User-notification commitment with carve-out; no transparency report; no warrant canary. TCU Article 18.5: “In the event that Infomaniak receives a request from a competent authority (judicial, administrative or law enforcement) … Infomaniak undertakes to: Inform the Client of said request, unless the law expressly prohibits us from doing so; Limit the disclosure of data strictly to what the authority has expressly requested.” DPA Article 2.1.13 mirrors the same wording. No numeric transparency report is published anywhere on infomaniak.com or in the 2024 Impact Report. No warrant canary in any document reviewed.
Real identifying details + valid mobile required. TCU Article 2.1: “the Customer must create an Organization on the Infomaniak Site and provide certain information allowing him to be identified, namely at least: his first and last name, his e-mail address, his physical address and a valid mobile phone number on which he can be reached … the Customer undertakes to provide true, accurate and complete information.” Article 2.2: “Infomaniak reserves the right to block access to the Organization in the event of incomplete or erroneous information or to immediately terminate the Contract if Infomaniak deems, on its own initiative and in good faith, that the Information is fraudulent.” Identity verification: Infomaniak Check (passport / ID card / driver’s license / selfie) may be required at Infomaniak’s discretion per the Confidentiality Policy. Free “my kSuite” also requires a “valid mobile phone number to confirm registration” per FAQ 2485 [archive].
Payment methods exclude crypto and cash. “credit card Visa, MasterCard, CB Carte Bleue; card PostFinance (if the currency is in CHF); IBAN transfer; PayPal; Twint; the prepaid account.” Source: Pay or renew manually FAQ [archive]. Tor support, cryptocurrency and cash are not mentioned in any of Infomaniak’s own documents.
2FA: TOTP + kAuth push + YubiKey + geo-restricted SMS. “kAuth app for iOS / Android devices … any OTP application (such as Authy for example) … YubiKey (from Yubico) … SMS (only for CH / FR / BE / DE countries).” Source: Two-factor authentication FAQ [archive]. Generic WebAuthn / FIDO2 beyond YubiKey is not stated.
IP logging. Confidentiality Policy: “We store your IP address to give you an overview of the IP addresses used to connect to your account and to verify the origin of any changes.” Retention for mail-server IP logs is not stated; the closest dated figure is “The logs of your email addresses are available free of charge for the last 19 days” per FAQ 2630 [archive].
Account-deletion retention. “In the absence of a specific request on your part, Infomaniak will automatically delete all your data six months after the termination of your account.” Mail Service Special Conditions Article 7.4 adds a six-day post-deletion grace.
DPA + GDPR. Formal DPA published at Data Processing Agreement (PDF) [archive]. Article 14.1: “This Agreement is governed by Swiss law.” For customer-uploaded mail content, the customer is controller and Infomaniak is processor.
Foundation-controlled since 13 May 2026. Press release: “The Infomaniak Foundation now holds the majority of voting rights in Infomaniak Group SA, in the form of special shares: a category that gives the Foundation a permanent blocking power and that can never be transferred. Boris Siegenthaler and the 36 employee-shareholders have all unanimously approved this transfer, accepting that the voting rights attached to their shares decrease accordingly. To date, Infomaniak has no external investors.” Founded 1994; group revenue CHF 56 million in 2025, 340+ employees. Source: Infomaniak Foundation [archive]. On October 1, 2026, parent Infomaniak SA began trading on SIX after the Perrot Duval transaction. The exchange confirms that the foundation retains majority voting power through unlisted shares. The May statement about outside investors describes the period before the listing. Source: Swiss Cloud Pioneer Infomaniak Joins SIX Swiss Exchange [archive].
Infomaniak distinguishes privacy from anonymous registration. Its June 6, 2025 statement requires a real identity at signup and opposes the proposed surveillance-ordinance revision in its then-current form, citing insufficient safeguards against mass surveillance. It calls for judicial approval of data-access requests. Source: Our View on the Second Revision of the LSCPT Ordinances [archive].
mail.de
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
German mail with free registration that does not require personal details. Optional Mailvelope and inbound public-key encryption protect selected mail; they do not retroactively encrypt the whole mailbox.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: mail.de, operated by mail.de GmbH; registered in Nordhastedt, with a contact address in Gütersloh, Germany
- URL:
mail.de - HQ jurisdiction: Germany OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany; the security page says customer data is stored exclusively in a German data center OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in OpenPGP through integrated Mailvelope, plus automatic inbound PGP/S/MIME encryption. Inbound encryption uses the user’s public key, but does not cover previously stored mail or ordinary sent copies OK+1
- Government-access posture: Annual request figures, including a 2025 report; no provider notification commitment or warrant canary found in the reviewed policies BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Free registration without personal data according to the privacy policy; Tor support not documented. This credit concerns registration, not the absence of IP logs OK+1
- Funding stability: Founded in 2009, service launched in 2011; managing shareholder Fabian Bock remains named in the imprint. Owner-managed operation for over ten years GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-11. The legal notice [archive] identifies mail.de GmbH, register HRB 8007 PI, and its managing shareholder. The company history [archive] dates incorporation to April 2009 and public service to summer 2011.
Encryption requires configuration. The security page [archive] separates TLS from optional message encryption. Its inbound PGP instructions [archive] describe encrypting new arrivals with an uploaded public key. The private key stays with the user. This protects stored incoming bodies after receipt; plaintext can reach the receiving server first. The instructions explicitly warn that unencrypted outgoing mail remains unencrypted in Sent. The Mailvelope guide [archive] documents browser-based encryption and decryption, with keys managed by the extension. Neither option makes every existing message zero-access.
The transparency report includes actual request counts. Despite its combined environmental title, the 2025 environmental and transparency report [archive] includes 380 subscriber-data requests from law enforcement, 22 seizures, ten traffic-data measures and three interception measures. Intelligence-service requests appear separately. These categories should not be added into a count of affected people. The report describes legal review and rejection of unlawful requests, but does not promise to notify affected users.
Anonymous registration still leaves logs. The privacy policy [archive] permits signup without personal data and says payment references are separated from mailboxes. It also specifies fourteen-day retention for website traffic data, including IP addresses. Its advertising-newsletter requirement concerns the advertising-supported FreeMail plan. The current product comparison [archive] also offers an ad-free FreeMail Zero plan with 500 MB; FreeMail has 1 GB and a mandatory newsletter. IMAP, POP3 and SMTP are listed for both. U2F and passkeys are documented on the security page. Custom-domain hosting and catch-all are not documented in the reviewed product list.
Posteo
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
German mail with cash payment and optional password-protected storage. Ordinary mail clients work through server-side decryption. Custom domains are deliberately unsupported.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Posteo, operated by Posteo e.K., Berlin, Germany
- URL:
posteo.de - HQ jurisdiction: Germany OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany (own infrastructure, all servers + stored data in Germany) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in crypto mail storage encrypts message content, attachments, headers and notes using a key protected by the account password. Ordinary IMAP/POP access still works, implying server-side decryption during access; separate inbound PGP/S/MIME can use a user-held private key OK+1
- Government-access posture: Annual transparency report (since 2014); no explicit user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Zero inventory data at signup; cash-by-letter accepted; Tor not explicitly documented; no crypto OK+1
- Funding stability: Customer-financed, “no advertising partners or investors”; in operation since 2009 GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Posteo e.K., Methfesselstraße 38, 10965 Berlin, Germany; registered as HRA 47592 B at Charlottenburg (Berlin).
German hosting on own infrastructure. Privacy policy: “We operate and maintain our own server infrastructure. All of our servers and stored data are located in Germany.” Content data is “saved on encrypted hard drives to protect them from physical access”. Source: Posteo Privacy Policy [archive].
Password-protected storage decrypts during access. Posteo’s crypto mail storage instructions [archive], checked on 2026-11-10, describe a generated key pair whose private key is stored in Posteo’s database under the account password. The feature covers existing mail, attachments, metadata and notes; contacts and calendars have separate switches. Posteo says messages become readable at the moment of access and ordinary IMAP/POP clients continue to work without changes. Server-side decryption follows from that documented compatibility: this is a technical inference, not a published audit of key lifetime in memory. It does not provide the same active-session protection as decryption confined to the user’s device. Forgotten passwords prevent recovery of the encrypted archive.
The separate inbound-encryption feature [archive] encrypts new arrivals with an uploaded PGP or S/MIME public key. Keeping the private key on the user’s device protects those message bodies after receipt, but does not retroactively encrypt every stored or sent message. Posteo’s own S/MIME browser extension also supports optional end-to-end message encryption.
No IP logging. “We also do not collect or save your IP address if you use an external client to retrieve your emails via IMAP or POP3 or to transmit messages via SMTP to be delivered by us.” And: “we strictly do not save any IP addresses that could be traced back to customers.”
No inventory data at signup. “As a matter of principle, we do not collect and save any inventory data (such as names, addresses, etc.) from you. When registering, you do not enter any inventory data and we do not collect any other personally related data.” Payment data is decoupled from the account.
Anonymous cash by post. “Even anonymous payment of the service can be made in cash by letter.” Cards, SEPA, PayPal also accepted; no crypto.
Transparency report since 2014 at posteo.de/en/site/transparency_report [archive]; no explicit user-notification commitment found; no warrant canary documented.
No custom domains: explicit privacy choice. Help: “No. We are an email provider with a particular, privacy-oriented model – and this is not compatible with incorporating own domains… One of our emphases is data economy: we do not collect any user information… If you were able to use own domains with us, this would affect the entire concept of Posteo: we would need to start saving user information for all customers who use their own domains with us – and to provide these to the Federal Network Agency to be provided on request to the authorities.” External addresses can be configured as sender identities (with forwarding) but Posteo does not host your domain.
Founded 2009; customer-financed. Privacy policy: “Posteo is financed by our customers: There are no advertising partners or investors.” In 2019 the German Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected Posteo’s constitutional complaint and ordered them to support targeted real-time interception (TKÜ) on valid German court order; Posteo reports compliance with valid interception orders. Its storage-password protection should not be read as a guarantee against access while a user is logged in; end-to-end encrypted contents have a separate key boundary.
StartMail
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
Dutch mail with a password-protected vault and optional OpenPGP. The server can access ordinary messages during a session. Bitcoin payment is limited to eligible annual subscriptions.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: StartMail, operated by StartMail B.V., Zeist, Netherlands
- URL:
startmail.com - HQ jurisdiction: Netherlands (9 Eyes / 14 Eyes member, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Netherlands OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: User vault encrypted when logged out; opt-in OpenPGP with server-stored private key (passphrase-protected); provider has plaintext access during user sessions for non-PGP messages OK+1
- Government-access posture: Annual transparency report; refuses non-Dutch authority requests; no explicit user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Bitcoin accepted on annual plans only; pseudonyms allowed at signup; Tor not stated OK+1
- Funding stability: Operating since 2013; describes itself as “independent from any commercial third parties or governments” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by StartMail B.V. at Boulevard 11, 3707 BK Zeist, Netherlands. ToS: “The StartMail Service is offered by StartMail B.V. (‘StartMail’), a company established under Dutch law with its registered office in the city of Zeist…” Source: Terms of Service [archive].
Dutch hosting, Dutch law. Privacy policy: “The StartMail databases (containing customer emails which are stored in encrypted user vaults) are located in data centers in the Netherlands.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. ToS: “The Agreement shall be governed by Dutch law… The court of the Hague, the Netherlands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction…”
User vault + opt-in PGP, but not zero-access. “All of your email messages are stored in a secure User Vault on our servers. All information in the vault is encrypted… Your User Vault is only opened when you login. Without the account password or a recovery key the vault is inaccessible when it is closed.” OpenPGP: “Users can encrypt emails via OpenPGP. The users’ key-pair is stored in the User Vault. Additionally, the private key is encrypted by means of the passphrase.” During an active session, “When you are logged in, your unencrypted emails are unencrypted”, so the vault model protects mailbox-at-rest but does not keep the provider out of message bodies during user sessions.
Transparency report annually. startmail.com/transparency [archive]; 2025 report shows 3 legal requests, all from Dutch authorities. Privacy policy: “ONLY if we receive a request from Dutch judicial authorities to hand over information about one of our Users, we will have our lawyers check the validity of the request… We will NOT comply with requests from any authorities other than Dutch authorities.” PRISM/US support article: “StartMail has never provided a single byte of user data to the US government, or any other government or agency.” No explicit user-notification commitment; no warrant canary.
Tight log retention. Privacy policy: “In our weblogs we store the browser user agent, pages visited, IP address and timestamp for a maximum of 7 days after which they are deleted.” SMTP/IMAP service logs also retained 7 days. “We do not keep a record of the IP addresses used to access our services” beyond those logs. Outbound email headers omit the user’s IP. Deleted emails purged immediately; backups retained max 3 days.
Account deletion. ToS: “When an Agreement is fully terminated, all data contained in the Account, including all e-mails, is immediately deleted permanently. Only the backup will remain for the maximum retention period of three days…”
Partial anonymous signup. Pseudonyms allowed: “A name that you choose (optional and may be an alias or pseudonym, but see also our Terms of Service…”. Anonymous Bitcoin payments: “If you choose to pay annually, you can do so anonymously with Bitcoin.”, but not on monthly plans or group subscriptions. Tor: not stated anywhere in StartMail’s own docs.
DPA / GDPR. StartMail names itself as GDPR controller: “clearly state our identity as a ‘controller’ of your personal data…” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. No standalone customer DPA template is published; sub-processors (Stripe, PayPal, Chargebee) are listed as processors under separate DPAs.
Independence claim. About page: “StartMail is independent from any commercial third parties or governments.” Launched 2013. The cited independence statement does not identify the shareholders of StartMail B.V.
Systemli
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
An invitation-based activist service with Tor access and password-protected mailbox storage. Mail is decrypted on the server during use. Germany is the provisional hosting assumption.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Systemli, a German activist tech collective; the registered association that holds the bank account and the network resources is Digitale Partizipation e.V., Berlin
- URL:
systemli.org - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Not named in any Systemli document. The RIPE record for autonomous system AS204911 names Digitale Partizipation e.V. in Berlin, peering through Community-IX, IN-Berlin, NL-IX and LWLcom, so Germany is the working assumption OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Mailboxes are encrypted on the server under the user’s own password (“Mailboxes on our servers are encrypted with your personal password”) on top of “All hard drives of our servers are encrypted”. This is the same session-unwrap model as Riseup: mail arrives in plaintext and is encrypted into the mailbox afterwards, so subject and routing metadata are exposed on arrival and end-to-end is left to the user’s GnuPG OK+1
- Government-access posture: No request report, warrant canary or individual notification commitment. The German terms promise public disclosure of third-party access and exhaustion of legal remedies; that is a narrower public-announcement commitment BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor onion services for mail, webmail and the rest of the suite; “We will never ask you for your personal information. Our services are usable anonymously”; “No IP addresses are retained”; donations accepted anonymously in cash by post GOOD0
- Funding stability: Donation-funded volunteer collective operating since 2003, no advertising, no paid staff GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
A collective, with an association behind it. Systemli describes itself as “ein 2003 gegründetes linkes Netzwerk und Technik-Kollektiv” and “Wir verstehen uns als politisches Kollektiv”, and states that “Alle Mitglieder arbeiten ehrenamtlich für das Projekt” (every member works on the project unpaid). The legal entity appears only on the donations page, as the account holder: “Digitale Partizipation e.V. … IBAN: DE77430609671150840800 … Verwendungszweck: Unabhaengige Infrastruktur”. Sources: Über uns [archive] and Support us [archive]. The suggested donation is “eine Spende von 1 Euro pro Account pro Monat” for individuals and 100 euros a year for projects, with the qualifier “Für Projekte ohne Geld wird ein anderer Weg gefunden”: projects without money get another route.
Server-side mailbox encryption, not end-to-end. The mail page lists as a feature “Mailboxes on our servers are encrypted with your personal password”, and the terms add “All hard drives of our servers are encrypted.” The 2019 announcement of the feature is precise about the threat it addresses: “Nur mit dem Wissen eures persönlichen Passwortes (oder eures Wiederherstellungscodes) können die E-Mails gelesen werden … Selbst bösartige Angreifer:innen mit Zugang zu den Servern könnten eure E-Mails nicht mehr ohne weiteres einsehen” (only knowledge of your password or recovery code can read the mail; even attackers with server access could no longer read it easily). The terms are equally direct that this is not the end of the job: “We urge you to use client-based encryption in addition. For emails, use GnuPG.” Sources: E-Mail [archive] and Terms of Services [archive].
The government-access commitment exists only in German. The English terms carry sections on data economy, data security, content and spam. The German terms carry one more, headed “Juristische Anordnungen” (legal orders): “Wir werden die uns zur Verfügung stehenden juristischen Mittel ausschöpfen, um die Privatsphäre unserer Nutzer*innen zu schützen. Wir werden nicht den Betrieb unserer Services oder uns selbst gefährden, um Nutzer*innen zu schützen, die entgegen unseres Selbstverständnisses gehandelt haben. Wir werden jeden Fremdzugriff auf unsere Systeme öffentlich transparent machen, sobald uns dies möglich ist.” They will exhaust the legal means available to protect users’ privacy; they will not endanger the service or themselves to protect users who acted against the collective’s principles; and they will make any third-party access to their systems publicly transparent as soon as they can. Sources: Nutzungsbedingungen [archive] and Terms of Services [archive]. The public-disclosure promise is recorded here, but it does not establish a request report or a commitment to notify the affected user individually. It therefore does not receive artifact credit under this rubric.
No IP logs, no personal data, anonymous by design. Terms: “We store as little data and logs as possible. We will never ask you for your personal information. Our services are usable anonymously. No IP addresses are retained. To secure our services against attacks and for debugging purposes temporary exceptions are possible. Our services are free of advertisement. We do not transfer data to third parties.” No retention period is given for those temporary exceptions. Inactive accounts are permanently deleted: “Accounts which have not been used for two years will be deactivated permanently and all data will be cleared. Re-activation is not possible. The user name will be blocked permanently to prevent identity fraud.”
Onion services across the suite. “With Tor Onion Service, you can connect completely inside the Tor network to our services. … We try to make all our services accessible as Onion Service.” The list pairs each clearnet host with a v3 address, including mail.systemli.org and webmail.systemli.org. Source: Onion Services [archive]. Cash by post is accepted for donations: “Es gibt auch die Möglichkeit, uns anonym Geld per Post zu schicken.” No cryptocurrency is offered.
Invite-only, by choice. “Each systemli account provides an email address. To register, you need an invitation code. Every email account receives three invitation codes 7 days after registering. The codes can be passed on to friends and used for registering. We have taken a conscious decision against an open registration system in order to prevent misuses of the service.” Unlike Autistici/Inventati’s former application process, no written statement of political affinity is required: an invite code is the whole gate. Trading codes is forbidden: “Invite codes for systemli accounts must not be offered to people you don’t know, sold or traded.” The terms do reserve a political veto, in “The usage of our services depends on the compatibility with our self-conception. We will prevent usage that contradicts our understanding.”
What Systemli does not do. There is no custom-domain email at any price; a custom domain is offered only for web hosting. There is no catch-all under any of the terms this article searched for. Compartmentalization is handled instead by “Infinite subaddresses like username+keyword@systemli.org”, which is free and unlimited but visibly derived from the one real address, so it hides nothing from a recipient who reads the address. The mailbox quota is not published anywhere: the wiki confirms a quota exists by documenting the over-quota warning, without a figure. Attachments are capped at 40 MB. IMAP and SMTP are offered over TLS, POP3 is not mentioned, and there is no first-party mobile app.
Systemli links to the Autistici/Inventati incident discussed in Out of scope.
Vivaldi Mail
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM6
The hosted Vivaldi Webmail service is free but requires community reputation and a recovery email. OpenPGP is optional and server-side; the browser’s separate mail client is not the service assessed here.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Vivaldi Mail / Vivaldi Webmail, operated by Vivaldi Technologies AS, Mølleparken 6, 0459 Oslo, Norway
- URL:
webmail.vivaldi.net(hosted mailbox); Vivaldi Mail atvivaldi.com/features/mail/is the separate browser mail client - HQ jurisdiction: Norway (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes member, GDPR via EEA) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Iceland: Sync privacy policy states “Vivaldi’s servers are hosted at the Hringdu data centers in Iceland”; SMTP host
smtp.vivaldi.netresolves to a Hringdu ehf (AS51896) IP range; mail-specific Vivaldi policy/help documents do not contain a verbatim mail-server location statement; treated as Iceland (outside 5/9/14 Eyes) per the Sync statement and network attribution GOOD0 - Zero-access encryption: Opt-in OpenPGP in Vivaldi Webmail; keys are stored on Vivaldi’s servers, so this is not full end-to-end encryption. This does not establish whether underlying storage disks are encrypted OK+1
- Government-access posture: No published transparency report; no warrant canary; no commitment to notify users of lawful requests; only generic “We do not share or sell your personal data with any third party. We protect user data from disclosure, with exceptions only requested by law or court order” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: No billing identity because the mailbox is free; recovery email and community reputation required. Tor support is not documented. Free access alone does not make the account anonymous OK+1
- Funding stability: Founded in 2014 by Jon von Tetzchner and Tatsuki Tomita; explicit “0 Outside investors”; “Having no external investors gives us the freedom to listen to our users”; independent, employee-owned, operating >10 years GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Norwegian entity. Community privacy policy: “At Vivaldi Technologies AS (“Vivaldi”), protecting your privacy is one of our top priorities.” Contact block: “Vivaldi Technologies AS / Mølleparken 6 / 0459 Oslo / Norway.” Source: Community privacy policy [archive].
EULA governing law: Norway / Oslo City Court. EULA: “Vivaldi’s headquarters are based in the beautiful city of Oslo, Norway. This EULA is therefore governed by the laws of Norway, except its conflict of laws rules and regulations. All disputes, actions or proceedings arising under or related to this EULA shall exclusively be referred and resolved by the Oslo City Court.” Source: EULA [archive]. The Community Terms of Use (which expressly cover Webmail) at community-terms-of-use [archive] is silent on governing law; the EULA’s Norway clause applies via the “ancillary services” wording.
Iceland hosting (stated for Sync, network-attributable for Mail). Sync policy: “Vivaldi’s servers are hosted at the Hringdu data centers in Iceland.” Source: Sync privacy [archive]. Support-form page: “We use Jira Software hosted on our servers in Iceland to manage messages sent to us via this form.” Source: Create a new account [archive]. The mail-specific Vivaldi policy/help documents do not contain a verbatim mail-server location statement; the Iceland attribution for mail itself comes from the Sync policy + SMTP-host network-level evidence (smtp.vivaldi.net on Hringdu ehf / AS51896, per discussion on the Vivaldi-hosted forum at forum.vivaldi.net/topic/72494 [archive]).
Mail metadata logged for up to three months. Community privacy policy: “In order to provide you our mail service, Vivaldi Webmail, we process the following email metadata: sender and recipient email addresses, the IP address from which incoming messages originated, and message sent and received times. Email messages are scanned by automated systems that allow us to detect malicious activity.” And: “Email logs are stored for up to three months.” Source: Community privacy policy [archive].
Optional server-side OpenPGP. Vivaldi explains that “the PGP keys are stored on our servers”. Its help page therefore describes webmail encryption as incomplete end-to-end protection and recommends a PGP-capable local client for E2EE. This is not Mailvelope, whose browser extension keeps keys client-side. The location of a PGP key does not establish whether ordinary storage disks are encrypted. Source: Email encryption in Vivaldi Webmail [archive].
Deletion on account close. Privacy policy: “When you close your Vivaldi account, your data is immediately deleted from our production servers.” Source: Community privacy policy [archive]. Terms of Use: “You can choose to end the agreement at any time, for any reason, by deleting your Vivaldi account and discontinuing your use of the services. When doing so, your data is permanently deleted from all our servers, and your username can never be re-used.” Source: Community Terms of Use [archive].
No transparency report, no warrant canary, no notification commitment. Targeted gap-search across vivaldi.com, vivaldi.net, help.vivaldi.com returned no transparency report and no canary. The only government-access language: “We do not share or sell your personal data with any third party. We protect user data from disclosure, with exceptions only requested by law or court order” and “Vivaldi will not transfer any personal data to third parties except as required by law or law enforcement.” Source: Community privacy policy [archive].
Signup data and age gate. Terms of Use: “Provide true, accurate, current and complete information about yourself as prompted by the sign-up process.” And: “You affirm that you are at least 16 years of age when signing up to Vivaldi’s services.” Source: Community Terms of Use [archive]. Required signup fields per Create a new account [archive] are “Username … Recovery email … Password … Profile Picture”; recovery email is mandatory; no government ID, real name, or phone number.
Reputation-gated Webmail access since May 2023. Help: “Vivaldi Webmail is a free and private email service we offer only to our active community members to cover their personal emailing needs.” And: “To start using your webmail account, you first need to be an active community member and build up some reputation by using the following services: Vivaldi Forum, Vivaldi Social, Vivaldi Themes, Community Blogs, Sync.” And: “To guarantee the efficiency of this method, details about how the reputation system works are not shared publicly. How long it will take to get access to Vivaldi Webmail will also vary.” Source: Webmail access and reputation system [archive].
No custom domains; aliases via plus-addressing only. Help: “In Vivaldi Mail all emails need to be delivered to and sent from username@vivaldi.net. This means that different aliases, unfortunately, can’t be used. But, if you have set your Vivaldi Mail up in a mail client, you may use plus addressing (also known as sub-addressing). With plus addressing you can add a keyword to your email address ( username+keyword@vivaldi.net) which allows you to create different variations of the email address.” Source: Webmail settings [archive]. Vivaldi staff confirmation: “Vivaldi.net webmail accounts don’t support custom domains so you’d have to use some forwarding account for that.” Source: forum.vivaldi.net/topic/114683 archives: 1, 2, 3.
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported. Server settings: “IMAPs (recommended): Server: imap.vivaldi.net Port: 993 … POP3s: Server: pop3.vivaldi.net Port: 995 … SMTPs (recommended): Server: smtp.vivaldi.net Port: 465.” Source: Setting up Vivaldi Mail in a mail client [archive].
Storage: 10 GB free. Help: “In Vivaldi mail each account gets 10GB of storage space.” Source: Webmail settings [archive]. ToU: “Please note that the email quota is of 10GB. As soon as your account reaches critical size, Vivaldi will send you a warning message. An account that has exceeded the quota limit will be blocked from receiving mail and from storing new messages.” Source: Community Terms of Use [archive].
2FA: TOTP + security key; no SMS. “For your Vivaldi account, the second verification can be done either with app based authentication or with a security key.” And: “An alternative to an authenticator app is a physical security key or device. You can add as many security keys to your account as you want.” Source: Two-factor authentication [archive]. WebAuthn/FIDO2 via security keys is supported. Recovery codes and app-passwords also documented.
No native mobile mail app. Vivaldi staff confirmation: “The mobile versions of Vivaldi on Android and iOS do not include the mail client and we don’t have separate client apps for mobile.” Source: forum.vivaldi.net/topic/103640 archives: 1, 2. Mobile users access via webmail.vivaldi.net or via a third-party IMAP/POP client.
Free, gated, no paid tier. Email signup page: “Free / Available for active Vivaldi Community members.” The same page actively recommends two paid competitors alongside its own free option: “Proton Mail — From €3/month” and “Fastmail — From $5/month.” Source: Email signup [archive]. No payment methods: the mail service does not accept payment. (Stripe is named in the Community privacy policy only for donations, not for mail.)
DPA: not stated; controller-stance only. Privacy policy: “The purpose of this policy is to inform you of how Vivaldi will process your personal data as data controllers and the measures and processes we have put in place to ensure its adequate protection.” And: “The legal basis for the processing is the fulfilment of your request (contract) and the legitimate interest Vivaldi has in providing you with a good experience when using our email service.” Source: Community privacy policy [archive]. No customer DPA template is published.
Vivaldi reports no outside investors. Vivaldi Mail product page: “Having no external investors gives us the freedom to listen to our users and, together with them, build the browser they deserve. 4 000 000+ Active users. 2 500 000+ Community members. 0 Outside investors.” Source: Vivaldi Mail features [archive]. Vivaldi’s interview with cofounder Tatsuki Tomita dates the founding to 2014, after discussions with Jon von Tetzchner in 2013. Source: Big in Japan [archive].
Client and service are separate products. The 2022 Vivaldi Mail launch cited here concerns the browser’s mail client, which can connect to other providers. This profile scores the hosted @vivaldi.net Webmail service; the client’s release date is not the mailbox service’s launch date.
GMX
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
German mail with optional Mailvelope integration and entity-level request reporting. Message subjects and addresses remain visible. Signup details and advertising practices differ between the international and German products.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: GMX, operated by 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH, Brauerstr. 48, 76135 Karlsruhe (Zweigniederlassung); Hauptsitz Montabaur (Amtsgericht Montabaur HRB 7666; VAT DE243413002); managing directors Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. Verena Patzelt
- URL:
gmx.com(English) /gmx.net(German) - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes / SSEUR, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany: “We process all personal data in secure data centers in Germany”; “Your personal data never leaves GMX; it is saved in our secure computer centers in accordance with European data protection laws” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in via the third-party Mailvelope browser extension (Chrome/Firefox only): “GMX has optimized the OpenPGP procedure to make it user-friendly. This was achieved in cooperation with the Mailvelope open source project from Heidelberg, Germany”; PGP key + passphrase live in the browser (“all important data is stored by the user. Neither government agencies, nor GMX, nor Mailvelope have access to the encrypted email content”); but without Mailvelope enabled GMX has full plaintext access, subjects and sender/recipient addresses remain exposed even when both correspondents use Mailvelope OK+1
- Government-access posture: No GMX-branded transparency report (no URL on
gmx.com,gmx.net,mail-and-media.com, orunited-internet.depublishes one; the entity-level Jahresbericht lives only at the WEB.DE-branded URL); Privacy Policy authorizes disclosure (“To work with law enforcement agencies. For example, to respond to inquiries or orders from law enforcement agencies or to provide information that we believe is important”) without committing to user notification; no warrant canary BAD+2 - Anonymous signup: Required signup fields are “gender, name, country, state, and date of birth” plus “mobile phone number and/or a secondary email address” for password recovery; Google reCAPTCHA at signup; payment via SEPA-Lastschrift / PayPal / Visa / Mastercard / Amex; no crypto, no cash; Tor neither documented nor blocked; paid tiers offered only to DE/CH/AT residents (“GMX ProMail ist nur für Kunden mit Wohnsitz in Deutschland, Schweiz oder Österreich bestellbar”); ad-funded free tier requires personalized tracking unless paid TrackFree opt-out is purchased on the German side BAD+2
- Funding stability: Long-established subsidiary of publicly listed United Internet AG. The group acquisitions date to 2001 for GMX and 2005 for WEB.DE; they are not recent ownership changes. Advertising remains a separate privacy concern OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
German legal entity; Montabaur jurisdiction. GMX Terms: “This Agreement is governed by, and shall be interpreted in accordance with, German law. If the customer is a consumer with habitual residence in the EU, the customer shall also enjoy the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law of his state of residence.” About GMX: “District court: Montabaur Commercial register number: 7666 VAT ID: DE243413002”. Sources: GMX Terms [archive], About GMX [archive].
Servers in Germany; “E-Mail made in Germany” alliance. Privacy Policy: “We process all personal data in secure data centers in Germany.” Mail-client data-collection page: “Your personal data never leaves GMX; it is saved in our secure computer centers in accordance with European data protection laws.” Security page: “within the network, transmission paths are automatically encrypted and your emails are only stored in secure European data centers”; “Encrypted communication complements transport encryption and offers protection even if the email leaves the secure email made within the European network.” TLS minimum: “You can only use a TLS protocol if your email program uses TLS versions 1.2 or 1.3. For security reasons, we no longer support the older TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Mail client data [archive], Encryption [archive], Outlook setup [archive].
Mailvelope third-party PGP; encryption-at-rest details Not stated. Encryption page: “GMX has optimized the OpenPGP procedure to make it user-friendly. This was achieved in cooperation with the Mailvelope open source project from Heidelberg, Germany”; “Yes, email attachments like pictures and other files are also encrypted with OpenPGP.” And: “Browser-based storage means that all important data is stored by the user. Neither government agencies, nor GMX, nor Mailvelope have access to the encrypted email content. Even court decisions on data delivery will remain ineffective because of this.” Encryption-at-rest algorithm/keying details: not stated. The English Terms say only: “Once GMX have received your information, GMX will use strict procedures and security features to try to prevent unauthorized access.” Sources: GMX Encryption [archive], GMX Terms [archive]. Mailvelope explicitly excludes email addresses and subject lines from encryption. GMX’s broader marketing claim about hiding metadata should not be read as a property of this integration. Source: Frequently Asked Questions archives: 1, 2.
IP and traffic-data logging; 7-day Verkehrsdaten retention; 21-day deactivation; 6-month inactivity deletion. English Privacy Policy: “date and time of access or delivery or IP address of the device used to access your inbox … Traffic data are deleted after the expiry of the legal retention period.” German Datenschutzhinweise: “Verkehrsdaten werden entsprechend der rechtlichen Anforderungen grundsätzlich innerhalb von sieben Tagen gelöscht” and “Falls du deinen Account löschen möchtest, deaktivieren wir zunächst deinen Account, überprüfen deinen Löschanspruch und löschen diesen in der Regel nach 21 Tagen.” Terms: “GMX is entitled to delete the messages saved in the customer’s account and other files after a period of 6 months of inactivity … without warning. After a period of 1 year of inactivity, GMX shall also be entitled to release the customer’s GMX email addresses (‘aliases’) and make them available to other customers.” KB confirms 1-year address block: “For security reasons, your email address will be blocked for 1 year. This means that no one can register with your old email address in this time period.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Datenschutzhinweise [archive], Terms [archive], Account deletion [archive].
Government-access disclosure authorized; no transparency report at any GMX URL; no canary. Privacy Policy: “To work with law enforcement agencies. For example, to respond to inquiries or orders from law enforcement agencies or to provide information that we believe is important” and “To comply with applicable laws and regulations. This may include laws outside of your country of residence.” German Datenschutzhinweise: “Überdies können Daten an andere Verantwortliche weitergegeben werden, wenn wir gesetzlich dazu verpflichtet sind oder eine behördliche oder gerichtliche Anordnung vorliegt.” No transparency report is hosted on gmx.com, gmx.net, mail-and-media.com, or united-internet.de. The entity-level Jahresbericht hosted at the WEB.DE-branded URL covers all 1&1 Mail & Media German portals at the entity level (46.32M total mailboxes), but is not surfaced from any GMX property. Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Datenschutzhinweise [archive].
Required signup data + Google reCAPTCHA. FAQ: “Enter your gender, name, country, state, and date of birth” and “Pick a backup recovery option by including your mobile phone number and/or a secondary email address. These are used in order to reset your password in the event you forget it. Your details remain secure and will only be used for password recovery” and “Prove you’re not a robot by entering the Google security captcha form.” No Tor support/block statement. Source: GMX FAQ [archive].
Paid tiers DE/CH/AT only. “Preise: GMX ProMail kostet 3,99 € pro Monat, GMX TopMail 6,49 € pro Monat und das Bundle ProMail + 500 GB Cloud 8,48 € pro Monat. Die Abrechnung erfolgt bei ProMail und TopMail jeweils halbjährlich im Voraus.” “Hinweis: GMX ProMail ist nur für Kunden mit Wohnsitz in Deutschland, Schweiz oder Österreich bestellbar.” English gmx.com markets only FreeMail with no Premium/Upgrade link in the footer. Sources: GMX Premium DE [archive], ProMail [archive], TopMail [archive].
FreeMail is ad-funded. Privacy Policy: “To ensure that we can continue to provide you with these services free of charge, we show advertising.” Storage: “Plenty of storage space with 65GB; Send attachments up to 50MB in size; Bonus features like Online Office and Organizer.” “TrackFree” anti-tracking add-on (German market only) is a paid opt-out: “Es ermöglicht die Nutzung aller GMX Seiten und Dienste ohne personalisiertes Tracking und personalisierte Werbung.” Sources: GMX FAQ [archive], GMX Premium FAQ DE [archive].
10-alias allowance on GMX-owned TLDs only; no custom domain on gmx.com. Alias help: “Your GMX account comes with the option of creating and using up to 10 different sender addresses, even allowing you to select other email domains for your alias addresses as well. … you also have the option of switching the email domain for another one of GMX’s available options – such as gmx.us, gmx.co.uk, or gmx.ca.” Custom-domain product (German market only): “Preise: Mit GMX FreeMail ab 1,99 € mtl. je nach gewählter Domain-Endung. Mit GMX Premium erhalten Sie exklusive Preisvorteile ab 0,97 € mtl. je nach gewählter Domain-Endung. … Die Vertragslaufzeit beträgt 12 Monate.” Per registered domain: “Zu jeder Domain erhalten Sie 500 E-Mail-Adressen”. Custom-domain attachment via forwarding-into-GMX: “Sie können eine Weiterleitung auf eine eigene E-Mail-Adresse einrichten oder auf das GMX Postfach einer anderen Person”. Sources: Alias addresses [archive], Homepage & Mail DE [archive], Persönliche Domains [archive].
Catch-all: Not stated in any English help-center page reviewed. Searches across the English gmx.com help center for “catch-all” and “wildcard alias” return nothing.
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported, off by default. Help: “POP3/IMAP sync is deactivated by default. If you wish to use third party applications or mobile apps to sync your email, you need to activate this feature in your settings.” Server data: “Incoming mail: Server imap.gmx.com with port 993 … Outgoing mail: Server mail.gmx.com with port 587 and the encryption method STARTTLS.” Sources: POP/IMAP toggle [archive], Outlook setup [archive].
2FA: TOTP only; app-specific password required for IMAP after 2FA. Help: “After 2FA is enabled, you will be prompted not only for your password but also for a 6-digit one-time password (OTP), which you generate on your smartphone using an authentication app” and “the six-digit code is also known as a ’time-based one-time password’ (TOTP).” App-specific passwords: “You can have the app-specific password created during the activation of two-factor authentication. You need it if you retrieve your emails via POP3/IMAP and use an external email program such as Outlook or Thunderbird.” SMS used only at enrollment, not as a login factor: “During setup, you must enter a confirmation code, which you will receive by text message to your mobile phone number.” WebAuthn/FIDO2/hardware-key support: not stated. Source: 2FA help [archive].
GDPR controller; no standalone DPA. Privacy Policy: “We are the ‘data controller’ for all data processing that results from your use of these functions. As per the GDPR, you are assigned the role of the ‘data subject’ and therefore benefit from the rights listed in Section 1.3 above.” DPO: “Data Protection Officer of 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH … Elgendorfer Str. 57, 56410 Montabaur, Germany … e-mail: dataprivacy@corp.gmx.com.” CCPA: “In accordance with CCPA, California residents have the right to have access to and delete their data, as well as to opt-out of the sale (broadly interpreted) of their personal data. In order to guarantee and facilitate the exercise of these rights, we have provided the page ‘Do not sell my personal Information’.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Group context: United Internet AG; 42M users. 1&1 Mail & Media corporate page: “in March 1997, GMX (Global Message Exchange) was launched in Munich as one of Germany’s first e-mail providers”; “Our GMX, WEB.DE & mail.com brands have 42 million active users around the world.” United Internet H1 2025 Interim Report: “As of June 30, 2025, the United Internet Group employed 10,824 people” with “1,115 in the Consumer Applications segment (prior year: 1,070).” SLA: “GMX guarantees an annual average server accessibility of 99%.” Sources: 1&1 Mail & Media [archive], United Internet H1 2025 [archive], GMX Terms [archive].
Hostpoint
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
Swiss-hosted mail with provider-readable messages and identifying signup requirements. Hostpoint does not support catch-all addresses. Its legal documents permit disclosure, without the accountability artifacts counted by this rubric.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Hostpoint Cloud Office, operated by Hostpoint AG, Rapperswil-Jona SG, Switzerland (CH-320.4.049.510-4)
- URL:
hostpoint.ch/en/email - HQ jurisdiction: Switzerland (outside 14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Switzerland: “Hostpoint stores all web, e-mail and database data on servers in the Swiss data center of Digital Realty (formerly Interxion) in Glattbrugg” GOOD0
- Zero-access encryption: None: “For e-mails, at least line encryption (TLS) is offered and used where supported”; storage is described only as “encrypted where possible”; no built-in PGP, no S/MIME, no zero-access vault BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary; the GTC reserves broad disclosure rights to courts and authorities (Cl. 3.2.3-3.2.4) BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; payment via invoice / credit card / PayPal / SEPA LSV / prepayment; no crypto, no cash; GTC 3.1.2 requires “truthful and verifiable information” and lets Hostpoint demand supporting documents at any time BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded 2001 by Markus Gebert, Sandro Bertschinger and Claudius Röllin; ~130 employees in 2026; CEO statement (April 2026): “While various providers have been taken over by international groups, Hostpoint remains independent”; no external investors, no acquisitions disclosed GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Hostpoint AG, Neue Jonastrasse 60, 8640 Rapperswil, Switzerland (CH-320.4.049.510-4, UID CHE-101.974.997). Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Swiss-only hosting. Company page: “Hostpoint stores all web, e-mail and database data on servers in the Swiss data center of Digital Realty (formerly Interxion) in Glattbrugg.” Email product page: “At Hostpoint, data is stored in a highly secure data center in Switzerland.” Company statement: “With the exception of a few components of rankingCoach, all data relating to our products and services are stored on our servers in Switzerland.” Sources: Company [archive] and Email [archive]. An EU representative (Hostpoint Limited, Malta) exists for GDPR Art. 27 only.
Swiss law, Hostpoint’s seat as exclusive forum. GTC 13.3: “These GTC and any disputes arising under or in connection with the contractual relationship between Hostpoint and the Customer shall be subject exclusively to Swiss law, excluding its conflict of laws rules and the provisions of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).” And 13.4: “The ordinary courts at the registered office of Hostpoint shall have exclusive jurisdiction.” Source: GTC Web hosting (PDF) [archive].
No zero-access encryption. Annex 2 TOM Addendum A: “Data stored in the Data Centre is protected against physical access (see paragraph G) and encrypted where possible.” And: “For e-mails, at least line encryption (TLS) is offered and used where supported.” The privacy policy makes no provider-side PGP / S/MIME / zero-access claim. DANE was added in 2020 for inter-server TLS only.
Broad disclosure clauses; no transparency report; no canary. Privacy Policy §7: “To the extent that courts or authorities request and we are legally required, we will pass on your personal data to them or other third parties.” GTC 3.2.3: “Hostpoint reserves the right to inspect contents made accessible by the Customer by means of using the hosting services upon receipt of a Notice pursuant to the Code of Conduct – Hosting … or at the request of courts or authorities.” GTC 3.2.4: “Hostpoint still has the right to inform third parties of the identity of the Customer at the request of courts or authorities.” GTC 3.2.6 lets Hostpoint suspend the service “if … a court or authority has requested Hostpoint to do so.” No clause commits to notify affected users when legally permitted. No transparency report or canary is published anywhere on hostpoint.ch.
Truthful identifying details required. GTC 3.1.2: “When ordering and registering and in the context of using the services, the Customer is obligated to provide truthful and verifiable information. Hostpoint may at any time and without providing reasons request that the Customer subsequently provides documents or information which enable Hostpoint to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the Customer. Hostpoint is entitled to defer the acceptance of an order or registration, to suspend services or to terminate the contract with the Customer with immediate effect in the event that the Customer fails to provide the requested documents or information within the deadline set by Hostpoint.”
Payment methods exclude crypto and cash. Right to cancel §B: “You can choose to pay by invoice, credit card, PayPal, direct debit (LSV) or prepayment.” GTC Annex 1 §2.3 even prohibits running “Crypto-mining software” on the servers. Cryptocurrency and cash are not mentioned. Tor support / blocking is not stated in any Hostpoint document.
Catch-all explicitly not supported. Support KB: “Info: Note: Hostpoint does not offer catch-all addresses.” Source: Alternative e-mail address KB [archive]. Hostpoint’s official Twitter on 13 February 2015: “Nein, Catch-All E-Mail Accounts bieten wir nicht an.”
Account-deletion grace. “Temporarily delete e-mail address: This option deletes your e-mail and Cloud Office data, but you can restore it yourself within 30 days free of charge. Once this period has elapsed, the data is permanently deleted.” Backup retention by tier: 30 / 90 / 180 days (Basic / Plus / Business).
Log retention. Privacy Policy §6 only gives a general retention rule (“five, ten or more years” after end of contract). For web hosting access/error logs, support article states: “Access and error logs are kept for at least 7 days.” IP-log retention for mail-server connections specifically is not stated.
2FA: TOTP authenticator app only. “If two-factor authentication is activated, you first have to enter your Hostpoint ID password and then a code generated via an authenticator app (e.g. Authy, Google Authenticator, Aegis) on your smartphone.” WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware keys and SMS are not documented. The 2FA also only protects the Hostpoint ID / Control Panel; it is not described as protecting individual IMAP/SMTP mailbox sessions. Source: 2FA general questions [archive].
DPA via Annex 2 of the Web-hosting GTC. Annex 2 Cl. 5.1: “The client therefore assumes the role of controller.” And Cl. 5.3: “Hostpoint takes on the role of the processor in terms of the processing of personal data.” No standalone E-mail / Cloud Office DPA document.
Owner-operated, independent since 2001. 25th-anniversary press release (30 April 2026): “around 130 people at its Rapperswil-Jona SG site … In the last five years alone, the workforce has grown by almost 70 percent.” CEO Markus Gebert: “The Swiss hosting market has changed significantly and become increasingly consolidated in recent years. While various providers have been taken over by international groups, Hostpoint remains independent. We want to continue on our path … and continue to focus on quality, proximity to customers and reliable Swiss infrastructure in the future.” Source: 25-year press release [archive]. Hostpoint also acquired ~SWITCH retail .ch domains in 2014-2015 (“450,000 customers … 1.2 million domain names”), an inbound acquisition, not an exit.
Inbox.eu
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
Latvian mail whose advertised end-to-end encryption is described as TLS in its help center. The terms permit government disclosure and require identifying signup details; those provisions qualify the broader privacy marketing.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Inbox.eu, operated by SIA “INBOKSS” (LLC INBOKSS), reg. no. LV40003560720, headquartered at 15 Matrožu Iela, Rīga, LV-1048; sister consumer products on the same platform are inbox.lv (Latvia), inbox.lt (Lithuania), mail.ee (Estonia)
- URL:
inbox.eu - HQ jurisdiction: Latvia (EU/GDPR, outside 5/9/14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Latvia: “INBOX processes personal information in its servers, which are located in Latvia”; data center in Riga “built in accordance with European security standards (EN 50600-3)” GOOD0
- Zero-access encryption: None: marketing advertises “End-to-end encryption” as a Premium feature but the help-center article of the same name defines it as TLS-in-transit only: “Our service supports encryption in transit using TLS (Transport Layer Security) by default”; no PGP, no S/MIME, no zero-access vault; provider explicitly retains the ability to inspect content (“Any potential access is handled exclusively by our Security Department and only in response to a valid legal request”) BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report; no warrant canary; no user-notification commitment; ToS §4.6 explicitly authorizes disclosure: "«Inbox.eu» can send personally identifiable information provided by you at registration to other companies or people when: … c) We respond to subpoenas, court orders or requests from official bodies"; ToS §7.6.14 widens to “good faith belief” preservation/disclosure; directly conflicts with the marketing privacy page that asserts “We do not store or share your personal information with third parties – neither government agencies nor advertisers … And we never will” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Real name + surname + birth date + gender required (“When registering, you must provide information about yourself: 1.1.1 Name 1.1.2 Surname 1.1.3 Birth date 1.1.4 Gender”); to send mail (not just receive), mobile-phone validation is required (“in the Trial mode, you can receive emails as well, however, to send new ones, you must validate your mobile phone number”); payment is Visa/Mastercard/PayPal/Swedbank/SEB/invoice only: “Payment card information is not collected or processed”; no crypto, no cash; Tor not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: “Inbokss Ltd was established in 1998”; 27 years operating; self-described bootstrapped (“our service is shaped by real user needs — not venture capital pressure or data monetization”); no parent / shareholders disclosed in primary documents (treat as independent based on self-description) GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Latvian SIA. Terms of Service: “LLC INBOKSS, reg.no. LV40003560720, hereinafter referred to as «Inbox.eu»”. Privacy Policy: “SIA "INBOKSS" reg. No. 40003560720”. Footer: “Inbokss Ltd. 15 Matrožu Iela, Rīga, LV-1048”. Sources: Terms of Service [archive], Privacy Policy [archive], Inbox.eu [archive].
Servers in Latvia; EU-only processing. Privacy Policy §2: “INBOX processes personal information in its servers, which are located in Latvia.” Marketing: “All data is hosted on our own servers in Latvia and handled in full compliance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)”; “Our headquarters and robust servers are located in Latvia, at the heart of the Baltics”; “Our servers are hosted in one of the largest data centers in Northern Europe — a secure and modern facility in Riga, built in accordance with European security standards (EN 50600-3).” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Our story [archive], Email privacy features [archive].
Latvian governing law; PTAC consumer ADR. ToS §7.6.11 references “any applicable laws of the Republic of Latvia or any international laws”. ToS §4.10: “Your personal data will be processed in accordance with the "Personal Data Protection Law" requirements, and will be based on personal data processing systems of Latvian Republic Data State Inspectorate.” Complaints route via Latvia’s Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības centrs) at ptac.gov.lv/lv/content/stridu-risinasanas-process. No explicit choice-of-law clause for non-consumer commercial disputes. Source: Terms of Service [archive].
“End-to-end encryption” claim is TLS in transit only. Pricing page markets “End-to-end encryption” as a Premium feature, but the help-center article titled “End-to-end encryption” defines it as: “Our service supports encryption in transit using TLS (Transport Layer Security) by default across all our products and subscriptions. This ensures that emails are encrypted while being transmitted between servers, provided the recipient’s email server also supports TLS.” No PGP, no S/MIME, no zero-access at rest. Privacy Policy §6.1.1 mentions only “Encryption using a standard SSL”; algorithm/keying details for at-rest storage are not disclosed. Marketing security page describes transit encryption only: “every email you send is automatically encrypted using TLS 1.2+ protocol”. Server-side plaintext access is confirmed: “Any potential access is handled exclusively by our Security Department and only in response to a valid legal request submitted through the appropriate international legal channels, including Interpol where applicable.” Sources: Pricing [archive], End-to-end encryption help article [archive], Privacy Policy [archive], Email security [archive].
ToS authorizes government disclosure; marketing claims the opposite. ToS §4.6.c: "«Inbox.eu» can send personally identifiable information provided by you at registration to other companies or people when: … c) We respond to subpoenas, court orders or requests from official bodies according to the procedure provided for by laws of the Republic of Latvia". ToS §7.6.14: “you acknowledge and agree that «Inbox.eu» may preserve the Content and may also disclose the Content if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such preservation or disclose is reasonably necessary to: a) comply with legal process; b) enforce the TOS; c) respond to claims that any Content violates the rights of third-parties; d) protect the rights, property of «Inbox.eu», or personal safety of «Inbox.eu», its users, and the public.” Marketing privacy page (directly conflicts): “We do not store or share your personal information with third parties – neither government agencies nor advertisers or advertising networks. And we never will.” No transparency report, no warrant canary, no user-notification commitment is published anywhere on inbox.eu. Sources: ToS [archive], Email privacy features [archive].
IP logging; no retention period stated. Privacy Policy §1.2 logs login IP + date/time. §1.3: “When you use INBOX services, we can collect and process information on your physical location. INBOX uses location determination technologies based on your IP address.” The INBOX FILES ToS adds: “INBOX also automatically receives and records information on our server logs from your browser including your IP address, INBOX cookie information, and the page you requested.” No explicit IP-log retention period.
Conflicting deletion windows: 7 days (marketing) vs. one year (binding Privacy Policy). Privacy Policy §5.1: “The user has the right to delete their own personal data by deleting their profile in the "User Profile" section; access to the profile will be blocked and information about the user will be deleted from the INBOX servers within one year.” Marketing FAQ (directly conflicts): “When you request account deletion, we permanently remove all emails, contacts, files, and personal information from our servers within 7 days.” The Privacy Policy is the controlling document. ToS §2.9.2: “Inbox.eu service validity period to inactive (not validated) domain user (including domain registration date) is 270 days from day when account status change from "active" to "inactive". After these 270 days all domain account content and information about domain user will be permanently deleted from inbox.eu mail system.” ToS §2.10.1: “Inbox automatically deletes messages(permanently), located in the Trash folder 30 days after messages are moved or delivered to these folders.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Email privacy features [archive], ToS [archive].
Real identifying details required; phone validation gates outbound mail. Privacy Policy §1.1: “When registering, you must provide information about yourself: 1.1.1 Name 1.1.2 Surname 1.1.3 Birth date 1.1.4 Gender.” §4.2: “Providing personal identifying information is a prerequisite of using INBOX services.” Phone validation required to send (not just receive) mail: “In the Trial mode, you can receive emails as well, however, to send new ones, you must validate your mobile phone number”; “after the end of the 30-day trial period, TRIAL email addresses without validated mobile phone number will be deleted.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Trial validation [archive], Trial deletion [archive].
Payment: bank-linked rails only; no card data stored by Inbox.eu. Pricing page: “We also accept payment via bank transfers (Swedbank, SEB) and invoice payment via online banking.” Help center adds: “Credit card VISA and MasterCard users will be forwarded to First Data website for the purchase … Clients of payment system PayPal will be forwarded to Pay Pal website for the purchase.” Privacy Policy §1.4 confirms: “Payment card information is not collected or processed.” No cryptocurrency, no cash, no Monero/Bitcoin acceptance documented anywhere.
Business Premium is the only tier with custom domains. Pricing page: “Custom domain name addresses | Unlimited” in the Business column only. Business management model: “Use one Inbox.eu account to manage all your domain mailboxes. After registration add other domain in admin section.” Custom-domain attachment requires full DNS-level proof of control: “Verify domain ownership via DNS/MX records. To activate your domain, verify ownership using one of four methods (DNS, MX, TXT, or HTML).” Sources: Pricing [archive], Mail for business [archive], Business admin help [archive].
Same-domain aliases only; 5 per mailbox. Pricing comparison: “5 email aliases” on Business Premium. Business help: “You can pay only for one mailbox, but use 5 more aliases for free. All mails sent to the specified aliases will go to your main mailbox. Aliases works without any time limits.” Alias scope is same-domain only: “Aliases - a way to create an additional names for any your email account without paying for another email, e.g. info@yourdomain.com, sales@yourdomain.com”. Sources: Pricing [archive], Business help [archive], Inbox.eu business info [archive].
Catch-all is supported on paid custom-domain plans only. Help: “Catch-all feature is available for domain email users on the Inbox.eu platform. A Catch-all address allows you to receive emails sent to any non-existent address in your domain. … The Catch-all feature is available only for domains with a paid subscription.” Important precedence: “If an existing address matches the recipient, the email will go to that account instead of the catch-all.” No documentation of “wildcard alias” or *@domain as a sending identity. Source: Catch-all feature [archive].
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported; disabled by default. Pricing comparison: “IMAP/POP3/APOP/SMTPs access”. Server data: “POP3 server: mail.inbox.eu - IMAP server - mail.inbox.eu - SMTP server: mail.inbox.eu”; ports 995/POP3s, 993/IMAPs, 587 or 25 SMTPs. Caveat: “In order to ensure users’ safety, default access to mailbox using POP3/SMTP/IMAP protocol is denied. To enable this option, go to "Options", click "Email forwarding, mail programs, SMS alerts" and choose "Enable external POP3/IMAP and SMTP access".” Source: Mail program help [archive].
2FA: TOTP authenticator app only; WebAuthn/SMS not stated. Help: “2-step verification (known also as two-factor authentication) is an extra layer of your account security … It can be implemented using mobile application for code generation, installed on your mobile device and set exactly for your account.” WebAuthn/FIDO2 not stated; no separate SMS 2FA login flow documented. Source: 2FA help [archive].
No standalone DPA; one-clause processor stance. ToS §9.3: “If third-party personal data is stored on the INBOX platform, you are the data controller, and INBOX as the data repository is the processor, storing data in accordance with applicable Latvian legislation and GDPR requirements.” Source: ToS [archive].
Trial is time-limited, no free tier. Marketing: “Yes, Inbox.eu provides a free 30 day trial version with essential features, as well as premium plans for users who require additional capabilities and advanced functionalities.” Trial outgoing-mail cap: “Send up to 3 emails per day”; phone validation required to send. Source: Inbox.eu [archive].
Founded 1998; Inbox.eu product line launched 2011; bootstrapped. Our story: “Inbokss Ltd was established in 1998 as a European email provider with a clear vision: to deliver simple, secure, and private email services that respect user privacy.” And: “In 2011, we started a new project called Inbox.eu, which provides functional custom email addresses for the owners of registered domains.” Self-described funding: “our service is shaped by real user needs — not venture capital pressure or data monetization.” No external funding round, no acquirer, no parent disclosed. Source: Our story [archive].
2024 Baltcom customer migration; 2022 DDoS on sister product inbox.lv. Inbokss company site: “In May 2024, LLC "Baltcom" and LLC "Inbokss" signed an agreement according to which LLC "Inbokss" will provide email services for LLC "Baltcom" clients on the inbox.eu platform”; “In June 2024, the company LLC "Baltcom," which became part of the mobile operator "Bite," migrated to the domain mail technical platform Inbox.eu.” (Baltcom was fully merged into Bite Latvija on 2024-07-01 per LSM and pricer.lt, a customer-acquisition event for Inbokss, not an acquisition of Inbokss.) The 2022 DDoS was on sister product inbox.lv and is documented only by external press (The Baltic Times, 2022-05-16): chairman Andris Grikis said inbox.lv had “faced the largest cyber attack in its history”; CERT.LV preliminarily attributed it to “cyberhooligan group Killent who supports Russia’s aggressive regime” (widely transliterated as “Killnet”). Source: Inbokss company page [archive].
Migadu
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
A Swiss operator hosting mail in France. Migadu has no built-in zero-access encryption and directs users to their own PGP tools. A custom domain is required.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Migadu, operated by Migadu-Mail GmbH, CH-9414 Schachen, Switzerland
- URL:
migadu.com - HQ jurisdiction: Switzerland (outside 14 Eyes) GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: France (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes): Swiss company but explicitly does not host in Switzerland OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None: explicitly argues encryption-at-rest is just “encoding” if the keys live on the same infrastructure, and points users to external GPG instead BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; cash not accepted; Bitcoin only off-site via direct wallet on request (no on-site crypto checkout); minimal signup data OK+1
- Funding stability: Profitable, bootstrapped Swiss company since 2014; founders explicitly state “We have not taken any outside capital nor plan to ever do so. We are not interested in ’exiting’ our company.” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Migadu-Mail GmbH, Rohnen 587, CH-9414 Schachen, Switzerland. Source: Privacy/DPA [archive] and Contact [archive].
Swiss company, French servers. Pros/cons page: “In Switzerland, but servers are not… This may come as a surprise, but we do not host our servers in Switzerland. Current data centers are located in France.” Source: Pros & cons [archive]. The operator and hosting countries are scored separately.
No built-in encryption: explicit refusal. “Email as we know it and encryption are incompatible. If someone is telling you otherwise, they are not to be trusted… If we were to roll out encryption at rest, we would have to keep the encryption keys ourselves. That means we would be encrypting and decrypting messages on the fly using a key which is available on the same storage where your data is. That is not encryption but rather encoding.” Recommends external GPG end-to-end instead. Source: Pros & cons [archive].
Privacy doc doubles as the DPA. “The processing of personal data takes place in compliance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the local Swiss Federal Data Protection Act (DPA). This document serves both as our Privacy Policy and as our Data Processing Agreement (DPA).” Stripe and PayPal listed as sub-processors. Source: Privacy/DPA [archive].
Minimal signup data; Bitcoin by arrangement. Signup requires only an existing email address (used as login + for confirmation). Card via Stripe, PayPal prepayment; “We do not offer on-site payments with BitCoins. However, if this is your preferred payment method, you can reach out to support and we will give you our wallet address.” No cash. Source: Pricing FAQ [archive].
No mailbox 2FA. Pros/cons: “No mailbox 2FA (yet!)… IMAP protocol as well email clients do not support second factor authentication for the mailboxes… We do offer so called App-specific passwords via mailbox identities though. These are commonly touted by email providers as 2FA. They are not.”
No provider domain. “We do not offer email at our domains. Our whole service was built around the premise of giving email liberties back to the users, not taking them away.” Migadu is custom-domain-only, the inverse of Posteo’s policy.
Bootstrapped, profitable, family-style since 2014. About: “Behind Migadu stands a small bootstrapped, independent Swiss company… We have not taken any outside capital nor plan to ever do so.” “Profitable shortly after founding in 2014.” Source: About [archive].
Murena Mail
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
French-operated mail hosted in Finland, with backups in Germany. Mailvelope is optional; the separate encrypted document vault does not make the mailbox zero-access.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Murena Mail, operated by Murena Retail SAS, 31 Avenue de Ségur, 75007 Paris, France (Caen RCS no. 883 789 398, Siret 883 789 398 00012, VAT FR82883789398); the e Foundation (French association loi 1901 registered 2018-04-26) publishes the account/mail policies via
e.foundation - URL:
murena.com(Workspace product),murena.io(webmail),@e.email/@murena.iouser addresses - HQ jurisdiction: France (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes member, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Finland: “Murena Workspace user data is stored in a replicated storage cluster at Hetzner’s data center in Helsinki, Finland (code named - HEL1)”; off-site backups “to Hetzner’s data center in Falkenstein, Germany (code named - FSN1)”; Finland sits outside 5/9/14 Eyes OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None native for mail: “Only a few team members can read your emails, unless some encryption mechanism is used like PGP”; opt-in OpenPGP via the SnappyMail webmail + Mailvelope browser-extension integration; files have Nextcloud server-side encryption with keys “only available in the servers”; document E2EE only exists in the separate Murena Vault (Cryptpad-based); Murena’s own roadmap acknowledges “True end-to-end encryption for Murena Workspace files, full database encryption, and encryption for mails is in our plans as long-term features” OK+1
- Government-access posture: No transparency report on murena.com, e.foundation, or doc.e.foundation; no warrant canary; no explicit user-notification commitment; only “We will only disclose the limited user data we possess if legally obliged to do so”; “Decryption is only authorized as part of a disaster recovery procedure, initiated by a user request submitted using this contact form or as part of a legal obligation to answer a binding request coming from legal authorities in the European Union” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; hCaptcha required at signup; mandatory non-Murena recovery email (“After 30 days without setting and verifying a recovery email address your account will be disabled and then deleted”); Bitcoin accepted on the paid Workspace tiers via BitPay (“We use Stripe, PayPal and Bitpay to process payments on this website”); username only, no real-name required OK+1
- Funding stability: e Foundation is a non-profit registered 2018-04-26; commercial sister Murena Retail SAS (formerly ESolutions SAS); 2018 Kickstarter (≥€71k), 2024 Crowdcube equity raise (€786,398 from 545 investors, including the previously secured funding shown in its progress bar); privately held with crowdfunded equity history, operating <10 years OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Commercial entity / non-profit split. Murena Retail SAS publisher block: “Publisher: Murena Retail SAS / Nº Siret: 883 789 398 00012 / VAT Number: FR82883789398 / Code APE: 5829C / Headquarters: 31 Avenue de Ségur – 75007 Paris, France.” Source: Legal notice [archive]. T&Cs lead: “MURENA RETAIL SAS, whose registered office is located 31 Avenue de Ségur, Paris (75007), France, registered in the Caen Trade and Companies Register under number 883 789 398.” Source: Terms & Conditions [archive]. The non-profit publisher of e.foundation: “Publisher: e Foundation / Non-profit organization under the French law for association 1901 registered on April 26th 2018.” Source: e Foundation legal notice/privacy [archive]. Murena’s mail privacy policy directs users to e.foundation for @e.email account policies: “For more information regarding the privacy policies of the following services: /e/OS and apps, @e.email account…” Source: Murena privacy policy [archive].
Mail data in Finland; off-site backups in Germany. Workspace product page: “All Murena servers are hosted in the European Union. More precisely, our email and cloud servers are located in Finland.” Source: Workspace [archive]. Service documentation: “Murena Workspace user data is stored in a replicated storage cluster at Hetzner’s data center in Helsinki, Finland (code named - HEL1) with server side encryption provided by Nextcloud server application.” And: “Additionally, we create a second copy of these snapshots and synchronize them every day to Hetzner’s data center in Falkenstein, Germany (code named - FSN1). These incremental cold backups are kept for up to three months.” Source: Murena Workspace services and data [archive]. Hosting provider: “Hosting: Hetzner Online GmbH” (Murena legal notice).
French law, French courts (shop / cloud subscription side). T&Cs: “These general terms and conditions of sale shall be governed by French law. We offer You to settle all disputes concerning the validity, interpretation, execution, termination and consequences and follow-up of the contract through an internal mediation procedure. Failing this, if You do not wish to follow a mediation procedure or if the mediation is not successful, the dispute will be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent French courts.” Source: Terms & Conditions [archive]. The product-side Workspace ToS at https://murena.io/apps/terms_of_service/en_GB/termsandconditions is referenced at signup; its specific governing-law clause is not reproduced here.
Files: Nextcloud server-side encryption; Mail: not zero-access. “All Murena Workspace files are encrypted by server-side encryption. This means the keys to decrypt the data are only available in the servers hosting the application. Only a handful of senior administrators and lead developers have access to those servers to perform maintenance and troubleshooting.” And: “All backups are encrypted with a different key, not stored on the application servers.” Mail specifically: “Only a few team members can read your emails, unless some encryption mechanism is used like PGP. This is the case on any e-mail provider except custom non-standard solutions… For now, you can already configure PGP on /e/OS Mail and on Murena Workspace webmail.” Source: Murena Workspace services and data [archive]. Forward-looking: “True end-to-end encryption for Murena Workspace files, full database encryption, and encryption for mails is in our plans as long-term features.” The Mailvelope integration page: “Murena’s SnappyMail integration with the Mailvelope extension allows you to encrypt/decrypt/sign your emails, as well as create/manage PGP keys right in the browser.” Source: Mailvelope setup [archive]. /e/OS Mail app PGP: “Our Mail app is integrated with Open Keychain to provide the possibility to send end to end encrypted e-mails from your device.” Source: What's /e/ [archive]. Murena Vault: “Murena Vault is a secure document management service integrated into the Murena Workspace. It is powered by Cryptpad, providing you with a secure environment to create, store, edit, and manage documents.” Source: Workspace [archive].
IP-log retention: “minimum legal duration”, no number stated. e.foundation legal notice (Spot search-engine section): “IP addresses are logged for the minimum legal duration.” For OS-update connections: “When you connect to our servers to update /e/OS, we collect some visitors statistics such as your IP address, only for our internal use… These statistics are not providing us any personal identifiable information. This information is not disclosed unless legally obliged to do so.” Source: e Foundation legal notice/privacy [archive]. Specific numeric retention for mail/IMAP/webmail logins: not stated.
No transparency report; no warrant canary. No transparency-report URL exists on murena.com, e.foundation, or doc.e.foundation. The only government-access language is: “All data on your ‘own’ /e/ server is encrypted and never shared, sold or traded to any third party. We will only disclose the limited user data we possess if legally obliged to do so.” Source: e Foundation legal notice/privacy [archive]. And: “Decryption is only authorized as part of a disaster recovery procedure, initiated by a user request submitted using this contact form or as part of a legal obligation to answer a binding request coming from legal authorities in the European Union.” Source: Murena Workspace services and data [archive]. No user-notification commitment.
Signup: hCaptcha + mandatory non-Murena recovery email. Account-creation doc: “Ensure you add a valid recovery email address to your Murena Workspace account. The recovery email is important in case you lose access to your Murena Workspace account for any reason. This email address cannot be a murena.io address.” And: “After 30 days without setting and verifying a recovery email address your account will be disabled and then deleted.” And: “Your username may contain Latin letters (a-z), digits (0-9) and special characters (- . _) Your username must be at least 3 characters long and at most 30 characters long.” Source: Create a Murena cloud account [archive]. hCaptcha disclosure: “We use the hCaptcha security service (hereinafter ‘hCaptcha’) on murena.io/signup… hCaptcha evaluates various information (e.g. IP address, how long the visitor has been on the website or app, or mouse movements made by the user).” Source: Privacy policy [archive].
No catch-all / no custom-domain consumer tier yet. Workspace plans page (https://murena.com/cloud-subscriptions/) lists 20 GB → 2 TB tiers; no custom-domain attachment, no catch-all on any consumer tier. Custom domains are announced as a roadmap / Business-tier feature only: “You can now manage and host your email and drive for your family or business, using a single identity on your own custom domain, and connect it with your /e/OS smartphone.” Source: e Foundation eCloud page [archive]. Catch-all under any terminology (“catch-all”, “wildcard alias”, *@) is not documented anywhere in primary Murena docs.
Free-tier hide-my-email + every account gets both @e.email and @murena.io. Murena Workspace murena.io alias: “Murena Workspace users now have the choice to use murena.io domain for emails. For example, a user called ‘jane.doe’ is now able to use both
jane.doe@e.email and
jane.doe@murena.io email addresses.” Source: Murena.io alias address [archive]. Hide-My-Email count: “5 Hide My Email” on paid 20 GB and 64 GB tiers per Workspace [archive]; historically “there is one alias available” on free per edevelopers-blog.medium.com/murena-cloud [archive]; current free count is not stated explicitly on the pricing page.
IMAP / SMTP supported; POP3 not documented. “SMTP/IMAP server: mail.ecloud.global / SMTP/IMAP username: your Murena Workspace email address in full (example: john.doe@e.email or john.doe@murena.io) / SMTP port: 587, plain password, STARTTLS, requires authentication / IMAP port: 993, SSL/TLS.” Sources: Create a Murena cloud account [archive], Configure email [archive]. POP3 is not stated as supported.
Pricing (EUR, monthly / yearly). Source: Cloud subscriptions [archive]. 20 GB “1,99€ / month” or “19,90€ / year”; 64 GB “3,99€ / month” or “39,90€ / year”; 128 GB “5,99€ / month” or “59,90€ / year”; 256 GB “7,99€ / month” or “79,90€ / year”; 1 TB “12,99€ / month” or “129,90€ / year”; 2 TB “24,99€ / month” or “249,90€ / year”. Free tier: “FREE ACCOUNT” with “1 GB FREE” of storage, supported “by donations”. Source: Workspace [archive] and Create a Murena cloud account [archive].
Payment methods. “We use Stripe, PayPal and Bitpay to process payments on this website.” Source: Privacy policy [archive]. T&Cs: “We give You the choice to pay by debit card, credit card, or with Your PayPal account if You have one.” Source: Terms & Conditions [archive]. Card, PayPal, and Bitcoin (via BitPay): supported. SEPA direct debit + cash: not stated.
2FA: TOTP only documented; no WebAuthn/FIDO2; SMS not stated. TOTP: “To enable a TOTP Password you will need a compatible client.” Source: Two-factor authentication [archive]. Murena maintains a fork of the Nextcloud TOTP app at Murena-SAS/twofactor_totp . WebAuthn / FIDO2: not stated in primary Murena docs.
DPA: not stated; DPO contact only. “How can I contact Murena Workspace Data Protection Officer (DPO)? Please write your inquiry to dpo@murena.com and the person currently performing this role will coordinate the necessary action and reply in the shortest delay.” Source: Murena Workspace services and data [archive]. General GDPR posture: “All of our online services are GDPR compliant for the protection of your data.” Source: Workspace [archive].
Built-in Google migration tool. “During migration, Murena Workspace will access the content of the following apps to migrate it to the matching Murena Workspace app: Gmail: all your Gmail e-mails will be imported in a dedicated folder in Murena Workspace’s Mail; Google Drive: all the files stored on your Google Drive will be imported into Murena Workspace’s Files; Google Photos…; Google Contacts…; Google Calendar…” And: “The content is imported into Murena Workspace at your explicit request while using the Google data migration tool available in Settings > Migration.” Source: Privacy policy [archive]. Generic IMAP import wizard: not stated.
Native Android Mail app, no native iOS app. /e/OS Mail is “a fork of the open source K9-mail application” (per the /e/OS community forum announcement at community.e.foundation/t/e-os-mail-application-and-gmail/18390; the source repo at gitlab.e.foundation/e/os/mail README also states it is “Forked from https://github.com/k9mail/k-9 [archive]”), pre-installed on /e/OS smartphones, available via F-Droid / App Lounge. Source: What's /e/ [archive]. For iOS, only Apple Mail autoconfig is documented: “If you are using a current Apple Mail version (both on macOS or iOS) you can visit https://autoconfig.murena.io/ [archive] and fill in your details to download a configuration package that automatically configures your client.” Source: Configure email [archive].
Funding: non-profit registered 2018-04-26; 2018 Kickstarter; 2024 Crowdcube equity raise. e Foundation: “Our non-profit organization ’e Foundation’ was incorporated in May 2018.” Source: About /e/ [archive]. e Foundation donations: “We use PayPal and Patreon to process donations to the e Foundation.” Source: e Foundation legal notice/privacy [archive]. 2018 Kickstarter raise (Eelo): “Duval launched a Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign with an initial goal of €25,000, and received at least €71,000 from contributors”. Source: Wikipedia /e/ [archive]. 2024 Crowdcube raise: the public pitch records approval on June 19, 2024. Technology Reseller reported a €400,000 target reached within 24 hours and a €786,398 (£650,000) total from 545 investors. The pitch says €343,652 had already been secured and was reflected in its progress bar. Sources: Crowdcube pitch archives: 1, 2, Technology Reseller archives: 1, 2, 3.
Brand history: Eelo → /e/ → Murena. Per Wikipedia /e/ [archive]: “Eelo was renamed to /e/ in July 2018 due to a conflict with the ’eelloo’ trademark” and “ESolutions SAS was re-named Murena Retail” concurrent with the launch of Murena-branded phones (per The Register’s May 2022 reporting).
Runbox
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
Norwegian mail with request reporting and cash or cryptocurrency payment. Storage encryption protects the disks, while end-to-end message encryption requires external tools.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Runbox, operated by Runbox Solutions AS, Oslo, Norway
- URL:
runbox.com - HQ jurisdiction: Norway (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes member, strong privacy laws; EEA member, outside EU but inside GDPR via local Personal Data Act) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Norway: “Runbox owns and operates its own servers, which are physically located in Oslo, Norway” (DigiPlex data center) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None built in: “encrypted SSD storage” (hardware-level only, protects against physical theft) plus opt-in client-side PGP via third-party clients (Mailvelope, Thunderbird, GPGTools); Runbox itself notes “the only way to truly ensure that your email can’t be read by anyone you don’t intend it to be read by is to use end-to-end encryption” BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Public transparency report (“This page is up to date as of 2026-08-31”; 33 requests 2011-2026, 17 complied, 16 rejected); Norwegian-court-order requirement (“Runbox will by principle respond by requesting a Norwegian court order pursuant to the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act before disclosing any information”); no explicit user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Tor support is not established in the provider documentation reviewed; Bitcoin (direct wallet) + Coinbase Commerce + cash by mail (“sent via regular mail at your own risk, and is not recommended”); ToS requires first/last name + country + alternative email at signup (phone optional, real-name not technically verified) OK+1
- Funding stability: Email service launched 12 October 2000; current operating entity Runbox Solutions AS formed March 2011 (employee buyout from Runbox AS); “Runbox is owned by employees and board members (77.54% in 2024) and close associates”; no external investors; partial Runbox 7 R&D funding from The Research Council of Norway GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Runbox Solutions AS, Oslo, Norway. Privacy policy: “Runbox Solutions AS (‘Runbox Solutions’), a company incorporated and located in Norway, provides users with email, web, and domain hosting services.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. About: “Founded in 2000 and based in Norway, Runbox Solutions is an independent, limited liability company with headquarters in Oslo.” Source: About [archive].
Runbox describes Norwegian ownership and control of its servers. Blog: “Runbox owns and operates its own servers, which are physically located in Oslo, Norway. While the facility housing our servers is managed by a third party, the servers—and all the data on them—are fully owned and controlled by Runbox.” And: “The CLOUD Act applies only to data—not the physical facility where servers are housed. Because Runbox owns and controls the servers, your data remains under Norwegian jurisdiction.” Source: Runbox vs the CLOUD Act [archive].
Norwegian law, Oslo city court. ToS: “The Agreement shall be governed by the laws of Norway. You agree that the Norwegian courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any and all disputes related to the Agreement. Oslo city court shall be the agreed legal venue.” Source: Terms of Service [archive].
Hardware-encrypted SSDs; no built-in zero-access. 2022 board annual message: “All email account data processed through the Runbox email service is stored on our own physical servers in Norway on encrypted SSD storage.” But Runbox itself acknowledges this is not zero-access: “Although Runbox always tries to encrypt your email during transfer … the only way to truly ensure that your email can’t be read by anyone you don’t intend it to be read by is to use end-to-end encryption.” Runbox 7 native PGP has been on the roadmap since at least November 2018 (“Runbox 7 Webmail beta test is now open to the public!”) but the May 2026 source check did not establish a released integration. Disk encryption does not prevent access by the running service. Sources: Annual Message 2022 [archive] and the Encryption help FAQ.
Norwegian-court-order disclosure policy. Blog: “If an entity requests access to any user data, Runbox will by principle respond by requesting a Norwegian court order pursuant to the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act before disclosing any information.” Source: Why we require a Norwegian court order [archive]. Privacy policy: “Runbox Solutions will not disclose your Account Information, or access or disclose your Account Content, except with your written permission or unless acting under good faith that such action is necessary to: conform to legal requirements or comply with legal process pursuant to Norwegian law; protect or defend the rights or property of Runbox Solutions.”
Transparency report published; no warrant canary, no notification commitment. Live report: “On this page you will find statistics on requests for disclosure of individual customer data that Runbox Solutions AS has received directly from authorities and others (law firms, individuals, etc) … This page is up to date as of 2026-08-31.” Update cadence is irregular rather than scheduled. The per-year table covers 2011 to 2026 and totals 33 requests received, 17 complied with and 16 rejected. Who is asking decides the outcome: of 15 requests from Norwegian authorities Runbox complied with 13 and rejected 2, while of 14 requests from foreign authorities it complied with 4 and rejected 10, and all 4 requests in the “Other” category (law firms, individuals) were rejected. Two entries carry the footnote “This request was received/processed in different calendar years”, which is why the 2018 and 2019 rows do not balance on their own. The busiest year is 2024 with 6 requests. Source: Transparency Report [archive]. Historical Runbox MD statement: “To date Runbox have received a total of 4 requests for information from Norwegian or foreign authorities, and complied with 1 request from Norwegian authorities after having been presented a Norwegian court order.” No warrant canary; no commitment to notify users when legally permitted.
Log retention. “Server logs relating to email delivery are stored for 10 days, while server logs relating to usage of the web interface are stored for 1 month.” IP stripping on outbound: “When sending email with the Runbox 6 Webmail, your IP address is no longer included in the message headers.” Source: Runbox email privacy 2013-06 [archive].
Account-deletion + backup retention. Privacy Policy: “Email service content … is stored in main storage on servers located in Norway for as long as your account is active and: up to 3 months after closure of trial accounts; or up to 6 months after closure of subscribed accounts.” Backups: “Backup of Account Content is stored on secure servers separate from the Runbox system for up to 6 months, even after the content has been deleted from the main storage, except for accounts that have activated the ‘No backup’ feature more than 6 months prior to this.” Account-Information records retained up to 5 years post-closure per Norwegian bookkeeping law.
Signup data + anonymous payment. Privacy policy: “You consent to providing us with the following personal data when you register an account: First name, last name, company name (where applicable), mobile phone number (where applicable), country, and alternative email address.” Phone is optional; first/last/country/alt-email required. Real-name accuracy is not technically verified. The reviewed provider documents do not establish Tor support. Crypto: “Runbox supports Coinbase payments via Coinbase Commerce and direct transfers to our Coinbase wallet” and “After selecting the desired products, select ‘Pay with Bitcoin’ as the payment method.” Cash: “Cash is sent via regular mail at your own risk, and is not recommended.” Checks and money orders no longer accepted. Sources: Coinbase payments help [archive], Bitcoin payments blog [archive], Payment methods [archive].
2FA: TOTP + OTP only. Blog (June 2017): “Runbox 2FA currently supports Timed One-Time Passwords (TOTP) and One-Time Passwords (OTP) as additional factors. We are planning to expand this with Yubikey or U2F support.” WebAuthn / FIDO2 / YubiKey remained “planned” as of May 2026, over eight years on. Source: Runbox 2FA [archive].
No native mobile app. Runbox 7 webmail is delivered as a Progressive Web App (PWA), installable on iOS via Safari “Add to Home Screen” and on Android via the browser prompt. Standard IMAP clients work normally. Source: Runbox 7 features [archive].
Custom domains + catch-all + unlimited aliases. “To host your domain’s mail with Runbox, you can add it from the Account » Email Hosting screen. You must change your domain’s MX records to mx.runbox.com” (MX takeover, all-or-nothing per domain). “The number of email aliases you can create on your own domain name is unlimited.” Catch-all on hosted domains: “Runbox supports a so-called ‘catch all’ function for email hosting. This means that you will receive mail on any valid address for your domain without having to setup an explicit alias. All mail will automatically be received by your main Runbox account.” Sources: FAQs [archive], Quotas [archive], Catch-all [archive].
Bootstrapped, employee-owned since 2011. About: “Runbox is owned by employees and board members (77.54% in 2024) and close associates. The company in its current form was founded in March 2011.” Recent operational incident publicly documented: Post-Event Analysis of Email Service Incident March 4th, 2026 [archive]; hardware failure remediated by rebuild and added redundancy, “No user data was lost.”
WEB.DE
Privacy Impact: MEDIUM8
German mail with optional Mailvelope and entity-level government-request reporting. Signup requires a phone number, and the free tier is advertising-funded. Subjects and routing addresses remain visible.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: WEB.DE, operated by 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH, Zweigniederlassung Karlsruhe, Brauerstr. 48, 76135 Karlsruhe; Hauptsitz Montabaur (Amtsgericht Montabaur HRB 7666; VAT DE243413002); managing directors Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. Verena Patzelt
- URL:
web.de - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes / SSEUR, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Germany: “Innerhalb unseres Sicherheitsverbunds sind alle Verbindungswege für Ihre E-Mails automatisch verschlüsselt und Ihre Mails werden in unseren Rechenzentren ausschließlich in Deutschland gespeichert”; “Der E-Mail-Austausch innerhalb des ‘E-Mail made in Germany’-Verbunds erfolgt ausnahmslos über Server in deutschen Hochleistungsrechenzentren” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in via third-party Mailvelope browser extension (Chrome/Firefox only): “Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung macht nur dann Sinn, wenn die Rechenoperationen zur Verschlüsselung auf Ihrem Rechner (und nicht auf einem Server von WEB.DE) ausgeführt werden. Dazu wird die Software Mailvelope als Erweiterung für die Browser Chrome und Firefox eingesetzt”; provider scope statement: “Durch die Kooperation mit Mailvelope wird zudem sichergestellt, dass alle sicherheitsrelevanten Daten wie Schlüssel oder zugehöriges Passwort außerhalb des Einflussbereichs von WEB.DE liegen”; WEB.DE webmail itself has no native PGP; subjects and sender/recipient addresses stay plaintext even when both correspondents use Mailvelope OK+1
- Government-access posture: Annual entity-level Jahresbericht published at the WEB.DE-branded URL (2025 figures: 37,174 subscriber-data / 2,816 traffic-data / 608 content-data disclosures / 1,681 G10/§100a interception orders against 46.32M mailboxes; “Die Sicherheitsbehörden haben keinen direkten Zugriff auf die Postfachinhalte”); no user-notification commitment (the Datenschutzhinweise say only “Überdies können Daten an andere Verantwortliche weitergegeben werden, wenn wir gesetzlich dazu verpflichtet sind oder eine behördliche oder gerichtliche Anordnung vorliegt”); no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Mobile-phone number mandatory at signup (“Geben Sie Ihre aktuelle Mobilfunknummer an … Ohne gültige Mobilfunknummer ist eine Registrierung nicht möglich”); gender + name + full postal address collected (“Wählen Sie als Geschlecht weiblich, männlich oder neutral aus und geben Sie Ihre Anschrift ein. Diese Angaben dienen der Absicherung Ihres Accounts”); account-recovery uses IDnow Autoidentverfahren or eID with the German Personalausweis; payment via SEPA-Lastschrift / PayPal / Visa / Amex / Mastercard; no crypto, no cash; Tor not stated; FreeMail’s “Consent or Pay” model couples ad financing with a non-cancellable weekly newsletter (“Der Newsletter kann nicht abbestellt werden, da er den FreeMail Dienst mitfinanziert”) BAD+2
- Funding stability: Long-established subsidiary of publicly listed United Internet AG. The group acquisitions date to 2001 for GMX and 2005 for WEB.DE; they are not recent ownership changes. Advertising remains a separate privacy concern OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
German legal entity; Montabaur jurisdiction. Impressum: “1&1 Mail & Media GmbH, Zweigniederlassung Karlsruhe, Brauerstr. 48, 76135 Karlsruhe, Deutschland … Hauptsitz Montabaur, Amtsgericht Montabaur, HRB 7666, UST-Id. DE243413002.” Managing directors: “Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. Verena Patzelt”. AGB §17: “17.1 Ausschließlicher Gerichtsstand für alle Streitigkeiten aus diesem Vertrag ist, wenn auch der Nutzer Kaufmann ist, Montabaur. 17.2 Für die von WEB.DE auf der Grundlage dieser Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen abgeschlossenen Verträge und für aus ihnen folgende Ansprüche gleich welcher [Art gilt deutsches Recht].” Parent entity: 1&1 Mail & Media Applications SE, Elgendorfer Straße 57, 56410 Montabaur, HRB 24401. Sources: Impressum [archive], AGB [archive], Mail & Media imprint [archive].
Publicly-listed parent United Internet AG. Bundestag-Lobbyregister entry for 1&1 Mail & Media Applications SE: “Die 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH gehört zur United Internet AG, Europas führendem Internetspezialist.” United Internet AG trades on Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s Xetra under ticker UTDI (ISIN DE0005089031, WKN 508903). Source: Lobbyregister R001925 [archive].
Servers in Germany; “E-Mail made in Germany” alliance. Email landing page: “Innerhalb unseres Sicherheitsverbunds sind alle Verbindungswege für Ihre E-Mails automatisch verschlüsselt und Ihre Mails werden in unseren Rechenzentren ausschließlich in Deutschland gespeichert.” E-Mail made in Germany page: “Der E-Mail-Austausch innerhalb des ‘E-Mail made in Germany’-Verbunds erfolgt ausnahmslos über Server in deutschen Hochleistungsrechenzentren. Dadurch unterliegt die Speicherung und Verarbeitung Ihrer Daten dem deutschen bzw. europäischen Datenschutzgesetz.” Encryption-at-rest details: not stated. Sources: Email [archive], E-Mail made in Germany [archive].
Mailvelope third-party PGP only. Help: “Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung macht nur dann Sinn, wenn die Rechenoperationen zur Verschlüsselung auf Ihrem Rechner (und nicht auf einem Server von WEB.DE) ausgeführt werden. Dazu wird die Software Mailvelope als Erweiterung für die Browser Chrome und Firefox eingesetzt.” And: “Durch die Kooperation mit Mailvelope wird zudem sichergestellt, dass alle sicherheitsrelevanten Daten wie Schlüssel oder zugehöriges Passwort außerhalb des Einflussbereichs von WEB.DE liegen.” Sources: PGP help [archive], PGP security [archive].
Annual Jahresbericht at WEB.DE-branded URL; no canary. Privacy Policy: “Überdies können Daten an andere Verantwortliche weitergegeben werden, wenn wir gesetzlich dazu verpflichtet sind oder eine behördliche oder gerichtliche Anordnung vorliegt.” The 2025 Jahresbericht (https://web.de/impressum/erteilte-auskuenfte-sicherheitsbehoerden-jahresbericht-2025-41806120 [archive]) covers the entire 1&1 Mail & Media entity: “Als in Deutschland ansässiges Unternehmen ist die 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH verpflichtet, unter Einhaltung strenger gesetzlicher Voraussetzungen ausschließlich deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden Auskünfte zu erteilen.” 2025 figures: “Anfragen … zu Teilnehmerbestandsdaten … 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH – deutsche Portale: 37.174”; “Anfragen … zu Verkehrsdaten … 2.816”; “Übermittlung von Inhaltsdaten an die Sicherheitsbehörden … 608”; “Anordnungen nach Artikel-10-Gesetz und §100a StPO … 1.681”; mailbox base “46,32 Millionen”. Separate DSA Art. 15 transparency at https://s.uicdn.com/pih/legal/2025TransparencyReport.xlsx [archive]. No user-notification commitment in any document; no warrant canary. Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Jahresbericht 2025 [archive], Impressum [archive].
IP and traffic-data logging; 7-day Verkehrsdaten retention; 21-day deactivation; 6-month / 1-year inactivity rules. Privacy Policy: “In den Log-Dateien werden beispielsweise folgende Informationen gespeichert: IP-Adresse, Name der abgerufenen Dateien bzw. Informationen, Datum und Uhrzeit des Abrufs, Informationen zum verwendeten Endgerät.” And: “Verkehrsdaten werden entsprechend der rechtlichen Anforderungen grundsätzlich innerhalb von sieben Tagen gelöscht.” Account deletion: “Falls du deinen Account löschen möchtest, deaktivieren wir zunächst deinen Account, überprüfen deinen Löschanspruch und löschen diesen in der Regel nach 21 Tagen.” Inactivity: “E-Mail-Inhalte von FreeMail-Postfächern, welche mehr als 180 Tage keine Logins verzeichnen (über Web, App oder IMAP/POP), können von uns ohne vorherigen Hinweis gelöscht werden.” AGB §5.3: “WEB.DE ist berechtigt, die im Account des Nutzers gespeicherten Nachrichten und sonstige Dateien nach einem Zeitraum von sechs Monaten der Inaktivität … ohne Rückfrage zu löschen. Nach einem Zeitraum von einem Jahr der Inaktivität ist WEB.DE darüber hinaus berechtigt, die vom Nutzer bei WEB.DE registrierten E-Mail-Adressen freizugeben und anderen Nutzern zur Verfügung zu stellen.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], AGB [archive].
Mobile number mandatory + IDnow / eID for recovery. Registrierung help: “Geben Sie Ihre aktuelle Mobilfunknummer an. Sie können dafür die Ländervorwahl von Deutschland oder der Schweiz auswählen. Ohne gültige Mobilfunknummer ist eine Registrierung nicht möglich.” And: “Wählen Sie als Geschlecht weiblich, männlich oder neutral aus und geben Sie Ihre Anschrift ein. Diese Angaben dienen der Absicherung Ihres Accounts.” Account-recovery via IDnow Autoidentverfahren or eID with the German Personalausweis (Privacy Policy sections “Autoidentverfahren” and “eID”). Source: Registrierung [archive].
FreeMail ad-funded; non-cancellable newsletter; “Consent or Pay”. AGB §2.4.2: “Der Newsletter kann nicht abbestellt werden, da er den FreeMail Dienst mitfinanziert.” Privacy Policy: “Um dir unsere FreeMail-Dienste ohne Entgelt zur Verfügung stellen zu können, sind Werbeeinblendungen Bestandteil unseres digitalen Angebots (Vertragserfüllung)”; “FreeMail Kunden können das WEB.DE Magazin nicht abbestellen, da dieses als fester Leistungsbestandteil des WEB.DE E-Mail-Dienstes ausgestaltet ist”; “Wir betreiben unser Angebot mit einem sogenannten ‘Consent or Pay’ Modell.” Sources: AGB [archive], Privacy Policy [archive].
WEB.DE MailPlus paid tiers (DE residents). Tarifvergleich: “3,99 € monatlich” (MailPlus), “6,49 € monatlich” (Club), “7,99 € monatlich” (Club 100); “Die Vertragslaufzeit inkl. Testphase beträgt 13 Monate. Danach setzt sich Ihr Vertrag ohne Laufzeitbegrenzung fort. Eine Kündigung ist 4 Wochen zum Ende der jeweiligen Vertragslaufzeit und im Zeitraum danach möglich.” AGB §11.3: “Die Begleichung des WEB.DE PremiumMail-Beitrags … erfolgt je nach Wahl des WEB.DE PremiumMail-Nutzers per Rechnung, Lastschrifteinzug oder Kreditkartenabbuchung.” Premium signup lists SEPA-Lastschrift / PayPal / Visa / Amex / Mastercard; no crypto, no cash. Sources: Premium [archive], AGB [archive].
Custom domains as separate SKU. “Schon ab 0,97 € mtl. Kurz und knackig, einprägsam und persönlich, authentisch und seriös: Durch klassische oder neue Top-Level-Domains wie .de, .info, .cool, .shopping oder .club werden Ihre E-Mail-Adressen noch aussagekräftiger.” And: “Preise: Mit WEB.DE FreeMail ab 1,99 € mtl. je nach gewählter Domain-Endung. Mit WEB.DE Premium erhalten Sie exklusive Preisvorteile ab 0,97 € mtl. je nach gewählter Domain-Endung.” Per-domain alias caps conflict between sources: 50 (help page) vs. 500 (marketing page). Sources: Persönliche Domains [archive], Homepage & Mail [archive], Adressen help [archive].
Catch-all: Not stated. Neither “Catch-all” nor “wildcard alias” / "*@domain" is documented anywhere on web.de help or product pages.
Aliases on @email.de are MailPlus / Club only; count not stated. Help: “Als WEB.DE FreeMail Nutzer erhalten Sie eine Standardadresse. Als WEB.DE MailPlus-Mitglied erhalten Sie weitere E-Mail-Adressen mit der exklusiven Endung @email.de und zusätzliche E-Mail-Adressen mit originellen Endungen.” And: “Diese Funktion steht Ihnen nur im WEB.DE Club oder WEB.DE MailPlus zu Verfügung.” WEB.DE never publishes a number; the 10-address cap is documented only on the GMX side of the same 1&1 Mail & Media platform. Deleted aliases blocked: “eine gelöschte Absenderadresse [bleibt] für mindestens fünf Jahre gesperrt.” Sources: Absenderadressen [archive], Verwalten [archive].
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported, opt-in. “Um POP3 oder IMAP nutzen zu können, müssen Sie diese Funktion in den WEB.DE Einstellungen einschalten.” Server data: pop3.web.de:995, imap.web.de:993, smtp.web.de:587 STARTTLS / 465 SSL. Sources: POP/IMAP toggle [archive], IMAP server data [archive].
2FA: TOTP only; WebAuthn / FIDO2 not stated. Help: “Zur Einrichtung der Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung wird eine sogenannte Authentifzierungs-App benötigt. Diese generiert für jeden Anmeldevorgang einen individuellen, temporär gültigen Zugangscode.” SMS is not offered as a login factor; the mobile number serves password recovery: “wird eine verifizierte Mobilfunknummer zur Passwort-Wiederherstellung benötigt”. Once 2FA is on, IMAP/SMTP need an “anwendungsspezifisches Passwort”. WebAuthn/FIDO2/hardware-key support is not documented. Sources: 2FA help [archive], POP/IMAP toggle [archive].
Native mobile apps (Android + iOS). “WEB.DE Mail & Cloud (Android) … WEB.DE Mail, Cloud & News (iOS) … WEB.DE Cloud (Android)”. Source: Privacy Policy app listing [archive].
GDPR controller; no standalone DPA. “Verantwortlich für die Verarbeitung deiner persönlichen Daten ist die 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH (Zweigniederlassung Karlsruhe, Brauerstr. 48, 76135 Karlsruhe; Hauptsitz Montabaur, Elgendorfer Str. 57, 56410 Montabaur).” DPO: “Datenschutzbeauftragter der 1&1 Mail & Media GmbH, Elgendorfer Str. 57, 56410 Montabaur, datenschutz@webde.de.” No standalone Art. 28 GDPR DPA published for consumer FreeMail/PremiumMail. Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
1995 founding; 2005 reorganization into 1&1 / United Internet. Impressum: “WEB.DE wurde 1995 gegründet, im Februar 1998 startete das redaktionelle Angebot.” Handelsregister context (HRB 7666 Montabaur via online-handelsregister.de): the WEB.DE AG carve-out into Combots AG and the 1&1 Internet AG / WEB.DE GmbH consolidation are documented in the entity’s historical filings. Founders Michael and Matthias Greve per Media Ownership Monitor Germany (germany.mom-gmr.org/en/media/online/outlet/web-de-113669). Sources: Impressum [archive], Handelsregister WEB.DE [archive].
Disroot
Privacy Impact: HIGH9
A free Dutch nonprofit mailbox with minimal signup information. Ordinary stored messages are readable by the operator; users must manage PGP themselves.
Availability checked November 14, 2026. Disroot’s homepage reports a major storage-server failure. Existing mailboxes are inaccessible, with temporary storage for incoming mail. This does not change the privacy rubric, but it prevents treating the profile as a recommendation to migrate now. Source: Disroot service notice [archive].
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Disroot, operated by Stichting Disroot.org, a Dutch non-profit foundation (KVK 69988099)
- URL:
disroot.org - HQ jurisdiction: Netherlands (9 Eyes / 14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Netherlands (“our own servers, located in a data center in the Netherlands”) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None: disk encryption against physical seizure only; “all emails, unless encrypted by the user (with GnuPG/PGP, for example) are stored unencrypted on our servers”; no provider-managed PGP integration BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No public periodic transparency report; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Free basic mailbox with no real name, phone number or home address required; confirmation email required. Tor support is not documented. Paid storage and donation routes have separate billing requirements OK+1
- Funding stability: Non-profit foundation since 2015; volunteer-run, donation-supported; “all revenues from the Disroot platform are invested back into the project” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Stichting Disroot.org (Dutch foundation, KVK 69988099), Amsterdam, Netherlands. Privacy policy: “For the purposes of the GDPR, Disroot.org is the ‘data controller’. This means that Disroot determines the purposes for which and the manner which your data is processed.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Dutch hosting, Dutch law. “We store all data in our own servers, located in a data center in the Netherlands.” And: “Disroot.org is hosted in the Netherlands and therefore is subject to Dutch laws and jurisdiction.” Source: ToS archives: 1, 2, 3 and Privacy Policy [archive].
No zero-access on email content. “We use disk encryption on all servers to prevent data leak in case the servers are stolen, confiscated or in any way physically tampered with.” But on emails specifically: “All emails, unless encrypted by the user (with GnuPG/PGP, for example) are stored unencrypted on our servers.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. Disk encryption protects against physical seizure but not against the provider or against compelled disclosure of data at rest while servers are running.
Tight log retention. “We store logs of your activity for a period no longer than 24 hours (unless specified otherwise per service).” Email-specific: “IP addresses of currently logged in users via IMAP/POP3 protocols are stored as long as the device is logged in the server (per each device logged in).” Server logs “are stored for a period of 24 hours after which they are deleted from the server. No backup of log files is created.”
Minimal signup data. “A valid email address: required for account creation. This email address is deleted from our database after the account has been approved/denied, unless the user chooses during the registration process, to keep it for password reset process.” And: “We do not require any additional information that is not crucial for the operation of the service (we do not ask for phone numbers, private personal data, home address).” Tor: not stated.
Account deletion. FAQ: “To delete your Disroot account log in to https://user.disroot.org [archive] and select ‘Delete My Account’. … Accounts and their data are wiped on daily.” Source: FAQ [archive].
No transparency report, no canary, no notification commitment. Provider docs do not publish a periodic government-request transparency report. The only “transparency report” reference in the privacy policy is per-user, addressed to the account holder “under suspicion of breaking our Terms Of Services”, not a government-request disclosure mechanism.
Free mailbox and paid extras. Disroot’s published perks page lists a free 1 GB mailbox and optional paid storage. The free account needs no billing identity. Payment methods for upgrades should be checked when the site returns from maintenance. Source: Disroot perks [archive].
Non-profit foundation, volunteer-run since 2015. “Disroot.org is a non-profit foundation and all revenues from the Disroot platform are invested back into the project, the maintenance of services and into free software development.” And: “The project is based in Amsterdam, was founded by Muppeth and Antilopa in 2015, it is maintained by volunteers and relies on the support of its community.” Sources: Mission statement [archive] and About [archive].
Documentation gaps for custom domains. Disroot offers custom-domain linking as a donation perk (“It allows you to use your own domain to be able to send and receive emails. It is a lifetime reward.”, per Disroot perks [archive]) but does not document the per-account domain cap, whether aliases can span domains, catch-all support, or whether full-domain MX takeover is required. Plus-addressing is supported on the disroot.org domain.
Mailo
Privacy Impact: HIGH9
French mail with optional OpenPGP and a passphrase-encrypted private key stored in the account. Ordinary messages have no documented zero-access protection, and signup asks for identifying details.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Mailo, operated by MAILO SAS, France; technology by Mail Object
- URL:
mailo.com - HQ jurisdiction: France (9 Eyes / 14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: France OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None for default mailbox; opt-in OpenPGP with server-stored keypair (Mailo holds both public and private keys, the private key encrypted by passphrase); no encryption-at-rest claim OK+1
- Government-access posture: No transparency report; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary; states it may provide data only on French magistrate authorization BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: First/last name + DOB asked at signup; payment via card / PayPal / surcharged phone only; no crypto, no cash; Tor not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Privately held French SAS; mixed business model (ad-supported free + paid subscriptions); MAILO SAS registered 2019, technology by Mail Object since the late 1990s OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by MAILO SAS (RCS 851585547), France; service edited by Mail Object. “Le service Mailo (anciennement NetCourrier) est édité par la société française Mail Object et en utilise la technologie.” Source: About Mailo (press) [archive].
French hosting, French law. “Mailo is hosted in France in a specialized host center with 24-hour supervision.” Source: Who we are [archive]. ToU: “This contract… is governed by French law. Any dispute concerning the validity, interpretation or execution of these Terms of Use will, after failure of any conciliation, be submitted to the competent courts.”
Server-side PGP, not zero-access. “Pour vous permettre d’utiliser PGP en toute facilité, Mailo stocke votre paire de clés (clé privée + clé publique) et les clés publiques de vos correspondants.” (Mailo stores your keypair: private key + public key, and your contacts’ public keys.) Source: Blog: encrypt with PGP [archive]. And: “Net-C propose une intégration de PGP côté serveur, avec tiers de confiance.” (Net-C offers server-side PGP integration as a trusted third party.) No encryption-at-rest claim in Mailo’s own docs.
No transparency report, no canary. Privacy rules: “Mailo may be required to provide data to the police, gendarmerie and justice authorities in a strict legal framework with the authorization of a magistrate.” Source: Privacy rules [archive]. The charter adds: “The users’ data is confidential: no backdoor is open for anyone, even authorities requesting access outside a specific legal framework.” No published transparency report; no warrant canary; no explicit user-notification clause.
Identifying data at signup. “you provide personal information that you explicitly fill in such as your first and last name, your e-mail address, your date of birth or your language.” DOB is mandatory to verify the user is 16+. Source: Privacy rules [archive].
No anonymous payment. FAQ: “Mailo vous permet de régler en ligne de façon totalement sécurisée par carte bancaire (CB, Visa, Mastercard) ou par PayPal.” Source: Payment methods [archive]. ToU adds “a surcharged phone number” as an option. No crypto, no cash. Tor not mentioned anywhere in Mailo’s own docs.
2FA: TOTP only. “Pour renforcer la sécurité de votre compte, vous pouvez activer la double authentification (2FA).” Provider response on FIDO2/U2F hardware keys: “Bonjour, ce n’est pas prévu aujourd’hui.” (Not planned today.) SMS 2FA explicitly rejected as insecure. Source: 2FA FAQ [archive].
Logs. Detailed connection history (with IP) retained 30 days and exposed in the user panel for self-audit. A broader IP-log retention policy is not stated.
Account deletion. Free accounts inactive for 12 months are auto-deleted; ToU: “All their data will then be permanently deleted.” No grace-period window stated for user-initiated deletion.
Mixed funding model. “Pour assurer ses équilibres financiers et sa pérennité, Mailo dispose de deux modèles économiques : – des boîtes aux lettres gratuites avec des bannières publicitaires dans le webmail – des packs…” Source: About Mailo (press) [archive]. Per French government registry, MAILO SAS was registered 15 May 2019; Mail Object (the underlying tech company) is older. No outside investors mentioned.
Riseup
Privacy Impact: HIGH9
An invitation-only nonprofit service with Tor access and password-protected mailbox storage. The server must be trusted during active sessions. US hosting is a provisional assumption, distinct from its documented US operator.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Riseup Networks, registered 501(c)(4) nonprofit; PO Box 3027, Lacey, WA 98509 USA; “The Riseup Collective is an autonomous body based in Seattle with collective members world wide”
- URL:
riseup.net - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act); “Riseup is a registered nonprofit under section 501(c)(4) of the US Internal Revenue Code” BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Not stated in provider docs (only that they have “physical control of our servers, they are not hosted ‘in the cloud’”); Riseup is US-based and operates from Seattle; assume US BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Personally-encrypted storage for new accounts since March 2017: Riseup unwraps the user key during a session (“With Riseup’s new system, you still put faith in the server while you are logged in”); structurally equivalent to StartMail’s vault model; “the email ‘subject’ and routing information regarding the message ‘from’ and ’to’ are seen by our servers in the clear when the email initially arrives” OK+1
- Government-access posture: Published warrant canary with a quarterly update schedule (Feb 1 / May 1 / Aug 1 / Nov 1); no published government-request statistics (“transparency report”); no explicit user-notification commitment (in 2017 a sealed gag order prevented disclosure of two FBI warrants) BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Tor onion services for IMAP/POP3/SMTP and web (“5gdvpfoh6kb2iqbizb37lzk2ddzrwa47m6rpdueg2m656fovmbhoptqd.onion”); invite-code signup with no phone or personal info; cash by post and crypto (Monero, Zcash, Bitcoin) accepted for donations GOOD0
- Funding stability: 501(c)(4) nonprofit, operating since around 1999 (described in a 2024 newsletter as “almost 25 years ago”); donation-funded with no advertisers or investors; “all financial decisions by the Riseup Collective are made using the consensus process” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
US nonprofit collective. Donate page: “Riseup is a registered nonprofit under section 501(c)(4) of the US Internal Revenue Code.” Legal address: “Riseup Networks, PO Box 3027, Lacey, WA 98509 USA”. The collective is described as “an autonomous body based in Seattle with collective members world wide”. Sources: Donate [archive], Contact [archive], About [archive].
Washington-state law, King County courts. ToS: “You agree that these Terms of Service and your use of riseup’s services is governed by the law of the State of Washington and any claim or dispute shall be resolved in the Superior Court for King County, Washington.” Source: Terms of Service [archive].
Personally-encrypted storage since March 2017, but not E2EE. Privacy policy: “All of your data is stored in an encrypted format, and only Riseup has the keys to decrypt the data. Additionally, as of March 2017, the storage for all new accounts is personally encrypted. Riseup is unable to read any of the stored content for these accounts.” Canary statement: “We have taken action to ensure that Riseup never again has access to a user’s stored email in plaintext.” But the same statement clarifies the model: “To be absolutely clear, this type of encryption is not end-to-end message encryption. With Riseup’s new system, you still put faith in the server while you are logged in. For full end-to-end email encryption, as before, you must use a client that supports OpenPGP (and is not web-based).” And the metadata gap: “Even when using end-to-end OpenPGP encryption for email messages, the email ‘subject’ and routing information regarding the message ‘from’ and ’to’ are seen by our servers in the clear when the email initially arrives. This is due to inherent limitations in the email protocol and in OpenPGP.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive] and Canary Statement [archive].
No IP retention. “No IP addresses of any user for any service are retained.” And: “Unlike corporate providers, we do not log internet addresses of anyone using riseup.net services, including email.” From/To metadata logged for abuse-prevention: “In order to detect when our servers are under attack from a ‘spam bomb’ or when a spammer is using our system, we keep a log of the ‘from’ or ’to’ information for every message relayed. These logs are purged on a daily basis.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Warrant canary, no published transparency report. Canary page: “Riseup positively confirms that the integrity of our system is sound: all our infrastructure is in our control, we have not been compromised or suffered a data breach, we have not disclosed any private encryption keys, and we have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party.” Re-signing schedule: “This canary will be re-signed on the following dates: February 1, May 1, August 1, November 1.” Source: Canary [archive]. General posture: “We will do everything in our power to protect the data of social movements and activists, short of extended incarceration. We would rather pull the plug than submit to repressive surveillance by our government, or any government.” Source: Recent email provider closures [archive]. No periodic government-request statistics page.
Tor onion services for IMAP / POP3 / SMTP. “We provide Tor Onion Services (Hidden Services) in case you need to increase your anonymity or circumvent possible blocks to our services.” And: “mail.riseup.net: 5gdvpfoh6kb2iqbizb37lzk2ddzrwa47m6rpdueg2m656fovmbhoptqd.onion (ports 25, 80, 110, 143, 465, 587, 993, 995).” Sources: Email [archive] and Tor [archive].
Invite-code signup, no phone. “In order to create an account you will need an invite: 1. Obtain an Invite Code from a friend who trusts you … 2. Use the Invite Code by visiting account.riseup.net to create your account.” And: “Because we do not require a phone number or billing information, we need some alternate way to prevent abuse.” And: “We do not require you to sign up with a phone number or personal information. Instead, we rely on invite codes.” Sources: Mail accounts [archive] and Email [archive].
Anonymous payment paths for donations. “You can send us cash in any currency in the mail to our PO Box. People do this all the time.” And: “Or use a cryptocurrency. Monero and Zcash are anonymous. For Bitcoin, you need to do a bit of work if you want to ensure strong anonymity with Bitcoin.” No paid email tiers: donations are “asked” but not required. Source: Donate [archive].
No webmail 2FA; no account-level 2FA documented. “We are not currently offering two-factor authentication for Roundcube, as the plugin had a lot of problems. Sorry.” Source: Roundcube 2FA [archive]. Account-level 2FA mechanisms (TOTP, WebAuthn/FIDO2, SMS) for the wider Riseup account are not documented in the help pages reviewed.
Small storage; no migration tool. “For different reasons we can only provide 1 GB of storage space for e-mail.” Source: Email [archive]. No automated import/migration tool from Gmail or generic IMAP is documented.
Custom domains and catch-all not offered. Riseup documents alias addresses on riseup.net and forwarding rules. A third-party-domain feature exists but is sender-only and discouraged: “Riseup also allows registering aliases for other 3rd party domains. This is an advanced usage and we don’t recommend you try to do it if you are not familiar with advanced email internals.” And: “If you add an alias for a domain other than riseup.net, mails sent to that address will not automatically arrive in your riseup account.” No catch-all / wildcard alias support is documented. Source: Aliases [archive].
2017 sealed-warrant compliance. Canary statement: “After exhausting our legal options, Riseup recently chose to comply with two sealed warrants from the FBI, rather than facing contempt of court (which would have resulted in jail time for Riseup birds and/or termination of the Riseup organization). There was a ‘gag order’ that prevented us from disclosing even the existence of these warrants until now. This was also the reason why we could not update our ‘Canary’.” The personally-encrypted storage rollout was the technical response: “We have taken action to ensure that Riseup never again has access to a user’s stored email in plaintext. Starting today, all new Riseup email accounts will feature personally encrypted storage on our servers, only accessible by you.” Source: Canary statement [archive]. The statement documents those two requests after the disclosure restriction ended.
Seeweb
Privacy Impact: HIGH9
Italian business mail with optional PGP in Roundcube. The provider processes ordinary messages for spam filtering and backups; those messages are not protected from provider access.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Cloud Mail (legacy TrueMail; mail and webmail endpoints still on
mail.truemail.it/webmail.truemail.it), operated by SEEWEB srl, Via Armando Vona 66, 03100 Frosinone, Italy (P.IVA 02043220603; capitale sociale €103,000; CCIAA 17793/98; REA 126233) - URL:
seeweb.it/prodotti/cloud-mail - HQ jurisdiction: Italy (14 Eyes / SSEUR, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Italy: “Tale backup avviene sempre off-site (su Data Center Seeweb distante da quello dove viene gestito il servizio di posta)”; “L’aderenza al CISPE e quindi anche al GDPR garantisce inoltre che i dati siano gestiti e conservati esclusivamente all’interno del territorio europeo”; data centers in Milan (2), Frosinone (1), partner facilities in Lugano / Zurich / Sofia OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: Cloud Mail is server-side plaintext (the provider performs “filtri basati su un elevato numero di controlli locali e servizi di reputazione … esaminandone il contenuto” and full daily backups via IBM Spectrum Protect); opt-in client-side PGP is offered in the Roundcube webmail (“chiavi PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)”, user procedure: “basta accedere alla webmail; aprire le impostazioni; creare la tua chiave; inviare email in modo crittografato”); no PGP-encrypted-by-default model and no server-side encryption-at-rest claim for message bodies OK+1
- Government-access posture: No transparency report on any Seeweb-owned domain; no warrant canary; no user-notification commitment (CGV Art. 14 merely refers to the Privacy Policy and does not contain Art. 28 GDPR notification clauses); no public DPA template; DPAs are signed bilaterally on request to
dpo@seeweb.it(DPO Tamara Arduini named); “transparency” in marketing copy refers to pricing predictability, not government requests BAD+3 - Anonymous signup: Full business data and contract acceptance required (“All’interno di quest’area riservata ci devono essere tutti i dati aziendali e il contratto (le condizioni generali) caricato”); payment limited to “PayPal, Paypal Preautorizzato Automatico, Bonifico Bancario, Sepa/Rid”; direct credit-card checkout is not listed in either the Italian or English FAQ; no cryptocurrency, no cash; Tor not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded 1998 (“Siamo un Cloud Computing Provider italiano che offre soluzioni IT dal 1998”); Seeweb founded the DHH (Dominion Hosting Holding) holdco in 2015 and was rolled into it in 2020; DHH S.p.A. is publicly listed on Euronext Growth Milan (ticker DHH.MI, ISIN IT0005203622; IPO 2016-07-27 at EUR 10.00/share raising EUR 4.2M); founder-aligned listing structure (“ecosistema di aziende indipendenti … in cui i vari partner mantengono il proprio marchio”) OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Italian Srl; Foro di Frosinone. Condizioni Generali: “il soggetto erogatore dei servizi di cui all’accordo, giuridicamente individuato nella SEEWEB srl proponente il presente accordo di fornitura di servizi.” Privacy Policy: “Il Titolare del Trattamento dei suoi dati personali è Seeweb Srl, P.IVA 02043220603 - Via Armando Vona, 66 - 03100 Frosinone – Italia.” Footer: “Seeweb © srl 1998-2026 – c.s. 103.000 EURO - CCIAA 17793/98 - REA 126233 - p.iva e c/f 02043220603.” Art. 11 Condizioni Generali: “Il rapporto di fornitura è regolato dalle leggi dello Stato Italiano. Per tutte le controversie relative al presente accordo le parti riconoscono la competenza esclusiva e sussidiaria del foro di Frosinone; in via principale sarà competente un arbitro, il quale seguirà le procedure stabilite dal regolamento depositato presso la CCIAA di Milano.” Sources: Condizioni Generali [archive], Privacy Policy [archive].
DHH publicly-listed parent. “Seeweb, dopo aver fondato - nel 2015 - DHH (Dominion Hosting Holding), nel 2020 è entrata a far parte del gruppo. … DHH è una società per azioni quotata in Borsa, sul mercato Euronext Growth Milan.” DHH S.p.A. trades on Euronext Growth Milan under ticker DHH.MI (ISIN IT0005203622); IPO priced at EUR 10.00/share on 2016-07-27 raising EUR 4.2M (Euronext IPO listing). Sources: DHH group page [archive].
EU-only data; Italian + EU data centers. “L’aderenza al CISPE e quindi anche al GDPR garantisce inoltre che i dati siano gestiti e conservati esclusivamente all’interno del territorio europeo.” Sysadmin Giovanni Metitieri (quoted in CWI/DigitalWorld Italia): “il backup giornaliero remoto, allocato in modalità off-site nei datacenter italiani di Seeweb … Nessun rischio di data profiling, quindi, né di dati al di fuori dei confini dell’Italia.” Data-center footprint: “Le nostre sedi di Milano, Frosinone e Lugano sono dotate, ognuna, di risorse di rete IP indipendenti.” Privacy Policy: “Il Titolare informa che effettuerà il trattamento dei dati conferiti, prevalentemente in via diretta o attraverso incarico ad altro soggetto comunque in ambito Europeo.” Sources: Cloud Mail docs [archive], Truemail guide [archive], Data centers [archive], Privacy Policy [archive].
TLS in transit; encryption-at-rest details Not stated. “Posta in ingresso Imap: Server: mail.truemail.it Porta: 143 Protocollo: STARTTLS … POP3: … Porta: 110 Protocollo: STARTTLS … Posta in uscita SMTP: Server: mail.truemail.it Porta: 587 Protocollo: STARTTLS” (with alternatives 993/SSL, 995/STARTTLS, 465/SSL). No at-rest algorithm disclosed on seeweb.it, docs.seeweb.it, or blog.seeweb.it. Source: Cloud Mail docs [archive].
Server-side plaintext + opt-in Roundcube PGP. Truemail guide: “chiavi PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)”; user procedure: “basta accedere alla webmail; aprire le impostazioni; creare la tua chiave; inviare email in modo crittografato (il destinatario deve usare lo stesso sistema).” Content-level inspection is documented: “filtri basati su un elevato numero di controlli locali e servizi di reputazione. Questi controlli avvengono sia prima della ricezione del messaggio (valutando l’IP, il dominio del mittente e il comportamento del suo mail server) che esaminandone il contenuto per individuare eventuali segnali tipici di spam o virus.” Metitieri in datamanager.it: “un filtro antispam che è in grado di restituire il 99% di messaggi genuini”. Sources: Truemail guide [archive], Cloud Mail docs [archive].
IP logging aggregated; 24-month post-contract removal; 30-day mail backup retention; 15-day account-termination grace. Privacy Policy: “Dati derivanti da implicita trasmissione nell’uso dei protocolli di comunicazione di Internet … indirizzi IP o i nomi a dominio dei computer utilizzati dagli utenti … Questi dati vengono raccolti in forma esclusivamente aggregata … per ragioni tecniche di corretto funzionamento.” Retention: “Dichiariamo che, trascorsi 24 mesi dal termine delle obbligazioni contrattuali o dalle attività di presales e commerciali richieste, rimuoveremo i dati personali non diversamente necessari per normative cogenti.” Art. 10 Condizioni Generali: “La ‘sospensione’ o ‘cessazione’ del servizio non comporterà la distruzione immediata del materiale … decorso il termine di giorni 15 dalla data di sospensione e/o cessazione del servizio – si intende autorizzata la rimozione dai server di proprietà del FORNITORE e la relativa distruzione.” Cloud Mail backup: “in caso di cancellazione di una email, garantisce il mantenimento dello storico per un massimo di 30 giorni.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Condizioni Generali [archive], Cloud Mail docs [archive].
No transparency report; CISPE Code of Conduct adherence. Privacy Policy: “Il Titolare dichiara di aver aderito ad un codice di condotta vincolante e certificativo in tema di trattamento di dati personali come istituito agli artt. 40 e 42 GDPR.” English Cloud Mail page: “the Seeweb Cloud Mail service is built on CISPE certified Cloud platforms, the European Code of Conduct in line with the GDPR policies on data protection.” Seeweb stance: “SEEWEB srl … shall act as Data Controller for the data collection, processing and management phases that are necessary for providing the services requested.” DPO Tamara Arduini named publicly: “il Titolare … ai sensi dell’art. 37 GDPR ha nominato Tamara Arduini Responsabile della Protezione dei Dati - Data Protection Officer … mail: dpo@seeweb.it.” The CISPE Code of Conduct received a positive EDPB opinion on 2021-05-19 and CNIL approval on 2021-06-03. No transparency report, no warrant canary, no user-notification commitment is published on any Seeweb-owned domain. Sources: Privacy Policy [archive], Cloud Mail EN [archive].
Custom domain mandatory; per-customer AOP aggregates all instances. Order form requires domain: “Nome del dominio (obbligatorio) … Inserisci il nome del dominio da associare al tuo hosting.” Cloud Mail docs: “per ogni cliente viene generato un solo account con cui è possibile gestire tutti i prodotti Cloud Mail attivati con il relativo account AOP.” Blog: “Il cliente che acquista un account Cloud Mail potrà creare più servizi per tutti i domini che vuole e rivenderli a terzi.” Plesk scope is per-domain: “dal menù di sinistra cliccare su Siti web e domini –> dominio.tld –> account di posta”. Cross-domain workaround is mailbox forwarding (“inoltro”); aliases are same-domain by default. Custom-domain attachment is MX-only, not a full DNS takeover: “Non è necessario che quest’ultimo sia gestito da Seeweb. In caso il dominio del cliente sia registrato presso un altro provider, sarà possibile modificarne solo i record mail.” Sources: Cloud Mail product page [archive], Cloud Mail docs [archive], Email-hosting blog [archive].
Catch-all: Not stated on any Seeweb-owned page. Searches across seeweb.it, docs.seeweb.it, and blog.seeweb.it for “catch-all”, “wildcard” and "*@dominio" return nothing. The Cloud Mail documentation enumerates “Alias, inoltri e risposte automatiche” but never uses the term catch-all.
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported. “Configurazione in IMAP la posta viene salvata sul server … Configurazione in POP3 la posta viene scaricata sul client”. Source: Cloud Mail docs [archive].
Storage 5 GB → 1,280 GB. Product page: “5 GB + 5 Caselle” (entry) up to “1280 GB + 1280 Caselle” (max). Migration is paid-only: “Migrazione da mail server esterno | 63,50 €/10 Caselle”. WhiteLabel reseller add-on: “Cloud Mail WhiteLabel … Sì - 45,50 €/mese”. Billing: “Fatturazione mensile a partire dal piano da 80GB. Durata contrattuale 12 mesi.” Source: Cloud Mail product page [archive].
Entry price 10 €/year + VAT. Seeweb’s product page renders prices via JavaScript (static HTML carries only the placeholder “Totale Annuale 0,00 €”). The numeric entry price is sourced from Seeweb sysadmin Giovanni Metitieri quoted in CWI/DigitalWorld Italia (Quine Srl, Tribunale di Milano n. 295 del 28-11-2018): “L’offerta Cloud Mail parte da soli 10 euro all’anno più IVA per un pacchetto da 5 GB di spazio disco e un massimo di 5 caselle email e arriva fino a 1.280 GB e altrettante caselle.” Cooling-off: “Il termine per l’esercizio di tale diritto è di giorni 10 dalla data di attivazione del servizio.” Source: CWI / Cloud Mail [archive], Condizioni Generali Art. 13 [archive].
Payment: PayPal / SEPA-RID / bank transfer only, no credit card listed. Italian FAQ: “si potrà pagare direttamente dal proprio centro contabile online con vari metodi: Paypal, Paypal Preautorizzato Automatico, Bonifico Bancario, Sepa/Rid.” English FAQ confirms: “Payments can be made directly from your online billing center using various methods: PayPal, Automatic Pre-Authorized PayPal, Bank Transfer, and SEPA/RID.” No card, no crypto, no cash. Sources: FAQ IT [archive], FAQ EN [archive].
No native mobile app; no documented 2FA on customer area. “Puoi configurarlo su Android e iOS, usando Outlook o Thunderbird.” The Cloud Mail product page references multi-factor authentication only abstractly: “Sofisticati sistemi criptati e autenticazioni a più fattori possono proteggere i tuoi messaggi e i dati in essi contenuti.” aop.seeweb.it (customer area) is blocked by robots.txt; the absence of 2FA documentation does not prove absence of the feature, only that it is undocumented on Seeweb-owned domains.
Forward Email
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
Paid US-hosted mailboxes use password-encrypted storage, including indexes. The IMAP server receives the password and decrypts the database during use. The free forwarding service is a separate product.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Forward Email, operated by Forward Email LLC (United States); founded by Nicholas Baugh in 2017 and still run by “its original founding team of designers and developers”
- URL:
forwardemail.net - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act); ToS: “Any claim relating to Forward Email’s web site shall be governed by the laws of the State of Delaware without regard to its conflict of law provisions” BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: USA, per “Our servers are located primarily in Denver, Colorado”, on DataPacket bare metal since February 2025, with mailbox backups on Cloudflare R2. The FAQ carries a standing note that an EU location under
forwardemail.eumay be announced, which would change this line but has not yet BAD+3 - Zero-access encryption: Per-mailbox SQLite encryption covers bodies, subjects, attachments and indexes at rest. The IMAP server receives the password and decrypts during use; scored as server-side session decryption. Free forwarding is a separate product, not a stored mailbox OK+1
- Government-access posture: An explicit notification commitment with a stated objection window, no warrant canary, and no transparency report anywhere on the site despite the whitepaper claiming “We publish regular transparency reports” BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Signup needs an email address; the stored-mailbox product is paid. Free forwarding does not qualify as a free mailbox. The crypto route is USDC settled through Stripe rather than a direct on-chain payment, there is no cash option, and Tor is not stated OK+1
- Funding stability: Bootstrapped and founder-owned since October 2017, no disclosed investors. Nine years, which is short of the rubric’s ten-year independence threshold OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
US entity, US law, US servers. The site, the license file and the technical whitepaper all name Forward Email LLC. Governing law is Delaware, per the ToS. Server location, from the FAQ: “Our servers are located primarily in Denver, Colorado – see https://forwardemail.net/ips [archive] for our complete list of IP addresses.” The same FAQ answer carries a forward-looking note: “We may soon announce our EU datacenter location hosted under forwardemail.eu.” An earlier statement was blunter about the intent: “All of our servers are in the United States, and we have no plans at this time to move outside the USA.” Sources: Terms [archive] and FAQ [archive].
The server receives the decryption secret. Forward Email’s technical guide describes the database key as “your decrypted in-memory only password”, passed from the IMAP client to its server. This is password-protected storage with server-side decryption during use. An E2EE message needs separate client-side encryption. Source: Quantum Resistant Email [archive].
Forwarding has a logging exception. Privacy policy: “We do not store any forwarded emails to disk storage nor databases. We do not store any metadata about forwarded emails to disk storage nor databases. Except as expressly described in this policy, we do not store logs or IP addresses to disk storage nor databases.” The named exception is short-lived: “We store 4xx and 5xx SMTP response code error logs for 7 days. Error logs contain the SMTP error, envelope, and email headers (we do not store the email body nor attachments). Error logs may contain IP addresses and hostnames of sending servers for debugging purposes.” Source: Privacy [archive].
Notification and an objection window. “We may additionally notify an Account about a law enforcement request, unless we are prohibited from doing so by law or court order.” And, on process: “If a request for information by law enforcement is valid, then we will preserve necessary and requested Account information and make a reasonable effort to contact the Account owner by their registered and verified email address (e.g. within 7 calendar days). If we receive a timely objection (e.g. within 7 calendar days), then we will withhold sharing Account information and continue the legal process as necessary.” Source: Report abuse [archive]. The policy gives seven days as an example response window, not a guaranteed deadline.
A transparency report that is claimed but not published. The technical whitepaper states “Forward Email is committed to transparency about government requests. We publish regular transparency reports that include: 1. The number and types of government requests received…”. No such report exists on the site: there is no transparency page, and the string does not appear on the security or business pages. The gap matters because it is the difference between a policy and a record, and this article scores the record. There is no warrant canary either.
A first external audit, published in full with the bad findings in it. Cure53 tested Forward Email’s architecture and infrastructure in May 2026, in the first review the company had ever commissioned, and Forward Email published the report unredacted. Cure53’s own summary: “it is quite alarming that Cure53 was able to unveil several High and Critical vulnerabilities in the frames of this Forward Email examination. A wide array of major vulnerabilities was observed, including XSS issues, RCE, IDOR, as well as SSRF problems.” Ten findings, of which “Cure53 detected two Critical and four High-level security vulnerabilities”: FWD-01-001, an IDOR in the invite-accept route granting domain access, and FWD-01-010, an admin remote-code-execution path through MongoDB query injection. Every one of the ten carries the same closing line in the published report: “This issue has been fixed by the development team and verified by Cure53 to be working as expected. The described issue no longer exists.” Source: Pentest-Report Forward Email Arch & Infrastructure 05.2026 [archive]. The report documents serious vulnerabilities and verified fixes. Cure53 also recommended a further assessment; no subsequent report was established in the reviewed sources.
The published code uses both MPL-2.0 and Business Source License 1.1. The latter is a source-available license, so the whole codebase should not be described as open source without that qualification. Reading repository code also does not verify what is deployed on the live service.
Stored mailboxes require payment. The advertised cryptocurrency route is USDC through Stripe. That satisfies this rubric’s payment-route criterion but does not establish anonymous billing or unlinkable transactions. Free forwarding is assessed separately from mailbox storage.
Bootstrapped since 2017. “The service is maintained and owned by its original founding team of designers and developers”, founded by Nicholas Baugh with the domain bought on 2017-10-02, out of beta on 2020-11-23 and at v1.0 in March 2025. No venture capital is disclosed. The long-term independence criterion requires more than ten years of operation; Forward Email has not reached that threshold.
Gandi Mail
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
French-operated mail hosted in France and Luxembourg, within the Your.Online group. Message encryption is the customer’s responsibility; Gandi publishes a DSA transparency report.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: GandiMail, operated by GANDI SAS, Paris, France; owned by Total Webhosting Solutions B.V. (Netherlands), ultimate parent Stichting Carbonara
- URL:
gandi.net - HQ jurisdiction: France (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: France (Equinix PA3, Saint-Denis) + Luxembourg (LuxConnect DC2) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None: Trust Center explicitly places this on the customer BAD+3
- Government-access posture: DSA transparency report published; no notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Not stated: Tor, crypto, cash not documented BAD+2
- Funding stability: Acquired by Total Webhosting Solutions B.V. (Your.Online group) BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by GANDI SAS, registered in Paris, France (RCS Paris 423 093 459). Privacy Policy names “Gandi SAS” as data controller. Owned by Total Webhosting Solutions B.V. with ultimate parent Stichting Carbonara, per Terms of Use [archive].
EU hosting. Trust Center: data centers in “France: Saint-Denis Equinix PA3” and “Luxembourg: Bissen LuxConnect DC2”. Source: gandi.net trust center [archive].
No provider-side message encryption. Trust Center: “Note: Encryption of customer information such as emails or data stored on our hosting services remains the responsibility of the customer.” Source: same.
DSA transparency report. Gandi: “As per article 15 of the EU Digital Services Act … Gandi is required to publish a transparency report”. Source: gandi.net DSA report [archive]. User notification: not stated. Warrant canary: not stated.
Personal data collection includes IP + location with general “no longer than necessary” retention. No concrete IP-log retention period stated. Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Ownership / funding. ToU: “Gandi SAS is owned by Total Webhosting Solutions B.V., a Dutch corporation … Total Webhosting Solutions B.V.’s ultimate parent company is Stichting Carbonara”. Source: Terms of Use [archive].
iCloud Mail
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
Ordinary iCloud Mail remains accessible to Apple and is excluded from Advanced Data Protection. Optional S/MIME in Apple Mail protects selected messages when certificates are configured.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: iCloud Mail, operated by Apple Inc. for the US consumer configuration assessed here
- URL:
icloud.com/mail - HQ jurisdiction: United States; regional contracting entities differ, and the mainland China service needs a separate assessment BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: International infrastructure with US-held keys and US content storage described in Apple’s legal-process guidance; no country-only storage promise for this configuration BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Ordinary mail remains provider-readable. Optional S/MIME is integrated into Apple Mail on supported Apple devices; it requires certificates and does not encrypt the existing mailbox automatically OK+1
- Government-access posture: Published request reports and a notification policy with legal, safety and investigative exceptions; no current warrant canary found OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Free storage, but Apple’s web signup requires a reachable phone number and the terms require accurate registration data; no documented Tor route BAD+2
- Funding stability: Established publicly listed company OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-11. The iCloud terms [archive] identify Apple entities by region and permit access to and disclosure of account contents under specified circumstances. Apple’s investor FAQ [archive] documents its public listing. This profile covers the US service; an Irish contracting entity or mainland China account should not be silently treated as the same legal configuration.
Advanced Data Protection excludes Mail. Apple’s data-security overview [archive] states: “iCloud Mail does not use end-to-end encryption”. Its table leaves Mail’s keys with Apple under both protection modes. The same document explicitly supports optional S/MIME in native Apple email clients. The iCloud encryption guide [archive] confirms encrypted messages can be used in Mail on iPhone, iPad and Mac, while iCloud.com’s web app may be unable to display them. The encryption credit here depends on that configured native-client route; an ordinary webmail inbox remains provider-readable.
Legal access and notice are documented. Apple’s law-enforcement guidelines archives: 1, 2 describe iCloud content storage, US-held keys and the process for requesting contents. The notification policy has exceptions beyond legal gag orders, including safety and prejudice to an investigation. Apple’s government-information page [archive] links its request reports. Company-wide request totals should not be compared directly with mailbox-only providers’ figures.
Account and storage limits matter. The account-creation guide [archive] requires a phone number in its web flow, although device setup can defer some verification steps. Free iCloud includes 5 GB shared storage. The US iCloud+ price list [archive] starts at $0.99/month for 50 GB. Paid plans support five custom domains and up to ten addresses per person per domain [archive], with catch-all for the domain owner [archive]. These are separate from the three @icloud.com aliases [archive]. Mail supports IMAP and SMTP, but not POP [archive], and Apple Accounts support FIDO security keys [archive], requiring at least two keys.
Iroco
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
French mail hosted at OVH in Roubaix. Signup blocks Tor and requires identifying billing details, with SEPA payment. Message encryption requires an external client.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Iroco, operated by IROCO SAS, Vanves (Hauts-de-Seine), France (RCS Paris 889 424 255; SIRET 88942425500012); co-directors Adeline AGUT (President) and Bruno THOMAS
- URL:
iroco.co - HQ jurisdiction: France (14 Eyes / 9 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: France: “Nos services sont hébergés dans un data center situé à Roubaix et opéré par OVH” (OVH SAS, Roubaix); contractual no-transfer clause: “IROCO s’interdit de transférer ses données en dehors de France sans l’accord préalable de l’acheteur” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None: Iroco runs a Postfix + Cyrus stack with no PGP / S/MIME / zero-access vault; the only “encrypted” claim is for the user password: “Nous stockons également votre mot de passe sous forme cryptée: nous n’y avons donc pas accès en clair”; no provider-side encryption-at-rest claim for message bodies; users may opt into PGP via third-party clients BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report; no warrant canary; no user-notification commitment; only the boilerplate “si la loi l’exige, IROCO peut effectuer la transmission de données pour donner suite aux réclamations présentées contre la Plateforme et se conformer aux procédures administratives et judiciaires” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor explicitly blocked at signup (“nous n’autorisons pas l’inscription avec une adresse TOR”; “Pour éviter ces désagréments, nous avons désactivé l’inscription avec TOR”); payment is SEPA via GoCardless only: no cards, no PayPal, no crypto, no cash; signup requires first/last name + billing address; CGV §15.1.1: “Lors de la création du compte de l’utilisateur, ses nom, prénom, adresse électronique” BAD+2
- Funding stability: SAS incorporated 29 September 2020 in Vanves; service launched 2021; share capital only 2 000 €; bootstrapped + one BPIFrance Innov’Up Faisabilité grant; LinkedIn lists 2-10 employees; January 2025 Russian-spam abuse incident led to the removal of the free trial and tightened payment controls OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
French SAS. Legal notice: “Raison sociale: IROCO SAS”; “Adresse du siège social: 3 rue Aristide Briand, 92170 VANVES”; “SIRET: 88942425500012”; “Nom du directeur et/ou co-directeur: Adeline AGUT, Bruno THOMAS”; “Montant du capital social: 2 000 euros”. CGV Article 2.5: “IROCO, Société par Actions Simplifiée, immatriculée au Registre du Commerce et des Sociétés de Paris sous le numéro 889 424255, représentée par sa Présidente, Adeline AGUT … son numéro de TVA intracommunautaire: FR 75889424255.” Sources: Mentions légales [archive], CGV [archive]. Externally corroborated incorporation date (29 September 2020) on societe.com.
OVH Roubaix hosting. FAQ: “Nos services sont hébergés dans un data center situé à Roubaix et opéré par OVH, une société française. Le data center est sécurisé, certifié ISO27001 et engagé dans une démarche d’éco-responsabilité. Les données présentes sur nos serveurs sont soumises à la règlementation française, notamment concernant la protection de la vie privée.” Documentation: “deux serveurs de production chez OVH à Roubaix. Un serveur pour le mail et un serveur pour le web. un serveur de préproduction (VPS) chez OVH également.” Legal notice (hébergeur): “OVH SAS, 2 rue Kellermann, 59100 Roubaix.” CGV §15.4: “IROCO s’interdit de transférer ses données en dehors de France sans l’accord préalable de l’acheteur.” Sources: FAQ hosting [archive], Doc [archive], Legal [archive]. (A third-party listing on european-alternatives.eu incorrectly states Grenoble; Iroco’s own docs are explicit about Roubaix.)
French law, Vanves jurisdiction. CGV Article 12: “Tous les litiges auxquels les opérations d’achat et de vente conclues en application des présentes conditions générales de vente pourraient donner lieu … seront soumis aux tribunaux compétents dans les conditions de droit commun. Pour la définition de la juridiction compétente, le vendeur élit domicile à son siège social.” Article 13: “Les présentes conditions générales de vente sont rédigées en langue française. Dans le cas où elles seraient traduites en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères, seul le texte français ferait foi en cas de litige.” Source: CGV [archive].
No zero-access; only the user password is “encrypted”. FAQ data section: “Nous stockons également votre mot de passe sous forme cryptée: nous n’y avons donc pas accès en clair.” About page: “Bien évidemment, nous n’accédons pas non plus au contenu de vos mails: vous avez la certitude que vos données stockées sur nos serveurs resteront confidentielles.”, a policy/access statement, not a cryptographic guarantee. Documentation: “Serveur SMTP: Postfix; Serveur IMAP, calendriers/contacts: Cyrus”; no PGP/S-MIME integration anywhere in iroco.co, the FAQ, the blog, or the Doc page. CGV §15.5 admits the limitation: “il est à signaler qu’internet n’est pas un environnement complètement sécurisé et IROCO ne peut pas garantir la sécurité de la transmission ou du stockage des informations sur internet.” Sources: FAQ data [archive], About [archive], Doc [archive], CGV [archive].
IP-logging via AbuseIPDB at signup. CGV §15.3: “vérifications par IROCO, par ses propres moyens ou en ayant recours à des prestataires externes, que l’adresse IP de l’utilisateur n’est pas référencée auprès de AbuseIPDB (Marathon Studios, Inc) comme étant une adresse à l’origine d’utilisations abusives de services en ligne”. Doc: “Le serveur de mail est protégé par le détecteur d’intrusion fail2ban. Fail2ban est relié au site AbuseIPDB qui sert à indiquer les adresses IP malveillantes sur internet. Nos serveurs téléchargent ensuite la liste pour mettre à jour nos pare-feux.” IP-log retention period not stated. (AbuseIPDB is operated by Marathon Studios Inc., East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, USA, a third-party processor.)
Account-deletion mechanism; retention not stated. CGV §9bis: “L’acheteur peut mettre un terme au contrat à tout moment, par lettre recommandée avec accusé de réception adressée au siège social d’IROCO, ou bien par l’interface utilisateur de l’application iroco, ou bien par courriel envoyé à l’adresse suivante: unsubscribe@iroco.fr, le contrat prenant alors fin au dernier jour du mois en cours suivant la date de réception de la demande de résiliation.” Restitution: “téléchargement d’archive. modalités financières: aucune.” No specific retention window for backups or residual data is published.
No transparency report, no canary, no notification commitment. Searches of iroco.co and blog.iroco.co return nothing. The only government-access reference is the standard CGV §15.3 “si la loi l’exige, IROCO peut effectuer la transmission de données pour donner suite aux réclamations présentées contre la Plateforme et se conformer aux procédures administratives et judiciaires” clause.
Tor explicitly blocked at signup. FAQ: “Pourquoi j’ai cette erreur: ’nous n’autorisons pas l’inscription avec une adresse TOR’ à l’inscription? … Pour éviter ces désagréments, nous avons désactivé l’inscription avec TOR.” Source: FAQ Tor [archive]. This explicitly documents blocking Tor signup.
SEPA-only payment via GoCardless. Signup app: “Lorsque vous aurez complété l’intégralité du formulaire, vous serez redirigé vers le site de GoCardless, notre prestataire de paiement, afin de procéder à la mise en place de la souscription d’abonnement par mandat SEPA.” CGV §2.4: “prestataire de paiement (GoCardless)”. Iroco does not accept cards, PayPal, crypto or cash. (GoCardless Ltd, UK Companies House no. 07495895, incorporated 17 January 2011, is a UK-based payment processor, a 14 Eyes / 5 Eyes data-flow consideration for what is otherwise a French-jurisdiction setup.)
Real identifying details at signup. CGV §15.1.1: “Lors de la création du compte de l’utilisateur, ses nom, prénom, adresse électronique”. §15.1.4: “Dans le cadre du paiement … celle-ci enregistre des données financières relatives au compte bancaire ou à la carte de crédit de l’utilisateur, ainsi qu’une adresse et un numéro de téléphone.” FAQ: “Via notre prestataire de paiement (la société GoCardless), nous collectons vos nom, prénom et adresse de facturation.”
Custom domains: organization tier only; Individual is @iroco.co / @iroco.io. Collective signup page: “Vous amenez votre nom de domaine. À partir de 3,60 € TTC par mois — Vos boîtes mail sur votre nom de domaine — Autant de boîtes mail que nécessaires — Autant d’alias que nécessaires”. FAQ (outdated answer for individuals, still on the page): “Cela sera très bientôt possible! Nous ne proposons pour le moment que les noms de domaine iroco.io et iroco.co”; the Collective tier now delivers custom domains, but the Individual tier still does not. Iroco is not a domain registrar: “Iroco n’est pas un ‘registraire’ de nom de domaine: nous n’hébergeons pas les noms de domaines. Il vous faut prendre un nom de domaine auprès d’un registraire.” Per-domain cap on Collective is unstated; CGV speaks only of “usage raisonné”. Sources: Collective signup [archive], FAQ domain [archive].
Catch-all not documented. Searches of iroco.co, the FAQ, the blog and the Doc page for “catch-all”, “fourre-tout”, “wildcard” and *@ all return nothing. The only alias mechanism described in detail is the +suffix plus-addressing scheme: “Chez Iroco, nous vous permettons de créer facilement jusqu’à 50 alias de messagerie directement depuis notre webapp … Normalement, il devrait prendre la forme suivante:
votrenom+votrealias@iroco.co ou
votrenom+votrealias@iroco.io”. Source: Blog alias [archive].
Aliases: 50 on Individual, “as needed” on Collective. Individual signup: “50 alias e-mail”. FAQ: “50 alias, c’est-à-dire des adresses mails secondaires composées sur la base de votre adresse principale. Les messages envoyés à ces alias arriveront dans votre boîte de réception principale.”
IMAP + SMTP supported; POP3 not documented. FAQ configuration: “Il faut préciser les deux adresses du serveur d’envoi de mail (SMTP), de réception de mail (IMAP) … imap.iroco.io si votre mail est sur iroco.io, imap.iroco.co si votre mail est sur iroco.co. La sécurité de connexion est SSL/TLS. smtp.iroco.io si votre mail est sur iroco.io, smtp.iroco.co si votre mail est sur iroco.co. La sécurité de connexion est SSL/TLS”. CGV §2.4: “protocoles mail IMAP (courrier entrant) et SMTP (courrier sortant)”. CalDAV + CardDAV also supported.
2FA: TOTP only. Login interstitial: “Code de vérification (OTP) — Si vous avez activé le code de vérification, merci de saisir ci-dessus ce code à 6 chiffres généré par votre outil d’authentification”. WebAuthn/FIDO2 and SMS 2FA not documented.
No native mobile app. Homepage: “Compatible avec votre client de messagerie préféré, sur ordinateur et sur mobile.”; third-party clients only; no iOS or Android Iroco-branded app exists in either store.
No migration tools. No mention of a Gmail import wizard, IMAP migration assistant, or “import from another provider” on iroco.co or blog.iroco.co. Users self-migrate via IMAP using any standard client.
No free tier. FAQ: “Pourquoi avez-vous supprimé la période d’essai gratuite d’un mois? Nous avions ajouté cette fonctionnalité pour permettre de tester nos services. Malheureusement, la grande majorité des utilisateurs de cette période d’essai ont créé des boites mail pour envoyer des messages non sollicités ou d’hameçonnage.” Individual subscription: 3,60 € TTC / month (3,00 € HT). All published prices are monthly; CGV §9bis describes the contract as “contrat dont la durée est indéterminée” with month-to-month cancellation. Sources: FAQ free trial [archive], Individual signup archives: 1, 2, 3.
Collective storage scaling: price Not stated. Iroco publishes an entry price and a storage range for the Collective offer but never the rate between them. The signup page gives only “You bring your domain name. Starting at €3.60 incl. taxes per month”, and the FAQ gives only “Configurable storage space between 5GB and 100GB for your email data, contacts, and calendars”; the three "(see details)" links beside the Collective feature list resolve to those same FAQ answers, none of which carries a figure. Neither /cgv, /tarifs nor /offres serves anything but the single-page-app shell, and no euro amount other than 3,60 € appears anywhere on iroco.co. An organization needing more than 5 GB has to start the flow to learn the price. Sources: Collective signup [archive], FAQ collective offer [archive].
DPA is embedded in the CGV, not a standalone document. CGV Article 15 contains the GDPR clauses (controller, sub-processors, DSAR mechanism). No B2B-style standalone DPA template is published. Sub-processors named: OVH (hosting), GoCardless (payments), AbuseIPDB (IP reputation), Matomo (self-hosted analytics, per Doc).
Founded 2020; bootstrapped + one BPIFrance grant. About: “Dans le cadre du dispositif Innov’Up Faisabilité, nous avons bénéficié d’une aide financière de BPIFrance pour le développement de notre projet.” SAS incorporation date (29 September 2020) and 2 000 € share capital per the Mentions légales and external registries (societe.com). 2021 INSEE filing qualified IROCO SAS for full statutory confidentiality under Article L.232-25 of the French Commercial Code (balance-sheet < 350 000 €; revenue < 700 000 €; < 10 employees). LinkedIn lists 2-10 employees.
January 2025 abuse incident. Blog (2 January 2025): “Il y a à peu près un mois, nous avons subi une attaque d’un groupe de spam, probablement localisé en Russie … Ils ont utilisé notre plateforme pour envoyer des messages d’hameçonnage (phishing).” This led to (a) removing the free trial, (b) introducing an initial payment check, and (c) the Tor signup block. No customer-data exfiltration was reported. Follow-up policy update (March 2025): “Suite à des tentatives de fraude nous avions mis en place un paiement initial avec la technologie instant bank pay … nous allons supprimer cette étape et n’utiliser que des prélèvements SEPA standards, en activant les comptes uniquement lorsque le premier paiement est passé.” Sources: Blog incident [archive], Blog signup [archive].
Thexyz
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
Classic Email uses Rackspace and has a documented Mailvelope integration, which receives the encryption credit here. The current Email product uses PolarisMail/EmailArray; its key handling and backup locations need clearer documentation.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Thexyz, operated by Thexyz Inc., Toronto, Ontario, Canada; “an independent, employee-owned Canadian company” since October 2007
- URL:
thexyz.com - HQ jurisdiction: Canada (5 Eyes); ToS: “The Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Province of Ontario, exclusive of its choice of law principles, and the laws of Canada, as applicable” BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Current Email uses PolarisMail/EmailArray and is marketed as Canadian hosting; Classic Email uses Rackspace. The security page still names Chicago without distinguishing products or backup locations BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Scored configuration: Classic Email with optional Mailvelope. Current Email plans advertise PGP and S/MIME, but their key handling is not documented. Ordinary messages on either product remain provider-readable OK+1
- Government-access posture: Nothing on any of the three. No transparency report, no warrant canary, no notification commitment, and the privacy policy has no law-enforcement section at all. The ToS reserves the right to suspend service “as requested by a law enforcement or regulatory agency” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Cryptocurrency is accepted, per the announcement that dropped PayPal in 2021, but the privacy policy is explicit in the other direction: “When you sign in to our services, you are not anonymous to us.” Tor is neither supported nor blocked in any document OK+1
- Funding stability: “Independent & employee-owned” since October 2007, “0 Ads, trackers or VC investors”, no acquisition history, no outside capital disclosed. That exceeds the rubric’s ten-year threshold GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Canadian entity, Ontario law. The About page states: “Thexyz is an independent, employee-owned Canadian company. For over 19 years we have run private, ad-free email from Toronto”, with “Founded in Toronto, Canada” dated 2007 and the counters “19+ Years running email”, “100% Independent & employee-owned” and “0 Ads, trackers or VC investors”. Source: About Thexyz [archive]. Governing law is Ontario plus federal Canadian law, with the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods expressly excluded. The copyright block reads “Copyright © 2007-2020 Thexyz Inc”. Source: Terms of Service [archive]. Canada is a Five Eyes founding member.
Current Email and Classic Email use different backends. Thexyz’s server-settings guide [archive] separates current Email, accessed at mail.thexyz.com, from Classic Email, accessed at webmail.thexyz.com. Current Email uses imap.thexyz.com, smtp.thexyz.com and pop.thexyz.com. Its public webmail login script archives: 1, 2, 3 sends authentication requests to cp.emailarray.com/json.php, directly establishing the EmailArray integration. DNS checked on 2026-11-11 resolves those three mail-server names to 66.179.84.186, in the POLAR-41 block registered to PolarisMail Inc. Classic instead uses secure.emailsrvr.com, which Rackspace identifies as its Email service [archive]. These findings cover the two named mailbox products, not every hosting or email product Thexyz sells.
Migration is staged, not universal. The February 25, 2026 migration announcement [archive] says Classic remains supported. Custom-domain customers can request a move; customers using an @thexyz.com address receive individual migration notices. The migration guide [archive] separates initial copying, mail-routing cutover and a final sync. A working login on the new platform does not by itself mean migration has finished. The current product page [archive] advertises Canadian hosting, while the security page [archive] still assigns email to Chicago. The backend split explains why both PolarisMail and Rackspace appear in the evidence. It does not establish where every mailbox copy or backup resides. Thexyz’s contract remains separate from either backend operator’s customer terms.
The Mailvelope guide applies to Classic webmail. Thexyz’s OpenPGP walkthrough [archive] instructs users to authorize webmail.thexyz.com in Mailvelope, matching the Classic endpoint. It documents encryption in the browser extension. The current plan comparison also advertises PGP options and S/MIME on request, but does not document the new platform’s key handling. The encryption credit applies to the documented Classic Mailvelope configuration. The current product’s feature list does not establish equivalent key custody. The security page’s AES/SSL claim does not identify the key holder.
Nothing published on government access, in a policy that never mentions it. Thexyz publishes no transparency report, no warrant canary and no notification commitment. The privacy policy covers cookies, social media widgets and Google Analytics, and contains no law-enforcement section of any kind. It states: “When you sign in to our services, you are not anonymous to us. We automatically receive and record information from your computer and browser, including your IP address, our cookie information, software and hardware attributes, the page you request and other standard browser parameters.” For deletion, it states: “When you request to terminate your services with us, data is permamnetly deleted after 14 to 30 days.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. No retention period is given for the IP logging, and no signable DPA is published. The security page claims “Thexyz complies with EU-U.S., UK, and Swiss Data Privacy Frameworks, with details available in our privacy policy”, but the privacy policy contains no such details.
Thexyz’s December 6, 2020 announcement, effective May 1, 2021, lists cryptocurrency among the payment options replacing PayPal and recommends BitPay. Its privacy policy still names PayPal among processors. The announcement supports the payment-method finding, but the conflicting processor list warrants checking checkout before purchase. Sources: Thexyz will no longer be accepting PayPal [archive].
Thexyz describes itself as independent and employee-owned since October 2007, with no VC investors. The funding classification relies on that published account of its ownership. There is no free tier or trial; the service documents a five-day money-back guarantee.
Zoho Mail
Privacy Impact: HIGH11
This score covers a US Mail Premium account with optional S/MIME. Ordinary mail remains provider-readable. Zoho documents advance notification of legal disclosure unless prohibited by law.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Zoho Mail, operated by the Zoho Group: Zoho Corporation (Pleasanton, CA, USA), Zoho Corporation B.V. (Utrecht, Netherlands), Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (India, sub-processor)
- URL:
zoho.com/mail/ - HQ jurisdiction: US account configuration, contracted through Zoho Corporation. Other regions have different contracting entities BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: US account configuration. Other regional services need separate assessment of their primary storage, backups and cross-border access BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Mail Premium configuration: optional integrated S/MIME with an uploaded private-key certificate; OpenPGP is also documented. Ordinary mail uses provider-managed at-rest keys and remains provider-readable OK+1
- Government-access posture: Customer notification before disclosure unless prohibited by law. No government-request report or warrant canary established in the reviewed sources BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; no crypto, no cash; only card / PayPal / NEFT / check; signup requires “true, accurate, current and complete” information BAD+2
- Funding stability: Privately held and bootstrapped for over thirty years, according to its current privacy commitment; no outside investors GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
Multi-entity group. Global privacy policy: “This Privacy Policy statement is made by the Zoho Group consisting of all the entities listed here (collectively, ‘Zoho’, ‘we’, ‘us’ or ‘our’).” Entities include Zoho Corporation (Pleasanton CA, USA; data centers in the US), Zoho Corporation B.V. (Utrecht, Netherlands; data centers in the EU), Zoho Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (India; sub-processor). Source: Zoho Group entities [archive] and Privacy Policy [archive].
Governing law depends on customer location. ToS: “The governing law and jurisdiction that will apply in case of any dispute or lawsuit arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, will depend on your billing address if you are a paid customer and your state or country of domicile in all other cases.” Source: Terms of Service [archive].
User-selected data center, multi-region group reach. “Zoho servers are located in most secure data centers in US, EU, CN, IN and AU.” Mail domain maps to data center: mail.zoho.com → US, mail.zoho.eu → EU, mail.zoho.com.cn → CN, mail.zoho.in → IN, mail.zoho.com.au → AU, mail.zoho.jp → JP. Source: Mail GDPR [archive].
Zoho Mail encrypts ordinary stored messages with provider-managed keys. Its documentation also describes integrated OpenPGP and S/MIME; S/MIME is available on Mail Premium and requires the user to upload a certificate bundle and its password. This profile credits that optional integration on Mail Premium, without treating it as default zero-access storage. A free or Mail Lite configuration should not inherit the Premium S/MIME feature. Sources: Mail GDPR [archive], Mail privacy [archive]. Feature and key-handling documentation: Encryption in Zoho Mail archives: 1, 2, 3 and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) archives: 1, 2.
Zoho’s security FAQ commits to notifying customers before disclosing their data, except when law prohibits notice. That is a provider notification commitment. No government-request statistics or warrant canary were established in the reviewed sources. Source: Frequently Asked Questions on Zoho Security archives: 1, 2.
Account-deletion retention. “When a personal Zoho Mail account is closed by the user or when an account is manually deleted by a Super Administrator/Administrator, the data from the deleted account is retained on Zoho Mail servers for 30 days, after which it is permanently purged.” Inactive free personal mailboxes are cleared after 300 days. Source: Data deletion policy [archive].
Identifying data required at signup. ToS: “You agree to: (i) provide true, accurate, current and complete information about yourself as prompted by the sign up process; and (ii) maintain and promptly update the information provided during sign up to keep it true, accurate, current, and complete.” No Tor support documented.
US pricing checked November 14, 2026: Mail Lite starts at $1 per user per month with annual billing. The Mail Premium configuration scored here costs $4 per user per month, billed annually, with 50 GB of mailbox storage and a separate 50 GB retention allowance. Source: Zoho Mail Pricing | Compare Editions [archive].
Payments: no anonymity. Pricing FAQ: “We accept payment via Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and PayPal. We also accept payment via NEFT bank transfers and cheque transfers for yearly subscriptions.” No crypto, no cash.
DPA available on request. “To enable you to be compliant with your data protection obligations, we are prepared to sign an appropriate Data Processing Addendum (DPA).” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Zoho describes itself as privately held and bootstrapped, without outside investors, and dates its operation to more than thirty years. That supports the long-term independence classification. Source: Our Privacy Commitment archives: 1, 2.
Combell
Privacy Impact: HIGH12
Belgian and Dutch mail hosting within team.blue. The provider requires identifying account details and documents disk encryption, without built-in zero-access message storage.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Combell Email, operated by Combell nv, Ghent, Belgium (CBE 0541.977.701); part of team.blue (parallel NL entity contracts under Dutch law)
- URL:
combell.com/en/email-hosting - HQ jurisdiction: Belgium (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Belgium + Netherlands: “Our own fibre-optic network connects all our data centres in Belgium and the Netherlands into one logical network” (both 14 Eyes / 9 Eyes) OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None: Privacy Policy invokes “telecommunications secrecy” (a legal-not-technical protection) and lists “hard disk encryption software” generically; no PGP, no S/MIME, no built-in E2EE in any KB or product page BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report (only a forward-looking DSA clause in the AUP, “Combell may publish reports”, with no actual report located); no user-notification commitment; explicit confidential cooperation (“Combell can be obligated to communicate certain data to the requisite authorities in a confidential manner”); no warrant canary BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Real identifying details required (“name, address, telephone number, e-mail address and customer number”); ID-card copy required to exercise GDPR rights; Tor not stated; checkout accepts Bancontact, Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Cartes Bancaires, iDEAL / Wero, Payconiq, PayPal and Apple Pay, every route card-, bank- or wallet-based, with no crypto and no cash BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded 1999 by Jonas Dhaenens (then 16); merged into team.blue in 2019 alongside TransIP Group and Register Group; team.blue lead investor Hg (since 2019), CPP Investments committed ~€550M for ~20% in July 2024, Sofina minority stake at a €4.8bn valuation; multi-rotation PE ownership BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Combell nv, Skaldenstraat 121, 9042 Ghent, Belgium (CBE 0541.977.701). Source: Privacy Policy §1 [archive].
Owned by team.blue group. About: “Combell is part of team.blue, a European group of hosting companies headquartered in our Ghent office.” Source: About Combell [archive]. team.blue press release: “Combell Group and TransIP Group today announce the creation of team.blue, one of the latest European tech companies to exceed a $1 billion valuation.” Source: team.blue press [archive]. Investor history per team.blue’s own corporate page: Hg (lead investor since 2019), CPP Investments (~€550M for ~20% in July 2024), Sofina (minority in 2024) at a €4.8bn valuation; founder Jonas Dhaenens retains an interest.
Belgian / Dutch hosting. Network page: “Our own fibre-optic network connects all our data centres in Belgium and the Netherlands into one logical network.” And: “since Combell only uses the best data centres in Belgium and the Netherlands, your e-mails are safe from spying eyes.” And: “71% of Belgium’s internet is located in one of our data centres.” Sources: Network [archive], Exchange hosting [archive], Datacenters [archive].
Belgian law (BE entity) or Dutch law (NL entity). Combell nv General Conditions: “This Agreement concluded with Combell is subject to Belgian law.” Source: General Conditions [archive]. NL counterpart Article 14: “This Agreement concluded with Combell is subject to Dutch law. Insofar as the rules of mandatory law do not describe otherwise, all disputes as a result of the Agreement will be settled by the authorised Dutch Court in the district where Combell is established.” Source: combell.nl General Conditions archives: 1, 2, 3. Customers contracting via combell.com are subject to Belgian law; combell.nl customers to Dutch law.
No zero-access encryption; legal-not-technical secrecy. Privacy Policy: “The existence and content of the personal communication that takes place via the Combell network (for example: email traffic, hosting…) is protected by the provisions for telecommunications secrecy. This means that Combell and its employees may not have any knowledge of the existence or content of such communication, outside of the exceptions enumerated by the law.” Generic stack: “Combell uses a variety of technical measures to protect personal data, such as: password protection, hard disk encryption software, firewalls, antivirus software, intrusion and anomaly detection system and access control systems for employees.” No PGP, S/MIME or built-in E2EE.
No transparency report, no canary; explicit confidential cooperation. AUP (forward-looking, no actual report located): “To enhance transparency and in compliance with the DSA, Combell may publish reports outlining its content moderation practices, including the number and nature of content removals and user accounts suspended or terminated.” Privacy Policy: “In the context of a police or judicial investigation, Combell can be obligated to communicate certain data to the requisite authorities in a confidential manner.” AUP: “Combell will fully cooperate with law enforcement authorities in their investigations of suspected criminal violations, violation of systems or network security.” AUP §6 disclosure trigger: “if Combell is obliged to comply with an order, instruction or request of a competent law enforcement authority.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive] and AUP [archive]. No warrant canary.
Real identifying details at signup; ID required to exercise GDPR rights. Privacy Policy: “Combell will ask you for a number of personal details, such as name, address, telephone number, e-mail address and customer number.” And: “you must provide us with proof of your identity. We therefore ask that you preferably attach a copy of the front of your identity card to your application.”
Custom domains mandatory; no provider-domain free addresses. “Note: all our mailboxes work with your own domain name. No more @telenet.be, @gmail.com, etc.” Source: Compare email hosting [archive]. “With your domain name, you also get a free mailbox to send and receive e-mails.”
Same-domain aliases only; catch-all supported per domain. Exchange aliases KB: “You can link multiple, alternative e-mail addresses with the same domain name to your Exchange mailbox. These are internal e-mail aliases, internal because the referral takes place within the same domain name.” Cross-domain workaround via per-alias forwarding to a different mailbox. Quantity: “Combell allows you to create an unlimited number of e-mail aliases and to decide to which mailbox these e-mails have to be forwarded.” Catch-all: “A catch-all mailbox will receive all e-mails that are sent to mail addresses on your domain name, even if they have not been created.” Sources: Exchange aliases [archive], Basic mail catch-all [archive], Creating an address [archive].
IMAP / POP3 / SMTP supported. Server hostnames: “IMAP: imap.mailprotect.be – port: 993 – Security: SSL · POP3: pop3.mailprotect.be – port: 995 – Security: SSL · … SMTP: smtp-auth.mailprotect.be – port 465 – Security: SSL” (https://www.combell.com/en/help/kb/how-to-configure-my-basic-mailbox-on-android-basic-mail/ [archive]).
2FA: TOTP via authenticator only. “Enable two-factor authentication with software token for your Combell control panel.” Setup uses Duo Mobile or any TOTP app. WebAuthn/FIDO2/SMS for the Combell control panel are not documented. (Microsoft 365 mailboxes inherit Microsoft’s MFA separately.) Source: Two-factor authentication blog [archive].
ISO 27001 since 2011. Privacy Policy: “Combell’s information security policy, requirements and management standards are in fact fully modelled on the international ISO 27001 standard, for which Combell has been certified since 2011.”
Retention. “Combell is obliged to keep records for up to 7 years” (accounting / fiscal) and “the legal necessity to provide certain data as evidence in case of disputes for up to a maximum of 10 years after termination of your contract.” IP-log-specific retention is not stated.
DPA stance. GTC Article 10: “If the Customer as ‘controller’ within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) processes personal data with the use of the services, products or goods from Combell, the Customer must conclude a ‘data processing agreement’ with Combell.” For natural-person customers Combell is controller: “Combell acts as the responsible party for processing the personal data of its customers.”
Founder origin story. “Everything started back in 1999, when Jonas Dhaenens (who was then only 16) registered the domain name combell.com using the money his father gave him for his excellent school grades.” Source: Combell 17th-anniversary blog [archive]. Footer: "© 1999 – 2026 Combell nv."
The two advertised entry prices are two different tiers, not a contradiction. The home and comparison pages advertise Basic Professional (5 GB) at “Normal price € 4.49/month · Now € 2.99/month”, while “1st year 43% discount · 6.99 /month · 3.99 /month” belongs to Expert+ (50 GB). A live checkout settles it: a cart holding “Basic E-mail Expert+ 50 GB” for one year shows "€ 47.88" with “43% discount” and “Renews at € 83.88 for 1 year”; exactly € 3.99 and € 6.99 a month. Belgian VAT at 21% is added on top (“Subtotal € 47.88 · 21% VAT € 10.05 · Total € 57.93”), confirming every advertised figure is ex-VAT.
Payment methods, from the checkout rather than the documentation. Combell never enumerates accepted payment methods in its Privacy Policy, General Conditions or knowledge base; the list appears only once an order reaches the payment step, where the “Pay securely” strip shows Bancontact, Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Cartes Bancaires, iDEAL / Wero, PayPal and Apple Pay, and the cart sidebar adds Payconiq under “Secure payment through solutions like”. Nine routes, all of them card, bank or wallet rails that require a named account holder. No cryptocurrency and no cash, so there is no anonymous path to a Combell mailbox. The checkout also carries a “90-day money-back guarantee”.
Fastmail
Privacy Impact: HIGH12
Employee-owned mail with Australian jurisdiction and US backups. Messages remain provider-readable. Fastmail publishes request reports and a notification policy; selecting Amsterdam for primary storage does not remove the US copies.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Fastmail Pty Ltd, ABN 31 142 646 580, Victoria, Australia
- URL:
fastmail.com - HQ jurisdiction: Australia (5 Eyes; CLOUD Act agreement with US active since Jan 2024) BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: USA by default (Philadelphia, PA and St. Louis, MO); an Amsterdam primary copy is selectable since August 2026, but replicas, backups and logs stay in the US either way BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None in own apps; opt-in PGP/S/MIME possible via third-party clients; disk-level encryption only BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Annual transparency report + explicit user-notification commitment (with stated exceptions); no warrant canary OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Cards / PayPal / Apple Pay / Google Pay only; no cash, checks, bank transfers, money orders; Tor not stated; crypto not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Independent and employee-owned since the September 2013 buyback from Opera; over ten years under that ownership GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
US server location. Help: “Our main servers are located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA … Our secondary site is in St. Louis, Missouri, USA.” Source: How Fastmail provides a secure service [archive].
EU region since 2026-08-03, which does not move the score. CEO Bron Gondwana: “You can now make the European Union the primary home for your Fastmail data, on our own secure servers in Amsterdam. Previously, all accounts were stored entirely in the US.” The same post lists what stays behind: “Resilient replicas of your data will live in the US (for now)”, “Emergency backups for everybody are stored in our Philadelphia location”, and “Logs are in the US.” Fastmail also declines to sell the choice as protection, in the most direct sentence any provider in this comparison has written on the subject: “We’re an Australian company, subject to Australian law including legal-cooperation treaties between Australia and other countries. Wherever your data is stored, we will respond the same way to lawful requests from relevant authorities”, and “If what you need is a guarantee that your data remains only in the EU, we don’t have that, and we’d rather tell you directly than let you assume otherwise.” Source: Fastmail offers EU data region, 2026-08-03 [archive].
Pobox is this entry too. Fastmail bought Pobox in 2015 and merged it in on 2024-11-12, so an @pobox.com address is a Fastmail account under these same terms. See
Out of scope for why it gets no row of its own.
Australian law applies. ToS: “These Terms are governed by the laws of the State of Victoria Australia … The courts sitting in the State of Victoria, Australia shall have exclusive jurisdiction”. Source: Terms of Service [archive].
No E2EE in their own apps: explicit choice. Fastmail: “We don’t offer end-to-end encryption in our own apps, as we don’t believe it provides a meaningful increase in security for most users, while the trade-offs are significant.” Source: Fastmail vs Proton [archive] and features/security [archive]. Disk-level: “All your data is stored on encrypted disk volumes, including backups.”
User-notification commitment. Law-enforcement page: “Fastmail notifies a user if an authority has made a legal request for their information, giving them the opportunity to challenge the request.” With exceptions for harm, Australian-law prohibitions, or already-closed accounts. Source: Information for law enforcement [archive].
Transparency report. Annual report published since 2021. 2024 onwards includes CLOUD Act request statistics: “In 2021 this was amended by the Cloud Act agreement between Australian and the USA, however the processes only came into force in January 2024, so we received our first requests under the Cloud Act in that year.” Source: Data Transparency Report [archive].
Payment methods limit anonymity. Pricing FAQ: “We currently accept most major credit and debit cards, plus PayPal, Apple Pay, and Google Pay. We are unable to accept cash, cheques, bank transfers, or money orders.” Source: Pricing [archive]. Cryptocurrency is not listed among the current payment methods.
Founded 1999; Opera acquisition + employee buyback. Blog: “FastMail has been around for 15 years now, via a short detour as part of Opera Software and then back to being our own company again.” Source: Working at FastMail [archive].
Fastmail describes itself as independent and employee-owned. Its September 25, 2013 announcement dates the staff buyback from Opera, establishing more than ten years of independence. Sources: Our values archives: 1, 2 and Exciting news: FastMail staff purchase the business from Opera archives: 1, 2.
Gmail
Privacy Impact: HIGH12
This profile covers US consumer Gmail. Google can read ordinary stored mail and offers government-request reporting and notification with exceptions. Workspace encryption features do not apply to the consumer account.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Gmail, operated by Google LLC for the US consumer configuration assessed here; parent Alphabet Inc.
- URL:
gmail.com - HQ jurisdiction: United States; Google Ireland Limited serves many European accounts, so the contracting entity depends on residence BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Worldwide processing, including the United States; no country-restricted storage commitment established for this consumer configuration BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None built into consumer Gmail. TLS and provider-managed storage encryption do not withhold keys from Google; hosted S/MIME and client-side encryption are work/school features BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Request reports and advance notification with legal, emergency and account-security exceptions; no warrant canary found OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Free tier without billing details; phone number optional in the standard signup guide, but anti-abuse checks can require it. Credit is for the documented phone-free route, not a guarantee that every signup can use it; Tor support not documented OK+1
- Funding stability: Established publicly listed parent, Alphabet OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-11. Google’s government-request policy [archive] distinguishes Google LLC from Google Ireland Limited, describes its notification exceptions and links to request statistics. Those company-wide statistics cover multiple products; they are not Gmail-specific exposure rates. Alphabet’s investor FAQ [archive] describes the group’s advertising, subscription and cloud businesses.
Consumer Gmail does not offer Workspace’s key controls. The encryption guide [archive] distinguishes TLS for all accounts, hosted S/MIME where Google manages a key copy, and organizational client-side encryption where Google lacks the key. The latter two are work/school features. Google’s privacy policy [archive] describes worldwide processing, collection of IP and device information, and scanning of content for service functions. Its retention policy [archive] describes a deletion process generally taking around two months and encrypted backups that can retain data for up to six months, with longer retention for specified legal and operational reasons.
Advertising claims need their qualification. The Gmail advertising policy [archive] says Gmail does not scan messages to select Gmail ads. It also says stored Gmail content is not used for advertising unless the user chooses to make it available to other Google services that support ads. These advertising controls do not prevent Google from accessing ordinary messages.
Free signup is conditional. The account-creation guide [archive] makes a phone number optional, and the name policy [archive] restricts impersonation without requiring a legal name. A separate verification guide [archive] says phone verification is sometimes mandatory to prevent abuse. The free plan includes 15 GB shared across Gmail, Drive and Photos [archive]. IMAP access [archive] and hardware security keys [archive] are supported. Plus-addressing is documented in Google’s address-variation guide [archive]; custom-domain hosting belongs to Workspace and is outside this consumer profile.
Raidboxes
Privacy Impact: HIGH12
The current mail service uses team.blue’s securemail.pro infrastructure. Physical hosting and the optional PGP implementation need clearer documentation; neither the certificate’s address nor the product’s encryption label establishes them.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Raidboxes Email Hosting 2.0, operated by Raidboxes GmbH, Münster, Germany (HRB 16184); part of team.blue
- URL:
raidboxes.io/en/email-hosting - HQ jurisdiction: Germany (14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Marketed as Germany (“Server location Germany”), but the actual IMAP/SMTP endpoints
mail-rb.securemail.pro/smtp-rb.securemail.procarry a TLS certificate issued to “Register S.p.A., VIALE GIOVINE ITALIA 17” (Florence, Italy; also a team.blue subsidiary; both Italy and Germany are 14 Eyes); physical mail-server country is not unambiguously stated in Raidboxes’ own docs OK+1 - Zero-access encryption: None: product page claims transport and storage encryption (“Your emails are fully encrypted—not just during transfer via SSL/TLS, but the entire email including attachments”, no algorithm given); PGP listed only as “Optional” in the plan comparison with no statement on key custody (server-side vs. client-side) and no dedicated help article in the “Mail Hosting 2.0” collection BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report (only a DSA contact point in the Imprint); no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: No Tor support stated; payment via SEPA (GoCardless), credit card (checkout.com), or invoice only; no crypto, no cash, no PayPal mentioned; ToS §7(2): “The Customer is obligated to provide their contract data correctly and completely” BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded 2014 by Torben Simon Meier and Johannes Benz; seed-funded by HTGF in 2016 (€600k); acquired by team.blue on 28 June 2022 (HTGF exit); since August 2025 the mail backend was migrated off Mailbox.org onto team.blue’s own
securemail.proinfrastructure BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Raidboxes GmbH, Hafenstraße 32, 48153 Münster, Germany (HRB 16184; VAT DE306895091). Authorized representatives: Christian Klapka, Johannes Bernardus Nijholt. Source: Legal notice [archive].
Acquired by team.blue on 28 June 2022. About page: “2022 Growth to 50 team members, over 16,500 customers and more than 35,000 websites hosted by us. Another milestone: Raidboxes joins forces with team.blue in order to expand further.” Source: About us [archive]. HTGF exit announcement: “Bonn, 28 June 2022 – team.blue … announced that the High-Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF) portfolio company Raidboxes … is joining its growing group of companies. HTGF is selling its stake after having closely supported the team led by Johannes Benz and Torben Simon Meier since 2016.” Source: HTGF exit [archive]. Privacy Policy further names “team.blue N.V., Skaldenstraat 121, 9042 Gent, Belgium”, “iubenda s.r.l.”, “LeadInfo B.V.”, “Hypernode B.V.” as joint controllers for advertising data.
German law, Münster as place of jurisdiction. GTC §15: “The law of the Federal Republic of Germany applies. The version of the contract in the original German language is binding. If the Customer is a consumer, the mandatory provisions of the law in the state of his habitual residence shall remain unaffected. If the Customer is a business person, a legal entity under public law or a special fund under public law, the place of jurisdiction is the registered office of Raidboxes.” GTC §15(4): “Raidboxes is not willing and is not obliged to participate in a dispute resolution procedure before a consumer arbitration board.” Source: General Terms [archive].
Mailserver identity points to a team.blue sibling. Marketing copy claims “Server location Germany” and “Full control: Own infrastructure, no third-party providers” (https://raidboxes.io/en/email-hosting/ [archive]). The Help Center documents the actual server hostnames: “Posteingang (IMAP) … mail-rb.securemail.pro … Port 993 … Encryption SSL / TLS” and “Postausgang (SMTP) … smtp-rb.securemail.pro … Port 587 … Encryption TLS / STARTTLS” (https://helpcenter.raidboxes.de/en/articles/11851526-email-hosting-2-0-everything-you-need-to-know [archive]). The *.securemail.pro TLS certificate is issued to “O=Register S.p.A., VIALE GIOVINE ITALIA 17”; Register S.p.A.’s own corporate page states “The ultimate parent entity of Register S.p.a. is team.blue EquityCo S.a.r.l.” (https://www.register.it/company/?lang=en [archive]). This suggests a group infrastructure relationship, but a certificate does not prove physical hosting in Italy or identify every party processing mailbox data. Confirmation of location and operator is still needed.
Encryption claims leave key custody unspecified. Product page: “Your emails are fully encrypted—not just during transfer via SSL/TLS, but the entire email including attachments.” The Privacy Policy describes only generic “https://” TLS encryption: “For security reasons and to protect the transmission of your personal data and other confidential content, we use encryption on our domain. You can recognize this in the browser line by the string ‘https://’ and the lock symbol.” No algorithm or key-management is specified for at-rest encryption. PGP appears only as “PGP encryption | Optional | Optional | Optional” in the plan comparison (https://raidboxes.io/en/email-hosting/ [archive]) with no statement on key custody. The German migration article describes “die neuen Mailserver bieten Spam- und Virenfilter, SSL-Verschlüsselung, einen Blacklist-Checker und optional eine PGP-Verschlüsselung” (https://helpcenter.raidboxes.de/de/articles/13224505 archives: 1, 2, 3). No dedicated PGP help article exists in the post-Mailbox.org “Mail Hosting 2.0” collection.
No transparency report, no canary, no notification commitment. The only “transparency”-related disclosure is the Imprint’s DSA contact: “Contact point for authorities pursuant to Art. 11 of the Digital Service Act of the European Parliament and Council … This e-mail address is intended exclusively for enquiries pursuant to Art. 11 DSA. Other enquiries will not be processed and answered.” No transparency report exists on raidboxes.io, blog.raidboxes.io, or helpcenter.raidboxes.de. No warrant canary. Privacy Policy contains only a generic recipients clause at §9: no user-notification commitment, no explicit non-notification clause.
1 connected domain per mail plan. Email-hosting comparison table: “Maximum number of connected domains | 1 | 1 | 1”, across all three tiers (Mini, Starter, Pro). Same-domain aliases only (5 / 10 / 15 per mailbox); cross-domain delivery requires external forwarding. Help Center: “Please note that creating a mailbox is only possible if the corresponding domain is already hosted with Raidboxes.”
Catch-all supported on the one connected domain. “With the catch-all feature, all emails sent to non-existent email addresses of your domain can be automatically forwarded to a specific mailbox.” And: “To use the catch-all function, you need a mailbox with the same name, e.g., catchall@yourdomain.de.” Source: Email Hosting 2.0 help [archive].
2FA: TOTP, email or SMS; no WebAuthn/FIDO2. “Our 2FA feature allows you to receive authentication codes via app, email or SMS.” And: “To activate two-factor authentication via app, select the option Authenticator App (TOTP) and click on Activate 2FA to confirm. … We recommend the app Authy.” SMS provider Twilio Ireland Limited is named in the Privacy Policy. WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware-key support is not documented. Source: 2FA help [archive].
Payment methods exclude crypto, cash, and PayPal. Subscription management blog: “We work with GoCardless for SEPA payments and checkout.com for credit card payments.” Source: New subscription management 2022 [archive]. Cryptocurrency, cash, and PayPal are not mentioned anywhere in payment-related primary sources. Discount on prepayment: “5 or 10 percent discount” for semi-annual / annual.
Migration via paid Audriga only on the new platform. “If you want to migrate the data of a mailbox from an external provider to Raidboxes, you can use the paid migration service from audriga.” A free self-service Gmail/IMAP importer for the Email Hosting 2.0 stack is not documented.
Real identifying details at signup. Privacy Policy: “As part of the registration or order process, it is necessary for you to create a customer account so that you can use our services.” GTC §7(2): “The Customer is obligated to provide their contract data correctly and completely and to inform Raidboxes immediately about any changes.”
DPA available via the customer dashboard. Privacy Policy §22: “If you intend to transfer personal data to us when using our products, enable you to conclude a contract for order processing (AVV) online with us.” Dedicated DPA page: “Do you need our DPA? No problem! Simply fill out the form below with your account details to conclude the data processing agreement with us online. A copy of the contract will then be sent directly to your e-mail address.” Source: DPA [archive].
Backend migration off Mailbox.org on 26 August 2025. Help Center: “Please note: Starting August 26, 2025, mailbox.org mailboxes will only be available for domains that are already connected to mailbox.org and obtain mailboxes through this cooperation partner.” Source: Raidboxes Email + Mailbox.org [archive]. Some old marketing copy referencing Mailbox.org is still partially visible on the product page even though the partnership has ended.
Soverin
Privacy Impact: HIGH12
Dutch mail with custom domains and unlimited aliases, now part of The Sharing Group. The live mailbox remains provider-readable, and signup requires a phone number.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Soverin, operated by Soverin B.V., Vijzelstraat 68, 1017HL Amsterdam, Netherlands (KvK 61552275)
- URL:
soverin.com - HQ jurisdiction: Netherlands (9 Eyes / 14 Eyes, EU/GDPR) OK+1
- Hosting jurisdiction: Netherlands (“All data stays in the Netherlands”); broader claim is “servers that are separately located within Europe” OK+1
- Zero-access encryption: None for the live mailbox: TLS in transit and “disc encryption” on servers (against physical seizure) only; backups are encrypted with a per-user key (“these backups are encrypted with Your personally generated key”) but no E2EE or zero-access claim for stored mail; no native PGP/S-MIME integration BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No published transparency report; no user-notification commitment; no warrant canary; ToS reserves the right to “hand over any information We have about You … if a competent authority requests Soverin to hand over such information” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; payment via Mollie (“credit cards, iDeal and others”); no crypto, no cash documented; signup requires “a mobile phone number” (stated to be used only for password reset) BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded around 2014 (10-year anniversary press release in 2024); described in 2024 as “joining The Sharing Group, a collective of companies that use technology to empower people and society”, a recent corporate-group affiliation that introduces parent-portfolio exposure even with the statement “Our name, our team, and our commitment to privacy and independence remain unchanged” BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Dutch entity, Dutch law. Terms (July 2025 PDF): “Soverin, We, Our or Us: Soverin B.V., registered at Vijzelstraat 68 (1017HL) Amsterdam, registered at the chamber of commerce under number 61552275.” And: “All rights and obligations arising out of or in connection to these Terms and the Agreement are construed, governed, interpreted and enforced according to the laws of the Netherlands.” And: “The exclusive jurisdiction and venue of any action with respect to any subject matter relating to these Terms will be the court’s located in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.” Source: Terms and Privacy Statement (PDF, July 2025) [archive].
Dutch hosting, EU-only processing. Privacy Statement: “Soverin only Processes Personal Data in countries within the European Union.” FAQ: “All data stays in the Netherlands, protected by EU law — no U.S. Cloud Act exposure.” And: “Everything is hosted in servers that are separately located within Europe, with secured infrastructure and disc encryption in case our hardware is ever confiscated.” Sources: Privacy Statement [archive] and FAQ [archive].
TLS + disc encryption only; no native E2EE. Privacy Statement: “The security of Your data is extremely important to Soverin … We encrypt all data connections from and to our email servers.” Terms (5.2): “Soverin treats all emails between You and Your designated recipients confidentially. Soverin does not check, open or view the contents of Your emails, including attachments, calendars and contact entries.” The provider does not claim built-in zero-access or end-to-end encryption for mailbox content; the only stored-data encryption claim is “disc encryption in case our hardware is ever confiscated”, i.e. physical-seizure protection only. No native PGP / S-MIME integration is documented.
Per-user backup encryption: narrow scope. Privacy Statement (6.2): “The backups of Our servers do contain copies of Your data, amongst which including email. However, these backups are encrypted with Your personally generated key, granting You exclusive access to Your data. This key will be erased when You delete Your account, so no one will be able to access Your backup. So to be extra clear; Soverin cannot access Your backup.” This protects backups; it does not establish zero-access protection for live mailboxes.
IP removed from outbound headers; server-side logging not stated. FAQ: “We remove your personal IP address from the headers of your email. Nobody needs to know your location when you send an email.” No statement on whether (or how long) Soverin logs client IPs at the mail-server level.
Account-deletion retention. Terms (6.6): “Upon termination of Your Account or Your optional custom domain, it is, including Your emails, calendar and contact entries and all other data therein, is directly, automatically and permanently deleted.” FAQ: “If you leave Soverin, your data is removed from our systems, including backups, in line with our data retention policies.” No fixed retention window stated for backups.
No transparency report, no canary, no notification commitment. Soverin publishes no government-request statistics page. Terms (5.6): “Soverin is entitled to report and hand over any information We have about You and relating to You and Your use of the Service to the police if We have reason to assume the Service is used for criminal activities and also if a competent authority requests Soverin to hand over such information.” No commitment to notify users when legally allowed; no warrant canary.
Phone number required at signup; no anonymous payment. FAQ: “Signing up is easy … All you will need is a mobile phone number to sign up. And don’t worry, we only use it to reset your password.” About: “Signing up is a breeze. All you need is a phone number. We are not interested in acquiring personal data or building user profiles. Your mobile phone number is all you need to sign up, it is only used to reset your password.” Sources: FAQ [archive] and About [archive]. Terms (6.2): “We use trusted payment provider Mollie (www.mollie.com [archive]), which supports credit cards, iDeal and others, when charging You for any kind of fees.” No crypto, no cash, no Tor documented.
TOTP only; no FIDO2 / WebAuthn / SMS 2FA. Help: “Soverin uses Time-based One-Time Passwords (TOTP). This means a unique, one time passcode is generated by an authenticator app on your phone. Without this code, logging in with just your password isn’t possible.” Source: Two-factor authentication [archive].
POP3 support is not documented. The help page lists IMAP (993 / 143) and SMTP (465 / 587); POP3 is not described. Source: Mail app setup [archive].
DPA via Privacy Statement; processor stance. Privacy Statement: “This Privacy Statement qualifies as a processing agreement as referred to in Article 28 AVG. The applicability of any other processing agreements is expressly rejected.” And: “Soverin and You agree that with respect to the processing of Your personal data supplied by You to Soverin for enabling You to use the Service, Soverin is ‘processor’ within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation and complies with the Privacy Statement.” Source: Privacy Statement [archive]. No customer-signable DPA template is separately published.
Founded around 2014; 2024 group affiliation. About: “Soverin is an independent private company based in Amsterdam, run by a team of internet enthusiasts who want to create great products that are safe, beautiful and easy to use.” Source: About [archive]. 2024 announcement: “Today, we are taking an important step in that mission: Soverin is joining The Sharing Group, a collective of companies that use technology to empower people and society.” And the reassurance: “Our name, our team, and our commitment to privacy and independence remain unchanged.” Source: Soverin joins The Sharing Group archives: 1, 2, 3. The provider docs do not disclose the full ownership chain inside The Sharing Group; Soverin previously presented as fully independent, so the group affiliation is the structural risk to flag.
HEY
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
US-hosted mail with encryption of individual database fields, but provider-held keys. HEY has a disclosure-notification policy, requires card payment, and no longer publishes its former warrant canary.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: HEY, operated by 37signals LLC, 137 N. Oak Park Avenue, Oak Park, Illinois, USA; privately held and run by Jason Fried and David Heinemeier Hansson, with a passive minority stake held by Jeff Bezos’s Bezos Expeditions since 2006
- URL:
hey.com - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act), per “37signals is a U.S. company with its main data infrastructure located in the U.S.”; the current Terms carry no choice-of-law or venue clause at all, so Illinois domicile is the only jurisdictional anchor the documents give BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: USA, per “All of 37signals’ apps that serve millions of users every day are served from one datacenter in Ashburn, VA and one in Chicago, IL. This includes Basecamp, HEY”, on hardware 37signals owns, in facilities run by the colocation provider Deft BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None. HEY encrypts at rest, in transit, and “at-work”, meaning every content field in the live database has its own key, which limits exposure of plaintext database fields. It is still not zero-access: “HEY is not end-to-end encrypted (we still hold the keys), but otherwise it’s as locked down as can be.” No PGP, no S/MIME BAD+3
- Government-access posture: A clear notification commitment (“It is 37signals’ policy to notify affected users before we disclose data unless we are legally prohibited from doing so”), no transparency report of any kind, and a warrant canary that was deliberately retired in 2022 BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Card only. “We require a credit or debit card for payment. We can’t accept purchase orders, checks, ACH/wire, PayPal, cryptocurrency, barter, or other forms of payment.” Name, email and a verified backup address are required, the signup IP is kept for the life of the account, and Tor is not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Bootstrapped since 1999, “profitable for more than two straight decades”, never acquired; 37signals states it has had no data breach GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
US company, US data, no governing-law clause. Privacy policy: “This policy applies to all products built and maintained by 37signals LLC including Basecamp (all versions), HEY…” and “37signals is a U.S. company with its main data infrastructure located in the U.S.” and “Our products and other web properties are primarily housed in the United States.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. The Terms name 37signals LLC and confine legal compliance to US process (“we only preserve or share customer data if compelled by a U.S. government authority with a legally binding order or proper request under the Stored Communications Act”) but contain no choice-of-law or venue clause, so this article records governing law as not stated rather than inferring Illinois. Source: Terms [archive].
Own hardware, two US datacenters. The engineering blog is specific: “All of 37signals’ apps that serve millions of users every day are served from one datacenter in Ashburn, VA and one in Chicago, IL. This includes Basecamp, HEY… Both of those facilities are run by Deft, who we have been a customer of for more than a decade.” Source: 37signals datacenter overview [archive] (2023-08-10). HEY was moved off AWS onto owned Dell hardware in 2023, which David Heinemeier Hansson described in “We have left the cloud”: “the big move was HEY. This is an application that was born in the cloud. We’d never run it on our own hardware before, and as a full-featured email service, it had a lot of moving parts.” That move covered compute; AWS S3 object storage stayed until a separate migration to Pure Storage, which Heinemeier Hansson dated in March 2025: “We’re spending just shy of $1.5 million/year on AWS S3… That contract expires this summer, June 30.” Both statements are on his own blog at world.hey.com, which is to say on infrastructure he owns.
Per-field encryption, and an explicit refusal to claim more. Security page: “At-rest encryption means that all our databases, files, and other storages of content have their files encrypted when they’re backed up or otherwise sitting idle”, plus the part specific to HEY: “every content field in our database is encrypted with its own key, which is then encrypted with a master key.” The privacy policy contrasts this with the rest of the product line, where “Our application databases are generally not encrypted at rest.” And then the limit, under a heading that states it outright, “Encryption at-rest, at-work, and in-transit, but not end-to-end”: “HEY still technically holds the key to all email, because there’s no end-to-end encryption.” The FAQ goes further and names a competitor: “If you absolutely must have end-to-end encrypted email, checkout something like ProtonMail… This means HEY is not a good avenue for certain forms of high-risk exchanges.” Sources: Security [archive] and FAQs [archive].
Notification yes, transparency report no, canary retired. Privacy policy: “It is 37signals’ policy to notify affected users before we disclose data unless we are legally prohibited from doing so, and except in some emergency cases.” No periodic transparency report exists; the policies index lists Terms, Privacy, CCPA notice, Cancellation, Refund, Security, Accessibility, Taxes and Account Ownership, and nothing resembling law-enforcement statistics. The warrant canary was removed on purpose in 2022, with the reasoning recorded in the policy changelog: “Removed warrant canary (we still have never received a NSL or FISA order, but we are removing this language now to avoid a future situation where we receive one but are not permitted to remove the statement from our policy).” Sources: Policies [archive] and 2022 privacy policy updates [archive]. The retired canary receives no credit under this rubric.
IP logged for the life of the account. “we log the full IP address used to sign up a product account and retain that for use in mitigating future spammy signups. We also log all account access by full IP address for security and fraud prevention purposes, and we keep this login data for as long as your product account is active.” Deletion is on a clear clock: “Within 30 days, all content will be permanently deleted from active systems and logs. Within 60 days, all content will be permanently deleted from our backups.”
Card only, USD only. Pricing FAQ: “We require a credit or debit card for payment. We can’t accept purchase orders, checks, ACH/wire, PayPal, cryptocurrency, barter, or other forms of payment” and “We only bill in US Dollars.” Signup asks for “identifying information such as your name, email address, and maybe a company name”, plus a verified backup email address. Source: Pricing [archive].
A walled garden, stated as a design choice. “You can forward email from other accounts to your HEY account, but you can’t log in and check other email accounts from the HEY apps. HEY doesn’t support IMAP or POP.” And: “In order to use HEY, you’ll need to use one of our custom Web, Mac, Windows, iOS, and Android apps… off-the-shelf 3rd party email apps won’t work with HEY.” Outbound send-as over SMTP is supported for external addresses, but 37signals is careful to note it is not the same thing: “SMTP is an open standard protocol for sending email, it’s unrelated to checking email. Checking an external email account would require IMAP support, which HEY doesn’t offer.” There is no mail import at all: “HEY does not import your existing email from Gmail, Outlook, iCloud. HEY is a fresh start moving forward.” Export is MBOX plus vCard, so mail can be extracted, but the mailbox cannot be operated from anywhere except HEY’s own clients. Export lets users leave, but using a different client while keeping the HEY mailbox is not supported.
One domain per account. “No. Each HEY for Domains account can host a single domain. If you or your company has multiple domains, you’ll need to either set up multiple HEY accounts, or use a third party service like https://forwardemail.net [archive] which forwards emails from one domain to another.” MX takeover is all-or-nothing: “because of the way MX records and email domain hosting works, you can’t host corporate email across multiple email providers.” Personal accounts get no aliases at all: “HEY for You doesn’t support email aliases currently, but it is possible to create aliases using HEY for Domains Extensions.” Sources: HEY for Domains [archive] and help.hey.com [archive].
37signals reports long-term profitability and no data breach. FAQ: “we’re completely independent and don’t answer to the whims of investors or corporate overlords, and we’ve been profitable for more than two straight decades.” Security overview: “To date, we’ve never had a data breach.” The one outside investor is long-standing and passive; Heinemeier Hansson’s own account is “In 2006, Jeff Bezos bought a minority, no-control stake of Basecamp from Jason and me… And he still owns the stake.” 37signals reported 99.99% uptime for HEY in 2023. That ownership history does not change the provider’s access to messages.
Lavabit
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
The relaunched service offers optional password-based storage encryption. Its public documentation leaves several current product details unresolved and still describes the stronger DIME clients and modes as development work.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Lavabit LLC, Dallas, Texas, USA; founded by Ladar Levison
- URL:
lavabit.com - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act; jurisdiction stated as Dallas, Texas) BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Not stated in Lavabit’s docs (primary ISP is Cogent; assume US) BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Opt-in “secure” mode uses passphrase-derived asymmetric encryption at rest; default (“Trustful”) mode has none; DIME’s zero-access modes (Cautious / Paranoid) and the Volcano client are documented as protocols/products still “in development” OK+1
- Government-access posture: No transparency report (stated as planned, not published); no warrant canary; no user-notification commitment BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Tor not stated; payment methods not enumerated on the public site; signup identity requirements not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Founded 2004; voluntarily shut down in 2013 when US authorities demanded its TLS private keys; relaunched 2017; sole-founder operation; no investors disclosed OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
US entity, Texas jurisdiction. ToS: “The services provided by Lavabit LLC (hereafter referred to as Lavabit) are subject to the following Terms of Use.” And: “Should a need for legal action arise, Lavabit reserves the right to have said action occur within the jurisdiction of Dallas, Texas.” Source: Terms of Use [archive].
Encryption only on opt-in “secure” mode. Privacy policy: “For premium users who have elected to use our ‘secure’ service, incoming e-mail is stored using an asynchronous encryption process that guarantees that it can’t be accessed by anyone except the holder of the account password. For these accounts, only the encrypted version of the message is ever saved to disk.” Default (Trustful) mode is not encrypted at rest. DIME’s Cautious/Paranoid modes and the Volcano client remain prospective: “Volcano is Lavabit’s own propriety mail client… Now in development for iOS, Android, and webmail.” Source: Enterprise page [archive].
Strong non-disclosure baseline; no transparency report. Privacy policy: “Lavabit will not release any information related to an individual user unless legally compelled to do so.” On transparency: “We plan to conform to the Transparency Reporting Toolkit” (planned, not published). No warrant canary; no user-notification clause in any current document.
Limited logging. “We do not keep a record of the IP addresses used to access our services (except in the web server logs), and we not keep a record of what information was accessed during a particular session.” Web log IP retention: “typically deleted within seven days”. Mail is retained only until delivered/deleted/account-terminated.
IMAP/POP/SMTP supported in Trustful mode: “Accounts operating in Trustful mode send messages using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol—SMTP—and receive messages using the Post Office Protocol—POP—or the Internet Mail Access Protocol—IMAP.” Source: Security [archive].
Custom domains: contact-based setup. FAQ: “Contact us using the form below, with the address you want associated with your account, and we’ll provide you with requisite DNS entries, along with instructions for providing domain ownership.” Source: Questions [archive].
2013 shutdown, 2017 relaunch. About: “In 2013, we suspended service to protect our global customers when the U.S. government ordered us to release our Transport Layer Security private keys. To protect your digital privacy and freedom, we said no.” Source: About [archive]. The shutdown protected data by ending the service, at the cost of mailbox availability. The relaunch still operates under US jurisdiction.
Documentation gaps. Lavabit’s public site does not publish pricing, plan tiers, storage quotas, alias counts, catch-all support, 2FA methods, Tor support, anonymous payment options, or a customer DPA. Most comparison-relevant fields are explicitly “Not stated” in the provider’s primary documents.
Outlook.com
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
This profile covers a US consumer account. Ordinary mail and paid message-protection features do not establish user-only key custody. New custom-domain hosting requires a different Microsoft product.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Outlook.com / Hotmail, operated by Microsoft Corporation for the US consumer configuration assessed here
- URL:
outlook.com - HQ jurisdiction: United States; the contracting entity varies by residence BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Microsoft describes storage and processing in the United States and other countries; consumer mail has no country-only commitment in the reviewed policy BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None documented for Outlook.com. Paid Encrypt / Do Not Forward uses Microsoft’s message-protection service; it does not establish user-only possession of decryption keys BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Request reports plus advance notice, with legal and exceptional-circumstance carve-outs and delayed notice after gag orders expire; no warrant canary found OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Free mailbox and an email-based registration route, but the terms require accurate signup information. No explicit anonymous-registration or Tor commitment established BAD+2
- Funding stability: Established publicly listed company OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-11. The Microsoft Services Agreement [archive] identifies the contracting entities by region and prohibits false, inaccurate or misleading signup information. The signup guide [archive] allows an email address instead of a phone number; it does not justify describing phone verification as universally mandatory. Microsoft’s investor FAQ [archive] documents its public listing.
The consumer encryption feature keeps Microsoft in the trust boundary. Microsoft’s Personal and Family encryption guide [archive] describes Encrypt and Do Not Forward, with recipients authenticating through Microsoft accounts or a temporary passcode. It does not claim that Microsoft lacks decryption keys. Enterprise S/MIME and customer-key configurations should not be attributed to an ordinary Outlook.com account.
The privacy statement [archive] permits disclosure of Outlook.com contents under specified circumstances and describes international processing. It says email contents are not used to target ads. For deletion, its Outlook section says items generally remain in Deleted Items for about seven days, then up to thirty days in Microsoft’s systems, subject to legal holds. The mailbox-storage guide [archive] instead says Deleted Items are automatically removed after thirty days. Those published timelines disagree; neither promises immediate erasure of every retained copy.
Notice is a documented protection. The government-request report [archive] expressly includes Outlook.com among consumer services. Its FAQ promises prior notice except where prohibited or exceptional circumstances apply, followed by delayed notice when an applicable gag expires. The report separates consumer and enterprise requests, but consumer totals still include services other than mail.
The free plan has 15 GB of mailbox storage and a separate 5 GB cloud quota that also counts mail attachments. Filling the cloud quota can stop mail even when the mailbox has room. IMAP, POP and SMTP [archive] require modern authentication. Account aliases and plus-addressing [archive] are available, as are physical security keys [archive].
New Outlook.com custom-domain addresses closed on November 30, 2023. A January 2025 Microsoft Community Support reply archives: 1, 2, 3 states that cutoff for Microsoft 365 Personal and Family. A July 2026 Microsoft Q&A moderator reply archives: 1, 2, 3 confirms that new custom-domain hosting with Microsoft requires a business service. Existing personalized addresses were grandfathered under Microsoft's 2022 customer notice, reproduced by recipient Tom Plant archives: 1, 2, 3; removing one prevents adding it back. This is legacy availability, not a route for new customers.
Microsoft’s premium-feature FAQ [archive] still contains conflicting advice about moving a business domain to Outlook.com. The dated support replies make the restriction explicit. For a new domain hosted by Microsoft, use an appropriate Microsoft 365 Business or Exchange Online plan; those are separate products from the consumer service assessed here.
PrivateMail
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
Optional client-side OpenPGP protects selected messages, with cryptocurrency payment available. Ordinary mail remains provider-readable, and the policy permits disclosure without notice.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: PrivateMail LLC, United States. The privacy policy binds “PrivateMail LLC, and any of its parent companies, subsidiaries, or other related companies based in the United States”, and the service describes itself as “powered by the makers of TorGuard”, the Florida VPN operator
- URL:
privatemail.com - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act). ToS: “the laws of the State of Florida, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern this Agreement”, with arbitration “held in Orange County, Florida” BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: USA by its own policy: “Private-Mail is based in the United States, and the Digital Services are hosted here.” Checked at the network level on 2026-09-01:
smtp.privatemail.comresolves to a DigitalOcean (US) address, the inbound MX forprivatemail.comis MailChannels, and the webmail sits behind Cloudflare BAD+3 - Zero-access encryption: Opt-in OpenPGP built into the provider’s own webmail and apps, with keys held client-side: “Decryption keys are stored locally on the user’s machine.” It covers only what the user selects (“encrypt select emails or files”); ordinary mail remains stored on the server, and subjects and metadata stay plaintext OK+1
- Government-access posture: Nothing published: no transparency report, no warrant canary, no notification commitment, plus the explicit inverse: “Private-Mail will disclose your personal information, without notice, if required to do so by law” BAD+4
- Anonymous signup: Anonymous payment, yes: “Pay with Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, and many others”, and “Private-mail even accepts anonymous cryptocurrency options like Monero.” Tor is not stated OK+1
- Funding stability: Privately held inside the TorGuard group; no VC and no acquisition on record, the published footer and legal documents carry older dates: the footer reads “Copyright © 2022 Private-Mail All rights reserved.” and the binding documents date from 2019 and 2020 OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
A US entity under Florida law. The privacy policy names the party: “PrivateMail LLC, and any of its parent companies, subsidiaries, or other related companies based in the United States (collectively, “Private-Mail” or “we” or “us”)”. The ToS sets venue twice over: “You agree that the laws of the State of Florida, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern this Agreement”, “The arbitration shall be held in Orange County, Florida”, and if arbitration fails, “the sole and exclusive jurisdiction and venue for any action or proceeding arising out of or related to this Agreement shall be in an appropriate state or federal court located in Orange County, Florida.” Sources: Privacy Policy [archive] and Terms of Use [archive].
The TorGuard connection, in its own words. The anonymous-email page: “Private-Mail is powered by the makers of TorGuard so you know we build systems designed for privacy and to keep your email anonymous.” The homepage footer links straight to torguard.net, and the Pro plan bundles “x3 Months Free TorGuard VPN”. Source: Anonymous Email [archive]. The group’s US legal exposure has been demonstrated on the VPN side: in March 2022 TorGuard settled a suit brought by over two dozen movie studios, and per TorrentFreak the joint statement read “Pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement, Plaintiffs have requested, and Defendant has agreed to use commercially reasonable efforts to block BitTorrent traffic on its servers in the United States using firewall technology.” Source: TorrentFreak, 2022-03-14 [archive]. A VPN matter rather than a mail one, but the same group of companies answers to the same courts.
US hosting, stated and observed. Privacy policy: “Private-Mail is based in the United States, and the Digital Services are hosted here.” Resolving the mail hosts on 2026-09-01 agrees: smtp.privatemail.com sits at 157.230.52.163 in ARIN’s DIGITALOCEAN-157-230-0-0 block (DigitalOcean, LLC, US), with reverse DNS confirming the hostname; the privatemail.com MX records point to mx1/mx2.mailchannels.net; and the webmail host mail.privatemail.com resolves into Cloudflare’s network, which hides its origin. Those network records identify suppliers; they do not independently locate every stored copy or backup.
Zero-knowledge marketing against select-message reality. The anonymous-email page pitches the whole platform: “Private-Mail is a true zero knowledge platform that gives users the ability to trust and verify the opensource encryption methods we employ.” The support page describes what the feature actually covers: “We give users the power to encrypt select emails or files and we don’t store keys to decrypt this content. We have no way to access this data because only you hold the key on your local machine.” Both sentences are true of the encrypted subset and neither is true of the rest, which is ordinary server-side mail. Source: Support [archive]. Under this article’s calibration an integrated PGP path with local keys scores the same as Hushmail’s or StartMail’s server-side variants: real protection for chosen messages, no protection for the mailbox as a whole.
Disclosure without notice, and light logging around it. Privacy policy: “Private-Mail will disclose your personal information, without notice, if required to do so by law or when such action is necessary (a) to conform to the edicts of the law or to comply with legal process served; (b) to protect and defend the rights or property of Private-Mail; or (c) under exigent circumstances to protect the personal safety of users of the Private-Mail website or the public.” The reviewed pages contain no transparency report, no canary, no notification pledge anywhere on the site. On logging the same document lists “Apache Webserver logs (see apache.org; no usernames or passwords are ever logged by the webserver and the logs are regularly purged)”, and the anonymous-email page adds “Although we do check IP’s at time of purchase for fraud prevention, Private-Mail does not log your IP address when accessing our mail services.”
Deletion runs on a 120-day nonpayment clock. ToS: “We reserve the right to terminate unpaid user accounts (which include accounts signed up for paid service where payment has not been timely made) that are inactive for a continuous period of 120 days or more. In the event of such termination, all data associated with such user account will be deleted.” Retention after a user-initiated deletion is not stated. The refund policy is blunt about the anonymous payment rails: “Crypto Payments are not eligible for refunds.”
Older policy dates. The footer reads “Copyright © 2022 Private-Mail All rights reserved.”, the privacy policy “Last Updated December 25, 2019”, the terms “Last Updated, January 1, 2020”. The cart accepts new signups. Old document dates alone do not establish whether the service is being maintained. Source: privatemail.com [archive].
Tiers gate the protocols. Standard is "$ 8 95 /monthly" with “x5 Email Aliases” and “10GB Encrypted Email Storage”; Pro is $15.95 with 20 aliases and 20 GB; Business Pro is $64.95 with “Custom Domain” and “POP3, IMAP, SMTP”. The homepage feature list scopes open protocols narrowly: “IMAP/POP3 support (Business Accounts)”, so the individual tiers are webmail and apps only. Custom domains are business-tier: “Private-Mail offers secure domain management services for business plans at affordable pricing.” Catch-all appears nowhere in any document, under any name. Source: Business [archive].
Rackspace Email
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
US mail hosting with provider-readable messages and a notification pledge. The cited request report is historical. Its public listing predates this rubric’s recent-acquisition window.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Rackspace Email, operated by Rackspace US, Inc., San Antonio, Texas; parent Rackspace Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: RXT), taken private by Apollo-led funds in 2016 and re-listed in 2020
- URL:
rackspace.com/applications/rackspace-email - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act) BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: USA, on Rackspace’s own
emailsrvr.complatform: on 2026-09-01mx1.emailsrvr.comandsecure.emailsrvr.comresolve into ARIN netblocks registered to Rackspace Hosting, US BAD+3 - Zero-access encryption: None. At-rest encryption is an upsell in which the customer may or may not hold the keys: “Rackspace Technology offers strong encryption as one of the many security features available for purchase. Rackspace Technology gives customers the option to manage their own encryption keys.” Body, subject and metadata are all readable by the provider BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Two of the three artifacts. An annual law-enforcement report exists but has gone stale (the 2024 edition, “Revised Thursday, February 20, 2025”, is still the newest as of 2026-09-01), and the notification pledge is unambiguous: “Rackspace will notify its customers of any request for their confidential information unless prohibited by law or pursuant to a Court Order.” No warrant canary OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Neither. Billing runs on cards through the account cart, no crypto or cash option appears anywhere, and Tor is in no document BAD+2
- Funding stability: Publicly listed since August 2020. The 2016 take-private and 2020 IPO are outside the five-year ownership-change window; a later price increase is not an acquisition OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
The product, priced per mailbox. Product page: "$10.00 USD" “per mailbox/month” for the standard plan, “Large 25GB mailboxes and 30GB file storage”, with add-ons “Rackspace Email Plus” at "+$2.00 USD" and “Archiving” at "+$6.00 USD" per mailbox/month, and “Sign up for a free 14-day trial today.” The feature bullets carry a “100% uptime guarantee”, “Free and easy migrations” and “24x7x365 expert support”: the pitch is Outlook-friendly business email with human support, not confidentiality. Source: Rackspace Email [archive].
The March 2026 repricing. TechRadar: “The standard plan now costs $10 per mailbox per month, up from $3. Charges for the Email Plus (+$2, from +$1) and Archiving (+$6, from +$3) add-ons have also put extra strain on customers”, with partners reporting “increases ranging from 110% to nearly 500%”. Reseller Laughing Squid wrote “After almost 27 years using Rackspace as our email provider, they have suddenly announced that they are increasing our email pricing by an astronomical 706%”, and Rackspace’s own statement confirmed the schedule: “effective March 2026, Rackspace Technology is increasing the price of Rackspace Email.” One detail ties back into this comparison: Laughing Squid is moving its mail to PolarisMail, the Montreal operator whose netblock also hosts Thexyz. Source: TechRadar, 2026-01 [archive].
Two artifacts, one gone quiet. The Privacy Center commits to a cadence: “Once a year, Rackspace Technology publishes the number of legal demands for customer data received from law enforcement agencies around the world in the Rackspace Technology Law Enforcement Request Disclosure Report.” The newest edition is the 2024 report, “Revised Thursday, February 20, 2025”, and as of 2026-09-01 no 2025 edition has appeared, so the stated annual rhythm has lapsed by more than half a year. The report itself is a four-page PDF embedded in that page. Rackspace “received a total of approximately 36 law enforcement requests” in 2024, 75% of them from the US; 58% ended with no data disclosed, 8% were rejected, and content and non-content disclosures accounted for 17% each. The PDF also draws the subpoena line in writing, “Rackspace Technology does not produce content information in response to subpoenas”, and answers the direct-access question: “Rackspace Technology does not give any government (including law enforcement or other government entities) direct or unfettered access to customer data.” The notification pledge lives on the customer-data-requests page under “Notices”: “In accordance with the confidentiality provision within our Terms and Conditions, Rackspace will notify its customers of any request for their confidential information unless prohibited by law or pursuant to a Court Order.” The Privacy Center also states the process bar: “A subpoena or its local equivalent is required to request non-content data; and a warrant, court order or its local equivalent is required for content data.” Sources: Privacy Center [archive], Requests to Rackspace for Customer Data [archive] and 2024 Law Enforcement Report [archive] and the report PDF [archive].
Provider-managed encryption. Privacy Center: “Rackspace Technology offers strong encryption as one of the many security features available for purchase. Rackspace Technology gives customers the option to manage their own encryption keys.” Provider-managed at-rest encryption does not qualify for zero-access credit: Rackspace can still access the decryption keys.
Catch-all existed and was sunset. The knowledge base still documents the feature under a banner reading “Important : This feature has been sunset . Refer to the Rackspace Email to Open-Xchange Migration FAQ”, which also records where the platform is heading: onto Open-Xchange. Aliases remain, with an API-documented ceiling: “Currently there is a limit of 50 domain emails and 4 non-domain emails” per alias. Sources: Set an email catch all address [archive] and Rackspace Alias (REST API) [archive].
Clients and second factors. Client access is IMAP/POP3/SMTP on one host: “Server hostname : secure.emailsrvr.com” with port 993 incoming and 465 outgoing per the provider’s own Thunderbird guide. Webmail MFA offers “two options for enabling multi-factor authentication when you first log in: text message authentication and mobile application authentication”; administrators set it per domain as Required, Optional or Off, and no WebAuthn or hardware-key option is documented anywhere. Sources: Thunderbird setup [archive] and Manage multi-factor authentication for Rackspace Webmail [archive].
December 2022 hit the other SKU. Rackspace’s newsroom, 2022-12-06: the company “today announced a ransomware incident affecting its Hosted Exchange environment”, and drew the line that matters for this entry: “Rackspace Technology believes that this incident was isolated to its Hosted Exchange business. Rackspace Technology’s other products and services are fully operational, and the company has not experienced an impact to its Email product line and platform.” Hosted Exchange was “approximately $30 million of annual revenue” at the time. The Rackspace Email product scored here kept running; the incident concerns a separate product and should not be presented as a breach of Rackspace Email. Source: Hosted Exchange Environment Update [archive].
Rackspace was taken private by Apollo-led funds in 2016 and returned to Nasdaq in August 2020. Both events fall outside the five-year acquisition window used here. The recent email price increase affects purchase and continuity decisions, but does not change the ownership classification. Sources: 2016 announcement [archive], IPO pricing [archive].
Titan
Privacy Impact: HIGH13
A Cayman Islands operator with Singapore governing law, sold through hosting partners. Ordinary messages are provider-readable. The US hosting assignment is provisional and based on supplier and network records.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Titan Solution Ltd SEZC, “with its registered office at CO Services Cayman Limited, P.O. Box 10008, Willow House, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman, KY1-1001, Cayman Islands”; founded by Bhavin Turakhia, whose about-page timeline starts “2018 Bhavin Turakhia & team launch Flockmail (now Titan)”
- URL:
titan.email - HQ jurisdiction: Cayman Islands entity with Singapore governing law. Neither is a named member in this rubric’s alliance lists; British overseas territory status alone is not treated as UK incorporation GOOD0
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: USA. The sub-processor list names exactly one hosting provider, “Amazon Web Services, Inc.”, role “Cloud Service Provider”, country “USA”; on 2026-09-01
mx1.titan.emailandimap.titan.emailresolve into Amazon-registered netblocks and thetitan.emailzone runs on AWS Route 53 name servers BAD+3 - Zero-access encryption: None, and the privacy policy describes provider access to message content: “if you transmit an email using our mail service, we need to collect the content of that email to display it to both you and the recipient of such email”. No PGP, no S/MIME, no user-held key of any kind BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report, no warrant canary, no user-notification commitment. The legal-request page pledges process rather than notice: “We only disclose user information in response to a legally valid and properly executed request, such as a subpoena, court order, or search warrant, and only when we have a good-faith belief that the law requires us to do so.” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Neither. Titan sells no mailbox itself: “Select a Titan partner to complete your purchase”, the partners being GoDaddy, WordPress.com, Hostinger, Name.com, HostGator.com.br, Rumahweb and NameSilo, each running its own billing with its own identity requirements. The reviewed Titan pages do not establish an anonymous payment route across those partners; Tor is not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: VC-backed and under ten years old: “Automattic invests $30M into Titan, valuing Titan at $300M”, dated 2021-08-03 on Titan’s own timeline BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
The entity is Titan’s own, not the storefront’s. The Customer Terms are “entered into by and between Titan Solution Ltd SEZC, with its registered office at CO Services Cayman Limited, P.O. Box 10008, Willow House, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman, KY1-1001, Cayman Islands (“Titan”), and the applicable entity agreeing to these terms (“Customer”) for the Subscription (defined below) obtained by the Customer from either Titan or any third party (“Partner”)”. GoDaddy’s or Hostinger’s checkout is the Partner; the company answerable for the mailbox data is the Cayman SEZC, and its registration number appears in no public document. Sources: Customer Terms of Use [archive] and Privacy Policy [archive].
The jurisdiction rule has limits. Titan’s customer terms identify a Cayman Islands entity and Singapore governing law. The rubric has no category for “Five-Eyes-adjacent” territories, so this entry uses the outside-alliance category. That is a limitation of this coarse classification, not evidence of stronger legal protection than the UK. The US hosting assumption is scored separately, and the EU-hosted variant needs its own assessment.
Titan uses its own mail endpoints. Customers point their domain’s MX at “mx1.titan.email” and “mx2.titan.email” with a Titan SPF include; client access is “imap.titan.email” port 993, “pop.titan.email” port 995 and “smtp.titan.email” port 465. These hosts resolved into Amazon netblocks in the September 1, 2026 check. Network registration alone does not establish which AWS tenant operates them. The nearest confusion is
Namecheap Private Email, which is a different platform on Namecheap’s own privateemail.com hosts. A separate EU-hosted reseller infrastructure exists (the knowledge base carries parallel setup articles “for EU-hosted users”), but the sub-processor list names only AWS in the USA. Sources: Setup Titan for your domain [archive], Configure Titan on other apps using IMAP/POP [archive] and List of Sub-processors [archive].
“Encrypted” in marketing, readable by design. The homepage FAQ answers a question about spam with a sweeping claim: “All your messages on Titan are encrypted and are safe from spam, malware, ransomware, phishing and other attacks.” The privacy policy describes the actual arrangement: “Content: Content of any files and communications you input, upload, receive, create and control. For example, if you transmit an email using our mail service, we need to collect the content of that email to display it to both you and the recipient of such email”. Transport encryption and provider-held storage encryption are what “encrypted” means here; the provider can process message contents. Encryption with provider-held keys is compatible with that access; the marketing claim does not establish zero-access encryption. Source: titan.email [archive].
Process pledges, no notice, short clocks. Beyond the disclosure standard quoted above, the legal-request page commits “We do not disclose user content (such as emails or attachments) unless explicitly required by law” and, on preservation orders, “Titan will retain the requested data for a period of six (6) months from the date of acknowledgment.” Nothing anywhere commits to telling the user. After termination, “Titan may delete any Data that it has collected under each individual Terms of Use within 60 (Sixty) business days after the termination of such Terms of Use.” The DPA sets the GDPR roles: "‘Controller’ shall refer to the Customer" and the “Processor” is “Titan for the purpose of this Addendum”, with the standard clauses “prescribed under Article 46 (2)(c) of the GDPR” incorporated by reference. Sources: Submit a Legal Request archives: 1, 2, 3 and Data Processing Addendum [archive].
Domain and client features. A domain is mandatory (“You don’t need an active website to use Titan, but you do need your own domain name”), catch-all is a first-class feature (“Enabling Catch-all mailbox” per domain), each mailbox gets “up to 10 email aliases”, migration is built in (“Titan comes with built-in migration tools to help you easily move existing email data to your Titan account”), and 2FA is TOTP through “an authenticator app on your phone, such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, Authy, or Zoho OneAuth” with recovery codes, though no hardware key and no SMS. Sources: Set up Catch-all email [archive], Email Alias [archive] and Two-Factor Authentication settings [archive].
Sold only through partners, priced by them. The signup page: “Select a Titan partner to complete your purchase. Clicking on one of Titan’s partner’s below will bring you to the partner page where you’ll be able to choose your Titan package and complete your purchase.” No price appears anywhere on titan.email; GoDaddy anchors the current lineup (homepage headline: “Titan and GoDaddy partner to offer next-gen Professional Email”). Source: Signup [archive].
Young, VC-backed, growing. Titan’s own timeline: “2018 Bhavin Turakhia & team launch Flockmail (now Titan)”, partnerships from 2019 on, then “Automattic invests $30M into Titan, valuing Titan at $300M.” dated “08/03/2021”, and a stat block claiming “250k +” “Businesses use Titan”. The founder-CEO line reads “Titan is led by Founder-CEO Bhavin Turakhia and by the founding leadership team behind brands like Directi and Media.net.” Source: About [archive].
Hushmail
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
Canadian-hosted mail with server-side OpenPGP in webmail. The policy explicitly rules out telling users whether an order exists. The iPhone app has a different encryption path.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Hush Communications Canada Inc. (servers); parent Hush Communications Corporation (Delaware, USA); HQ Vancouver, BC, Canada
- URL:
hushmail.com - HQ jurisdiction: Canada (5 Eyes) with US parent corporation BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Canada: Vancouver, BC + Calgary, AB BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Server-side OpenPGP for webmail: private key is decrypted on the web server during user sessions, exposing message body to the server briefly; client-side PGP only in the iPhone app OK+1
- Government-access posture: Explicit non-notification: “we will not disclose to any user the existence, or nonexistence, of any order we may have received”; no public transparency report; no warrant canary BAD+4
- Anonymous signup: Card payments only; IP recorded at signup and purchase; Tor not stated; crypto not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Privately held Delaware corporation; founded 1998-1999; long operational history OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Corporate identity. Privacy Policy: “Our servers where user data is stored are located in Vancouver, British Columbia and Calgary, Alberta, Canada, and operated by Hush Communications Canada Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Hush Communications Corporation, a private Delaware, USA company.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive].
Server-side PGP is not zero-access. Security analysis: “Message body known to web server: Yes, after the message emerges from SSL encryption, the body is temporarily exposed to the server before the PGP encryption takes effect.” And “Private key decrypted and used on server for decrypting and signing messages (for the duration of your session).” Source: Security Analysis [archive].
Non-notification of legal orders. Privacy Policy: “Because such orders generally state that we are not permitted to disclose the existence of the order to a user, we will not disclose to any user the existence, or nonexistence, of any order we may have received.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. This standing non-notification policy triggers the additional penalty in the rubric.
British Columbia law for orders. Court-orders article: “Hushmail will not accept an order from any authority or investigative agency that is not enforceable under the laws of British Columbia, Canada.” Source: How we handle court orders [archive].
IP logging at signup and purchase. Privacy Policy: “As part of the account creation process your IP address will be recorded … we will record the IP address from where the payment is made.” Retention: “The records we keep of your activities are permanently deleted after approximately 18 months.”
Founded 1998-1999. About: “Hush Communications was founded in 1998, and in May 1999 we launched Hushmail.” Source: About [archive]. “Hush Communications is a profitable, privately held Delaware corporation.”
Ryan Singel reported in November 2007 that Hushmail supplied email from three accounts to US investigators following a Canadian court order under a mutual-assistance treaty. His report cites the court filing in a steroid investigation. Source: Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds [archive] (Wired, November 7, 2007).
MXroute
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
US-operated domain mail with no documented zero-access encryption. The operator publishes disclosure rules, but none of the three accountability artifacts counted here.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: MXroute LLC, registered in Texas, USA
- URL:
mxroute.com - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act) BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Not explicitly stated in provider docs; “We operate under U.S. federal and Texas state laws”; assume US BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None claimed; “As an email service provider, we transmit and store email data as part of our core service”; no E2EE feature BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No transparency report, notification commitment or warrant canary found. The separate forum policy is not treated as mailbox-disclosure policy BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: PayPal + cards only via Stripe; “Crypto payments are not supported at this time”; cash not accepted; Tor not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: “Independent and operator-run since 2013, with no exit plan.” “No private equity, no investor decks”; bootstrapped GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
US entity, US-only law cited. GDPR note: “MXroute is a company based in the United States with no operations (employees, incorporation, or physical presence) inside the European Union” and “We operate under U.S. federal and Texas state laws”. Source: docs.mxroute.com/…/gdpr.html [archive].
No published encryption-at-rest claim for email content. GDPR note: “We implement standard security measures to protect this data from unauthorized access”; no algorithm, no key-holder statement, no E2EE claim.
The forum policy has a separate scope. It states: “We may also release your information when we believe release is appropriate to comply with the law, enforce our site policies, or protect ours or others rights, property, or safety.” That forum policy does not establish mailbox-disclosure terms. No mail-specific report, canary or notification commitment was found in the reviewed sources.
No GDPR DPA. GDPR note: “While we respect the importance of data privacy, we maintain a neutral position regarding specific GDPR compliance measures.”
Bootstrapped since 2013. Homepage: “EST. 2013 · NO-NONSENSE EMAIL HOSTING”, “Independent and operator-run since 2013, with no exit plan”, “No private equity, no investor decks, no AI summaries”. Source: mxroute.com [archive].
Payment limits anonymity. Billing docs: “MXroute accepts payments through: PayPal Stripe” and “Crypto payments are not supported at this time”. Source: docs.mxroute.com/…/billing.html [archive].
Mythic Beasts
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
UK-hosted mail from a profitable, founder- and employee-owned company. Messages remain provider-readable, and mail logs include subject lines.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Mythic Beasts Ltd, “a limited company registered in England under company number 04052652”; Companies House records incorporation on 2000-08-14, registered office 45 Argyle Street, Cambridge
- URL:
mythic-beasts.com - HQ jurisdiction: UK (5 Eyes). Unusually, no governing-law or dispute-jurisdiction clause appears in the hosting terms, the AUP or the server terms at all; the England registration and the UK GDPR framework in the privacy policy are the only jurisdictional anchors the documents give BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: UK: “All of our hosting servers are in UK data centres, connected to our 10G fibre ring around London, Amsterdam and Cambridge”, and the privacy policy closes the loop with “Excepting the above, all personal data is stored in the UK”, the exceptions being domain registration and SSL certification. RIPE registers the netblock behind
smtp-auth.mythic-beasts.comas “Mythic Beasts Address Block”, country GB BAD+3 - Zero-access encryption: None. The provider is “a data processor of all User data on shared hosting servers or shared database servers. This includes data stored on websites, in mailboxes, or in databases”, its email server logs include “the subject line of the email being sent”, and no document claims at-rest encryption or integrates PGP into the Roundcube webmail BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Nothing published: no transparency report, no warrant canary, no notification commitment. What the policy does say runs the other way: “In some limited circumstances, we may be legally required to share certain personal data, which might include yours, if we are involved in legal proceedings or complying with legal obligations, a court order, or the instructions of a government authority.” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Neither. Payment is “by credit or debit card, paypal, direct debit, BACS transfer or even cheque”, every one of them name-attached and invoiced, and the same announcement rules out cash with a joke about “an envelope full of used fivers”. Tor is not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: “We have recorded a net operating profit in every financial year other than the first, have no debt and have never taken external investment. Over 90% of the shares remain with the founders, with the rest being owned by current and former employees.” GOOD0
Sources and detailed analysis
A mailbox on its own, from a web host. The price list carries a standalone “Email only” tier at "£1.67" per month with 2 GB disk and 25 GB bandwidth, one step above “Redirection only” at £1.00, and “Prices exclude VAT”. The email feature list reads “Unlimited POP3/IMAP mailboxes”, unlimited autoresponders, webmail and DNS control, and the tier boundary is drawn in one sentence: “If you require more storage than the email-only hosting account provides, please order a Web Hosting account.” That standalone tier is what keeps Mythic Beasts scored here while Greenhost, which bundles mail into web hosting, stays out of scope. Source: Hosting [archive].
Identity, and a missing clause. Privacy policy: “Our Site is owned and operated by mythic-beasts.com and all services offered by the company are offered and operated by Mythic Beasts Ltd, a limited company registered in England under company number 04052652.” The Data Protection Officer is named as Richard Smith, and the policy is versioned (“v1.15”, “last updated on 1/6/2023”). Companies House confirms incorporation on 14 August 2000 at 45 Argyle Street, Cambridge, CB1 3LR. The hosting terms, the AUP and the dedicated-server terms contain no governing-law or venue clause; the only uses of “governed” anywhere in them concern which version of the AUP applies. Sources: Privacy Policy (PDF) [archive] and Companies House 04052652 [archive].
Controller of the mail hubs, processor of the mailboxes. The privacy policy distinguishes these roles: “We are the data controller for all personal data on our mail hubs. Customers have no access to these (other than to send mail through them) and have relatively little control over how mail is processed on them.” And for stored mail: “We are a data processor of all User data on shared hosting servers or shared database servers. This includes data stored on websites, in mailboxes, or in databases.” Email server logs are equally specific: “Including the envelope sender and recipients, and the subject line of the email being sent. Content in the bodies of email messages is not logged, but may be processed by spam-detection software and the result of this is logged.” Connection logs record “the IP address used to connect to the service, and any username used to authenticate access to the service. Passwords are never logged.”
Retention is long and stated. The policy’s retention table: personal data collected from clients is “Normally held for up to 11 years or upon request for deletion”, financial information “11 years”, network monitoring data “Up to 12 months”, control-panel operations logs “3 years”, and correspondence “Indefinitely at the company’s discretion.” No mailbox-specific purge interval after account deletion is published.
UK-only storage with two carve-outs. The policy lists data transfers outside the UK for “Domain registration” and “SSL certification” only, then states: “Excepting the above, all personal data is stored in the UK.” The network agrees: on 2026-09-01 smtp-auth.mythic-beasts.com resolves into 46.235.224.0/24, a RIPE inetnum described as “Mythic Beasts Address Block” with country GB, and the reverse DNS of that address is mx1.mythic-beasts.com. The About page counts “six data centres in three countries”, but the Amsterdam and US sites serve the virtual-server and Raspberry Pi lines; the hosting page’s UK sentence is scoped to the shared web-and-email platform.
Unlimited domains, wildcard addresses. “All our Web and Email Hosting accounts come with unlimited domains.” Wildcards are per-prefix rather than per-domain: “It is also possible to create “wildcard” addresses that will accept mail to any address that starts with a specified prefix.”, configured by creating an address named prefix-default. A domain-wide catch-all exists too, as a .forward-default file, though the support docs call it “not recommended” because spammers invent random local-parts. Source: Email server [archive].
Hardware-key 2FA arrived in July 2026, for the control panel. Blog, 2026-07-14: “We’re pleased to announce that we now support WebAuthn/FIDO2 security keys as an option for two factor authentication (2FA).” Setup lives at “the “Two-factor authentication” page in the control panel”, which is the customer-account login for billing and service management. No document describes a second factor on the mailbox itself: IMAP, POP3 and webmail authenticate with the mailbox password alone. Source: Security keys now supported for 2FA [archive].
The cited payment-method announcement dates to 2014. Blog: “You can now pay by credit or debit card, paypal, direct debit, BACS transfer or even cheque. Just don’t post us an envelope full of used fivers – save those for the sorts of services where you don’t get a VAT invoice.” The reviewed payment documentation does not list cryptocurrency. Source: Now accepting paypal, 2014-08-13 [archive].
Bootstrapped, and it says by how much. About page: “Started in 2000 by a group of Oxford and Cambridge University graduates who were dissatisfied customers of other shared hosting providers”, growing “mostly by profit funded organic growth and selected acquisitions”: Black Cat Networks’ shared hosting (2007), Bluelinux (2010), Retrosnub (2017), BHost and VMHaus (2018). The company also states: “We have recorded a net operating profit in every financial year other than the first, have no debt and have never taken external investment. Over 90% of the shares remain with the founders, with the rest being owned by current and former employees.” Source: About Us [archive].
Namecheap Private Email
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
US-operated, CVC-backed mail with provider-readable storage and Bitcoin payment. This profile credits the notification duty for mailbox data transferred under its EEA contractual clauses; that duty is not a general promise covering every account.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Namecheap Private Email, operated by Namecheap, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona, USA
- URL:
namecheap.com/hosting/email - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act) BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Provisional: Default USA; DPA: “Namecheap may transfer Customer Data to the United States for processing.” Specific data-center locations for Private Email mail servers are not stated BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None: no encryption-at-rest or E2EE claim for Private Email in any legal or KB document; privacy policy is silent on encryption of mailbox content BAD+3
- Government-access posture: No published request report or warrant canary. The DPA’s EEA transfer clauses require notice to the customer and, where possible, the affected person, with exceptions for legal prohibitions. This credit applies to data covered by those clauses BAD+2
- Anonymous signup: Bitcoin accepted (via BitPay and BTCPay); credit balance up to $100,000 fundable in BTC; Tor not stated; signup requires “accurate, current and complete” account info OK+1
- Funding stability: CVC-backed: the investor lists Namecheap among its 2025 investments and now includes the Namecheap/Spaceship business as Starlight in its portfolio BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Operated by Namecheap, Inc. at 4600 East Washington Street, Suite 300, Phoenix, AZ 85034, USA. Per Hosting Privacy Policy: “Namecheap Inc, dba Namecheap”. Source: Web Hosting Privacy Policy [archive].
US-defaulted data processing. DPA: “Customer agrees that, except where specifically noted in the Terms of Service, Namecheap may transfer Customer Data to the United States for processing.” Source: Data Processing Addendum [archive]. No mail-server location is published for Private Email specifically.
No documented E2EE or zero-access encryption. Private Email’s KB and ToS do not describe encryption-at-rest or end-to-end encryption for mailbox content; protocol-level encryption (SMTPS port 465, IMAP SSL 993, POP3 SSL 995, SMTP STARTTLS 587) is documented for client connections.
Account-deletion retention. Hosting Privacy Policy: “When Your Namecheap account is cancelled (either voluntarily or involuntarily) all of Your personally identifiable information is placed in ‘deactivated’ status within Our corresponding databases.” And: “deactivation of Your account does not mean Your personally identifiable information has been deleted from Our database entirely. We will retain and use Your personally identifiable information if necessary in order to resolve disputes or enforce Our agreements.” No fixed retention window stated.
Government-access posture without a transparency report. DPA: “Namecheap does not voluntarily provide governments with access to any data about users for surveillance purposes, and Namecheap will not disclose Customer Data to any government or any other third party, except as necessary to comply with the law or a valid and binding order of a law enforcement agency (such as a subpoena or court order).” And: “Namecheap interprets legal process as narrowly as possible. Namecheap rejects or challenges any requests that have no legal basis or are unclear, overbroad or otherwise inappropriate.” No periodic government-request statistics or warrant canary were found. For EEA transfers covered by the DPA’s standard contractual clauses, clause 15.1 requires prompt notice to the customer and, where possible, the affected person when a public authority requests or directly accesses the covered data. If notice is prohibited, the clause requires efforts to obtain a waiver. Sections 9.2 and 9.4 define the transfer scope. This profile credits that contractual notification duty; it does not establish a general notice policy for data outside those clauses. Hosting Privacy Policy reserves the right to disclose “when We are required by law … in the good-faith belief that such action is necessary in order to conform to the edicts of the law…”
DPA / GDPR. Universal ToS Section 4: “Namecheap’s Controller to Processor Data Processing Addendum (‘DPA’), which is hereby incorporated by reference and applicable to Covered Services…” Customer is the “Data Controller/Data Exporter”; Namecheap is the Data Processor for Private Email. Source: Universal ToS [archive] and DPA [archive].
Bitcoin accepted; PayPal + Visa / Mastercard / Amex. Press release: “We’re delighted to inform you that we now accept the Bitcoin payment method, in addition to PayPal, Visa, Mastercard, and American Express.” And: “Namecheap will also continue to accept payment through BitPay, and customers looking to purchase Namecheap products and services with Bitcoin will now have the option to do so through BTCPay or BitPay.” “With BTCPay, Namecheap customers can now add any amount of money (up to $100,000) to their Namecheap account balance…” Source: BTCPay press release [archive]. SEPA / cash: not stated. Tor: not stated.
Namecheap documents U2F hardware keys and TOTP for the customer account. That page does not establish hardware-key protection for the separate Private Email mailbox login. Treat account and mailbox authentication separately. Sources: 2FA page [archive].
Aliases per mailbox, plan-gated. The current guide lists 10 aliases per mailbox for Launch, 50 for Expand, and unlimited aliases for Scale. Catch-all is supported via DNS (Email Forwarding, one catch-all per domain) and inside Private Email by designating a mailbox as the domain’s catch-all. Annual subscriptions are $14.88 for Launch (one 5 GB mailbox), $41.88 for Expand (three 10 GB mailboxes), and $71.88 for Scale (five 15 GB mailboxes). Sources: Aliases KB archives: 1, 2, 3, Catch-all KB [archive], and Plan comparison archives: 1, 2, 3.
Namecheap was founded in 2000. CVC lists it among its 2025 private-equity investments and includes the Namecheap and Spaceship brands under Starlight in its current portfolio. The investment presentation includes signed transactions that had not closed at year-end, so it is not a source for an exact closing date. Sources: Our Portfolio archives: 1, 2, 3 and CVC FY2025 full-year results presentation archives: 1, 2.
PolarisMail
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
Canadian-hosted mail with optional encryption on Enhanced plans. The S/MIME workflow uploads a private-key bundle and decrypts on the server; it does not provide default zero-access storage.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: PolarisMail Inc., Montreal, Quebec, Canada
- URL:
polarismail.com - HQ jurisdiction: Canada BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Canada; servers colocated with Aptum in Montreal, with Canadian mailbox storage stated on the product page BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Enhanced advertises optional PGP/GPG and S/MIME. The S/MIME guide uploads a password-protected private-key bundle to Group-Office; upstream code unlocks keys and decrypts messages on the server. Ordinary mail has no documented zero-access storage OK+1
- Government-access posture: No request report, warrant canary or notification commitment found; the privacy policy expressly allows disclosure without knowledge or consent, including for legal process BAD+4
- Anonymous signup: Paid service; no documented Tor support or anonymous payment route. The privacy policy includes names, phone numbers and addresses among customer records BAD+2
- Funding stability: Canadian-owned service operating since 2008. Detailed ownership and outside financing are not disclosed in the reviewed pages, so the independent ownership remains unverified OK+1
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-11. The privacy policy [archive] identifies PolarisMail Inc. and its Montreal address. Its definition of personal information includes message contents. Section 5 allows disclosure “without your knowledge or consent”, including compliance with a subpoena, warrant or court order. This qualifies the security page’s broad claim that customer data is never shared with third parties.
Transport encryption and optional message encryption are separate features. The security page [archive] documents Montreal colocation, TLS, hashed passwords and access logs. The feature comparison [archive] also documents PGP/GPG and S/MIME inside webmail under Enhanced features. The S/MIME instructions below explain more of the key handling than the feature list does. Basic mailboxes support custom domains, domain aliases, catch-all, IMAP, POP3 and SMTP. Alias and domain limits are not stated there; hardware-key authentication is not documented.
S/MIME uploads the encrypted private key. PolarisMail’s support FAQ [archive] instructs users to export a password-protected PKCS#12 (.p12) bundle and upload it through Group-Office’s S/MIME account settings. That bundle includes the private key and certificate. The guide describes an older interface, so it establishes the documented workflow rather than the exact current deployment.
In Group-Office’s upstream upload controller , the server receives the bundle and its unlock password, reads the certificate and saves the bundle. Its certificate model caches a validated passphrase in the server session and uses OpenSSL to decrypt messages on the server. Both links pin the source inspected on 2026-11-11. This supports treating the documented webmail S/MIME route as provider-accessible during use. PolarisMail’s deployed version, passphrase-retention settings and separate PGP/GPG implementation remain unverified; an encrypted key upload alone does not establish provider-blind encryption.
Retention differs by plan. The security page specifies daily backups retained for thirty days, metadata logs for 180 days, and up to thirty days of data retention after termination unless immediate deletion is requested. The newer Canadian hosting page archives: 1, 2, 3 advertises a 365-day backup for Enhanced, versus thirty days for Basic. It lists Basic at C$1.49/month for 25 GB and Enhanced at C$2.49/month. Buyers should confirm which deletion promise covers those longer backups. The same page states Canadian ownership and operation since 2008, but does not identify shareholders or financing.
PolarisMail supplies Thexyz’s current Email backend. PolarisMail sells white-label hosting [archive]. Thexyz’s server settings and public login code identify its current Email product with PolarisMail/EmailArray; Classic Email remains on Rackspace until migrated. The two companies have separate customer policies and remain separate entries.
Purelymail
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
Low-cost US-hosted mail with conditional password-protected storage. Password recovery and search indexes affect what the provider can recover. The service changed owners in March 2025.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Purelymail, operated by Add Rabbit LLC (United States); created by Scott Johnson around 2019 and “sold to Add Rabbit LLC in March 2025”, now run by Kevin Ryan
- URL:
purelymail.com - HQ jurisdiction: USA (5 Eyes, CLOUD Act); ToS: “the applicable United States federal law and the laws of the state of Delaware, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Terms”. The About page separately lists “Pennsylvania entity number 7240402” and an Erie, PA address, which is distinct from the contract’s choice of governing law BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: USA, stated without hedging: “Our servers are currently located in the AWS US-East-1 region, somewhere in northern Virginia.” Non-US regions appear on the 2026 roadmap as discovery work, not as a shipped option BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: Password-protected storage is conditional. “Email content is encrypted with your password, meaning that even we can’t read it without you supplying your password (if password reset is disabled)”, and the page adds a separate search-index exception: “partial message content may be recoverable from search indexes without your password, which can be disabled.” Decryption is server-side in the ordinary case: “For IMAP, message decryption currently has to be done on our servers” OK+1
- Government-access posture: None of the three. No transparency report, no warrant canary, no notification commitment, and a broad reservation in the ToS: “The Company reserves the right to monitor, retain, or disclose any information necessary to satisfy applicable laws, regulations, or governmental request” BAD+3
- Anonymous signup: Neither of the two. A phone number is required to open a trial, billing runs through Stripe alone since March 2026, crypto appears only as a possible future payment option, cash is not offered, and Tor appears in no document BAD+2
- Funding stability: Bootstrapped from 2019 and then sold: “Purelymail was created by Scott Johnson, and sold to Add Rabbit LLC in March 2025.” The March 2025 sale falls within the five-year acquisition window BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
US operator and governing law. The ToS opens “Purelymail (by Add Rabbit LLC) is hereafter referred to as the ‘Company’ or ‘we’” and specifies the governing law: “By using the Service, you agree that the applicable United States federal law and the laws of the state of Delaware, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Terms and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and the Company.” Source: Terms of Service [archive]. The FAQ agrees: “Our company is US-based, incorporated in Delaware. (Our staff is often elsewhere in the country.)” The About page footer gives “Pennsylvania entity number 7240402” above a postal address for Add Rabbit, LLC at 502 W 7th St, Suite 100, Erie, PA 16502. Source: About Us [archive]. A Pennsylvania registration or address does not conflict with a contract governed by Delaware law. Both sources place the operator in the United States.
US hosting, confirmed at the network level. The FAQ answer is unhedged: “Our servers are currently located in the AWS US-East-1 region, somewhere in northern Virginia.” Source: Frequently Asked Questions [archive]. Resolving purelymail.com on 2026-09-01 puts its single MX host inside an Amazon Technologies range, which matches. The security documentation frames the arrangement as a benefit: under a heading reading “Physical security through AWS”: “We host our servers through Amazon Web Services, which secures all physical machine access better than we ever could.” AWS physical security does not determine what data can be obtained through legal process. This profile applies the US jurisdiction classification to both operator and hosting. Other regions are wanted but unbuilt, per the roadmap: “We’ve also received requests from users to store their data in different data centers (e.g., Canada, Europe, etc.) … This is an area that we think should be a high focus in 2026/2027, but it is very likely a very complex undertaking.”
Password-based encryption and recovery. Purelymail encrypts mail under a key derived from the user’s password, and the security page describes two conditions: “Email content is encrypted with your password, meaning that even we can’t read it without you supplying your password (if password reset is disabled)”, and immediately beneath it, “Note that partial message content may be recoverable from search indexes without your password, which can be disabled.” The construction is named on the features page: “At-rest encryption for all mail messages, using XSalsa20-Poly1305 and 128-bit AES-GCM encryption cryptographic constructs. You can configure your account so that even we can’t access your mail without your password.” The stronger configuration is opt-in; password recovery retains a provider-side recovery path. The company is also explicit about what it does not do, in a section headed “What we don’t do”: “Serverside end-to-end encryption at time of delivery. Our forthcoming blog post will explain why not; the summary is that it’s not well-suited for email as a protocol”, and under future work, “For IMAP, message decryption currently has to be done on our servers.” Source: Security [archive]. The user key is unwrapped during a server session. Recovery settings and search indexes must be assessed separately from the encrypted message store.
Nothing published on government access, and a broad reservation in its place. There is no transparency report, no warrant canary and no notification clause anywhere on the site. The only relevant provision is the ToS disclaimer quoted above, which reserves disclosure “necessary to satisfy applicable laws, regulations, or governmental request” without narrowing what counts as a request. The privacy policy is 400-odd words and never mentions law enforcement, GDPR, CCPA, a controller-processor split or a DPA; its consent model is one sentence, “By visiting our website or using the Service, you consent to the terms outlined in this Privacy Policy.” Source: Privacy Policy [archive]. What the company does precommit to is unrelated to legal process: “We hereby precommit to never paying any ransom or blackmail.” Retention is short and stated: “Diagnostic logs are deleted after 30 days”, “We delete all account data immediately when you close your account, although it may remain in backups for up to 30 days”, and “We retain backups of deleted email messages for one month.”
A phone number at the door, and one payment processor behind it. The privacy policy names the one identifier the service insists on: “When you sign up for trial mode, we store the phone number you signed up with to prevent abuse. We delete it from our records after you activate your account.” Payment options narrowed in 2026: PayPal was removed on 2026-03-24, leaving Stripe as the sole processor, “If you were using card details, then you can still pay by card. This is done through our preferred payment provider, Stripe.” Source: PayPal payment option removed, 2026-03-24 [archive]. Cryptocurrency has never been accepted and is a conditional aside in the roadmap: “When we redesign the billing system, we’ll likely try to address issues like this (and perhaps even look into accepting crypto as a payment method).” Third-party directories claiming Bitcoin and Monero support contradict the company’s own words and should not be relied on. Tor is not addressed anywhere.
Sold in 2025, with the succession plan written down. The handover post carries both parties. Scott Johnson: “Purelymail has essentially tripled in customers over the last year. A lot of people really enjoy the service, way more than I ever expected when I started making it 6 years ago.” Kevin Ryan: “I’m Kevin. I bought Purelymail from Scott.” Source: A New Chapter for Purelymail, 2025-03-06 [archive]. The March 2025 sale is a recent ownership change under this rubric. A company-policy section headed “What if Kevin is hit by a bus?” records that “When Kevin took over from Scott he signed an agreement that Scott will be able to check in and ensure the company is being run in the right way”, that Scott retains administrative access, and what happens if everyone is gone: “the service should be able to continue without maintenance for some time, and mail data should be safe even beyond that. (Until the AWS bills run out, basically.)” Source: Company Policy [archive]. Two staff joined in February 2026.
Pricing and the announced increase. Simple pricing is "$10 a year" with “no hard limits. Not on users, custom domains, storage, or anything else”; advanced pricing meters the same service at "$0.56 per compressed GB per year" for storage plus a "$4.00 per year" account fee, and custom domains carry no charge on either. Sources: Pricing [archive] and Advanced Pricing [archive]. The 2026 roadmap explains the planned increase: “Many of you have sent us notes indicating that you recognize the $10/year pricing model is unsustainable, and you are probably correct. We are not able to hire additional developers to help work on everything in this roadmap only charging $10/year”, followed by “We plan on increasing prices.” Source: Purelymail 2026 Roadmap, 2025-12-18 [archive]. The same post rejects lifetime plans: “A lifetime subscription eventually makes a liar of the company that sold it.”
Yahoo Mail
Privacy Impact: HIGH14
US consumer mail with mandatory phone verification and server-side content analysis. Yahoo publishes request reports and a notification policy, but does not provide zero-access mailbox storage.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: Yahoo Mail, operated by Yahoo Inc. for the US consumer configuration; controlled by Apollo funds since 2021
- URL:
mail.yahoo.com - HQ jurisdiction: United States; the US terms name Yahoo Inc. in New York BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: International processing, including US transfers; no consumer region guarantee or complete mailbox/backup-location list established BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None documented. Yahoo’s communications policy permits server-side content analysis; transport encryption does not make stored mail inaccessible to Yahoo BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Published request reports and advance notice with exceptions; no warrant canary found. The global report linked from the hub ends in 2024, while EU DSA reporting covers 2025 OK+1
- Anonymous signup: Free, but the signup guide requires a valid mobile number for verification. Tor support is not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Apollo-controlled, privately held and backed by institutional private equity since September 2021. This receives the ongoing PE-funding classification even though the purchase is outside the five-year acquisition window; selling AOL did not transfer Yahoo Mail BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-11 and 2026-11-12. The US Terms of Service [archive] name Yahoo Inc. as the US Mail provider. Apollo announced completion of its Yahoo acquisition [archive] on September 1, 2021, with Verizon retaining a minority stake at closing. Yahoo’s EU DSA report [archive] confirms that AOL moved to Bending Spoons on January 2, 2026. Yahoo Mail and AOL Mail now require separate assessments. This profile excludes ISP-provisioned accounts and business mail sold under other contracts.
Yahoo can process message contents. Its Communications Products policy [archive] says its systems “may analyze and store all communications content”, and permits some manual review to improve automated functions. The March 2026 privacy policy [archive] limits email-based advertising profiles to messages from retailers and other organizations, with opt-out controls and consent where required. That narrower advertising rule does not prohibit other message analysis. Paid ad removal does not establish zero-access storage. The current Terms describe AI features and third-party providers; the reviewed documents do not establish whether mailbox content trains generative models.
The Data Transfer policy [archive] describes international processing and US transfer mechanisms, without a selectable consumer mailbox region. The privacy policy permits disaster-recovery backups and retention for business or legal requirements. Exact backup countries and a fixed mailbox-erasure deadline are not established.
Notice has a published basis. The transparency FAQ [archive] promises notice before disclosure, with legal and exceptional-harm exceptions, followed by notice when the restriction ends. The transparency hub [archive] links July-December 2024 as its latest global government-data edition when checked, despite a stated twice-yearly cadence. The newer EU DSA report covers February 17-December 31, 2025 and includes mail. Those reports have different scopes; their totals should not be treated as interchangeable mailbox surveillance counts.
Free signup still requires identifying information. The account-creation guide [archive] lists a name, date of birth and mobile number. Its phone-verification requirement prevents the free tier from receiving anonymous-signup credit. Yahoo's two-step verification guide [archive] documents phone codes, app push, authenticator codes and physical security keys. Authenticator setup requires at least two recovery methods. IMAP and SMTP access [archive] supports third-party clients; app passwords are used by clients that need them.
The US Mail Plus page [archive] lists 20 GB free and 200 GB for $5/month, with three temporary addresses free or 500 on Plus. Its global storage guide archives: 1, 2, 3 instead lists 15 GB and 100 GB and warns that plans vary by locale. The appendix uses the US product page’s figures and preserves that disagreement. Adding another provider’s account to Yahoo Mail does not establish custom-domain hosting; a current consumer setup path was not found.
AOL Mail
Privacy Impact: CRITICAL15
US consumer mail operated by AOL Media LLC under Bending Spoons. Current terms permit inbox processing and AI-provider sharing; physical storage locations and a current disclosure-notification commitment remain unestablished.
Findings and score breakdown
- Name: AOL Mail, operated by AOL Media LLC; parent Bending Spoons S.p.A. since January 2, 2026
- URL:
mail.aol.com - HQ jurisdiction: United States; the Italian parent’s location does not replace the New York mailbox operator BAD+3
- Hosting jurisdiction: Countries and backups undisclosed. US exposure is provisionally assumed for the scored configuration; Yahoo routing does not prove physical storage location BAD+3
- Zero-access encryption: None documented; AOL processes message contents for smart features, and the terms permit inbox sharing with AI providers BAD+3
- Government-access posture: Current AOL site publishes a historical Mail DSA report. No current promise to notify users or warrant canary found; no explicit policy against notice found OK+2
- Anonymous signup: Free; required name fields and truthful account information. Help describes verification by phone or another email address; Tor support is not stated BAD+2
- Funding stability: Recently acquired by Bending Spoons, with the sale completed in January 2026 BAD+2
Sources and detailed analysis
Sources reviewed 2026-11-11 and 2026-11-12. The AOL Terms of Service [archive] assign AOL Mail to AOL Media LLC and subscriptions to AOL Membership Services LLC. Yahoo’s EU DSA report [archive] confirms the completed January 2, 2026 sale to Bending Spoons. The US mailbox contract remains with AOL Media LLC.
The September 2026 privacy policy [archive] identifies AOL Media LLC in New York as controller. It permits processing of message bodies, subjects and attachments for smart features, and commercial emails for advertising. It also permits transfers to Yahoo as an independent controller, with an EEA exception. Retention depends on purpose: service-delivery data can remain for up to three years after the last interaction or subscription expiry; legal-defense data can remain for ten, with legal-retention exceptions. These are retention ceilings, not promises that an inactive mailbox remains usable for that long.
Mail routing still uses Yahoo hostnames. DNS checked on 2026-11-11 sends aol.com MX traffic to mx-aol.mail.gm0.yahoodns.net; IMAP and SMTP also resolve through Yahoo-named hosts. This establishes a continuing routing dependency. It does not establish the mailbox-storage operator, backup countries or the scope of any transition agreement. AOL’s policy permits storage at its premises and service providers but gives no country guarantee. The US hosting assignment is conservative and provisional; a documented storage boundary could change it.
The Terms expressly include the AOL Mail inbox in data that may be shared with AI providers to deliver features. They do not establish model-training use. Ad-Free AOL Mail [archive] costs $7.99/month for one username and removes paid advertising in webmail. AOL promotions remain, and the offer does not remove ads in the desktop software or mobile app. It promises no change to key custody.
A report exists, but covers the previous operator’s period. AOL’s current Digital Services Act page [archive] republishes a Mail report for February 17-December 31, 2025, explicitly identifying Yahoo International Limited’s pre-acquisition operation. The downloadable data includes government orders to provide information. This receives the rubric’s published-report credit; it is not evidence of post-sale request handling. Yahoo’s notification policy is not credited to AOL, and no equivalent commitment or canary was found in the current AOL documents.
The public registration form [archive] requires first and last names, and the Terms require truthful account details. The signup guide [archive] allows a verification code sent to a phone or another email address, so a universal phone requirement is not established. Two-step verification [archive] documents phone codes and authenticator codes, with availability limits and two recovery methods required for the authenticator option. POP, IMAP and SMTP [archive] are documented. Current storage quotas, alias limits and hardware-key support were not verified from primary documentation; the appendix leaves those fields qualified.
Out of scope
This comparison covers selected hosted mailboxes. The entries below explain why closed services and different product categories are excluded from the rankings. Historical cases remain useful for assessing disclosure and service continuity.
Providers that shut down: Skiff and CTemplar
Skiff and CTemplar both advertised encrypted mail. Skiff closed after its sale to Notion; CTemplar shut down after its founder said the service could no longer meet its security promises.
Skiff (sunset 2024-08-09, acquired by Notion 2024-02-09). Skiff was a US-based provider with one of the strongest technical postures on this list: built-in zero-access encryption that covered email body and subject lines (matching Tuta’s scope), unlimited aliases per custom domain, and explicit anonymous Bitcoin upgrades. It would have scored credibly against the EU-based providers despite US jurisdiction. Migration page: “All Skiff services, including Mail, Pages, Calendar and Drive, were sunset on August 9, 2024, as part of Skiff’s acquisition by Notion.” Source: skiff.com/data-migration [archive]. Mail forwarding terminated 2025-02-09. Skiff’s encryption did not prevent its buyer from discontinuing the service. Ownership structures belong in the assessment, but none guarantees indefinite operation.
CTemplar (shut down 2022-05-26). CTemplar, operated by Templar Software Systems Ltd. (Seychelles LLC per the 2021 footer; the present-day 2026 footer reads only "©2026 Templar Software Systems"), was an Icelandic-hosted OpenPGP provider whose on-paper posture matched the strongest entries in this comparison: physical servers in Iceland (“We host our users’ data on servers in Iceland because this offers the strongest legal protection”), Seychelles-incorporated parent, RSA-4096 OpenPGP zero-access encryption of body / subject / attachments, 7-day anonymous IP retention, instant deletion on account closure (except a 1-year username hold), explicit refusal to comply with anything other than Icelandic court orders (“CTemplar will only comply with valid Icelandic court orders”), anonymous Bitcoin + Monero payment, a Tor onion service, and an explicit warrant canary (“No law enforcement agencies have been here. Watch for this statement’s removal or change”).
It shut down on 2022-05-26, per the provider’s own announcement (preserved verbatim on multiple mirrors of https://ctemplar.com/ctemplar-is-shutting-down/): “CTemplar is closing and the last day of operation for this email service will be on May 26 of 2022.” A follow-up customer email reproduced at cyberinsider.com/ctemplar-email-shutting-down-alternatives [archive] carried the founder’s reasoning: “When we created this service, we made a promise to ourselves that we would shut down the email service if we couldn’t guarantee our security claims to our users. That day has come, and we would rather shut this service down than make security changes that would have been harmful to you.”
The marketing site at ctemplar.com is reachable again in 2026 but the email service is non-functional: the Tor mirror page now shows the onion as “Offline”, the knowledge-base topic pages all read “Nothing found…”, and the original transparency-report URL (https://ctemplar.com/transparency-report-ctemplar/) returns HTTP 404, evidence of a closed service, not evidence that a secret order caused the closure.
On 2021-07-09, CTemplar’s own customer email (reproduced at cyber-privacy.net/ctemplar-catastrophic-incident-with-complete-data-loss-july-2021 [archive]) admitted “a catastrophic technical failure that caused partial data loss, in one way or another, to most customers”; the incident shows the recovery cost of losing stored data; the quoted disclosure alone does not establish the technical root cause. The founder’s explanation and the earlier data-loss incident describe separate reasons to investigate continuity and recovery before relying on a mailbox.
Autistici/Inventati: seizures, domain loss and shutdown
Autistici/Inventati shut down all services on September 18, 2026, so it is excluded from the active-provider rankings. The Italian volunteer collective announced its decision on September 6, citing legal and financial risks to its users and communities. Its campaign archive confirms the completed shutdown. Sources: A/I shuts down - Stay human, 2026-09-06 [archive]; Keep the Internet free [archive].
The government-access attribute counts published accountability documents. Incident reports answer a different question: what was actually disclosed or seized. cock.li and Autistici/Inventati both have records of orders served on their hosting infrastructure.
Its published privacy policy stated that mailbox contents were “encrypted with keys that are only available to the user and not to the operators / AI staff”, IP addresses were anonymized before processing, activity logs were “retained for 15 days”, and the collective committed that “if permitted by law, we will promptly inform the user before any data disclosure… A/I will not comply with the request until all legal or other remedies have been exhausted.” Source: A/I Privacy Policy [archive].
2004: the host handed over the disks, and nobody told the operator. On 15 June 2004 the Italian Polizia Postale executed an order from the Procura di Bologna, issued in an investigation into the anarchist collective Crocenera, at A/I’s ISP: Aruba S.p.A. in Arezzo. Aruba’s technicians took the machine offline, let police copy the disks, and the police left with the server’s private SSL key. A/I was told the outage was a power failure. The collective found out on 21 June 2005, when the material surfaced in the case file of an unrelated request to close a single mailbox. EDRi’s contemporaneous account, in “Police backdoor discovered in Italian alternative server” (2005-06-29), puts the gap plainly: the backdoor was “installed over a year ago, on 15 June 2004 by the Italian ‘Polizia Postale’ (Postal Police), after a seizure ordered by the Procura di Bologna”, and the collective discovered it “after three hundred, seventy-one days of potential snooping of personal and/or sensitive information.” EDRi is also careful about what was not established: “There is no actual proof that any data (not relevant to the case under investigation) were collected, but the possibility is definitively there.” Source: EDRi-gram, 2005-06-29 [archive]. Four Italian MPs, Titti De Simone and Elettra Deiana of the PRC and Mauro Bulgarelli and Paolo Cento of the Greens, put formal questions to the Minister of Communications about whether the Postal Police, the Procura and Aruba had acted lawfully.
The lesson generalizes past activist hosting. The order was served on the host, not on the provider; the provider’s own security posture was never tested, because nobody asked it anything. That is the reason this comparison scores hosting jurisdiction separately from HQ jurisdiction. Hardware ownership is recorded in the profiles but has no separate score. A/I’s answer was architectural rather than legal: Plan R*, launched in October 2005, spread services and encrypted data across servers in several countries, on the assumption that any single machine can be taken without warning.
2026: a third way to lose a provider. On 26 August 2026 the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Autistici Inventati a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, in an action also naming Palestine Action and Masar Badil. Treasury describes A/I as “an Italy-based far-left organization that provides a range of technological tools and services to violent left-wing extremist groups, including website hosting on foreign servers, encrypted email accounts, chat and video conferencing, and digital architecture associated with its ‘Noblogs’ platform”, and states that it “is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of, an act of terrorism.” Source: Treasury press release, 2026-08-26 [archive]. This is an administrative sanctions designation, not a criminal conviction. Two days later the autistici.org domain stopped resolving; the collective’s statement of 28 August 2026 records that “Technical findings indicated a serverHold status for the domain” and that “A/I rejects the allegations and declares that its activities consist in providing tools for digital self-defence and infrastructure for the freedom of communication.” Source: A/I press release, 2026-08-28 archives: 1, 2.
Skiff’s closure, CTemplar’s shutdown and A/I’s shutdown following sanctions had different causes. They show why service continuity needs evidence about ownership, infrastructure dependencies and recovery arrangements alongside cryptography.
OnMail: where the money came from while it ran
OnMail was Edison Software’s own mailbox, the one that made a sender ask permission before their mail reached your inbox. It closed on 31 July 2025. The notice is a help-center article posted on 4 February 2025: “OnMail will be discontinuing services on July 31st, 2025. To ensure a smooth transition, we strongly recommend exporting your user data (and transferring any applicable domains) before July 31st, 2025.” Source: Exporting your OnMail account data [archive]. The domain has since gone further than the service did. On 1 September 2026 the registry still delegates onmail.com to four Amazon Route 53 nameservers and the registration runs to 24 January 2030, but the zone behind them is gone: those nameservers answer REFUSED, so every hostname under the domain fails to resolve, including the help center holding that notice. Reading it takes an archive now.
OnMail’s parent also ran Edison Trends, which sells purchase data pulled out of the mail Edison’s apps read, and Joseph Cox described the mechanics for Motherboard on 10 February 2020: “The popular Edison email app, which is in the top 100 productivity apps on the Apple app store, scrapes users’ email inboxes and sells products based off that information to clients in the finance, travel, and e-Commerce sectors.” The buyer-facing description came from a J.P. Morgan research document Cox obtained, which listed Edison as supplying “consumer purchase metrics including brand loyalty, wallet share, purchase preferences, etc.” with the “source” given as the “Edison Email App”. The Edison users Cox reached had not worked this out from the marketing. “They could definitely be a bit more upfront about their commercial intents,” one of them, Seb Insua, told him. “Their website is all like ‘No Ads’ and ‘Privacy First’.” Source: Joseph Cox, *How Big Companies Spy on Your Emails*, Motherboard, 2020-02-10 [archive].
Edison’s own documents do not agree about what an OnMail user had signed up for. The help center said the sharing was opt-in and reversible: “Consumers can opt-in and agree for OnMail to collect and share only commercial messages such as promotions and receipts”, and “this process is entirely opt-in, and even if you opted-in, you can revoke those permissions in the ‘Settings’ menu at a later stage if you ever change your mind.” The privacy policy that governed the account describes an opt-out instead, and says plainly that it does not reach backwards: “Opting out or deleting your account will not remove or otherwise affect information already included in or used to develop De-identified Data, so we may continue to disclose such De-identified Data to our subscribers.” The policy states: “Edison’s business processes prohibit reidentification of De-identified Data sold to our subscribers.” A second help-center article, written to explain the business model, says “For years now, Edison has been trying to fight data selling companies by showing them that there is a viable way to be a privacy focused business.” Sources: How does OnMail use my data? [archive], What is Edison's business model and how is it privacy focused? [archive] and the Edison Privacy Policy [archive].
Edison was bought by YipitData in September 2021 and told its users what the sale would mean for them: “This means that the Edison you rely on to send your emails, protect your privacy, and build new features, will get better from here on, with future innovations already in the works to roll out in the coming months.” The same post explains the fit through the research business rather than the mail: “Similar to our e-commerce research business, Yipit generates research reports based upon de-identified and aggregated data, with a focus on public companies.” Source: Edison Acquired by Yipit [archive]. Four years later the mailbox was switched off and the research business was not. Edison’s privacy policy, revised on 2 October 2025 and so two months after OnMail stopped taking mail, still describes registering “an OnMail account” and still sends users to “OnMail settings” to opt out. The old opt-out instructions remained in the policy after the mailbox closed.
Greenhost: a privacy host with no mailbox to buy
Greenhost is Greenhost BV, “established in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, registered at the Chamber of Commerce of the Netherlands under 62576593”, running on hardware it owns in a Dutch data center under Dutch law. Its privacy policy carries the user-notification commitment most of the ranking above lacks: “If Greenhost is required to provide a third party with your personal information (whether by subpoena or otherwise) Greenhost will use reasonable means to notify you promptly of that event, unless prohibited by law or if Greenhost is otherwise advised in legal proceedings.” Greenhost and Riseup also challenged GCHQ in court. From its privacy page: “We have sued GCHQ, the English security and information agency, for attacking and exploiting network infrastructure in order to unlawfully gain access to people’s private communications.” Greenhost was one of seven providers whose complaint the Investigatory Powers Tribunal joined to Privacy International’s in 2014, alongside Riseup: “Those providers were Chaos Computer Club (Germany), Greenhost (Netherlands), GreenNet (UK), Jinbonet (Korea), Mango Email Service (Zimbabwe), May First/People Link (US), and Riseup (US).” The Tribunal ruled against the claimants on February 12, 2016. It “held that GCHQ hacking of computers, mobile devices and networks is lawful, wherever it occurs around the world.” Sources: Privacy at Greenhost [archive], Privacy Policy [archive], Privacy International and Others v. United Kingdom [archive] and Privacy International, 2016-02-12 [archive]. The same privacy page records a data-minimization decision made for exactly the reason this article scores hosting separately: “We stopped logging non-critical email information in order to be safeguarded from having to share these with national authorities.”
Greenhost bundles mail with web hosting. Its products page states: “Hosting packages all include backups, email services for unlimited number of users and full control of your services through our in-house developed Service Centre.” Source: Products [archive]. The listed packages have prices and include mailboxes, but no separate mailbox-only offer was found. Bundled web-hosting email is excluded by this article’s scope; its privacy could still be assessed separately.
Greenhost has been part of The Sharing Group since 11 December 2024, having considered the alternative and passed on it: “We explored the possibility of partnering with socially conscious investors and implementing a steward-ownership model. Ultimately, we found that joining forces with TSG enables us to stay true to our values while benefiting from the stability and resources of a larger organization.” Source: Greenhost Joins Forces with The Sharing Group (TSG) [archive]. Soverin joined the same group in 2024. Both are ownership changes within this rubric’s five-year window. And in May 2026 Greenhost disclosed a breach of its own making, describing a staff-only API endpoint deployed in 2023 with the wrong access controls, spotted by a researcher on 25 April 2026, patched on the next working day, reported to the Dutch DPA two days after that, 59 customers affected, with the exposed and not-exposed fields listed separately and the reason given. The disclosure begins: “transparency is nice at comfortable times, but especially important in the uncomfortable moments.” Source: Customer Data Breach, 2026-05-22 [archive].
Pobox: the brand outlived the product behind it
Pobox continues through Fastmail. The homepage, /privacy and /user-agreement paths checked on September 1, 2026 returned HTTP 302 to https://www.fastmail.com/pobox, and the page at the far end says “Pobox has been discontinued as a separate service, and all existing customers moved to the Fastmail platform.” Fastmail’s privacy policy names one other brand and Pobox is not it: “We also operate under the brand/marketing name Topicbox”. Sources: Pobox is now part of Fastmail [archive] and the Fastmail Privacy Policy [archive].
Fastmail published an account of the merger by the engineer who worked on it. Ricardo Signes, Fastmail’s Chief Developer Experience Officer, opened his post of 10 December 2024 with the date and the delay: “On November 12th of this year, our service Pobox was finally merged into Fastmail. This had been inevitable since Fastmail’s acquisition of Pobox in 2015, but we’d put it off over and over.” Pobox had been “at its heart, an email forwarding service”, “started by Meng Wong and Helen Horstmann-Allen in 1995, while they were both still in college”, and by the end it was “around for thirty years.” During the nine years between purchase and merger, “Pobox had emergency support staff, but no full time developers, and it showed, with nearly no changes of any kind after 2015. That didn’t just mean they weren’t getting cool new features. It meant they weren’t getting as many deliverability improvements or updates to service monitoring.” Source: Ricardo Signes, *Dec 10: Sunsetting Pobox*, Fastmail, 2024-12-10 [archive]. Signes describes limited maintenance between the purchase and merger.
Pobox was fully merged into Fastmail, so it is covered by the Fastmail profile. Its former policy links redirect to Fastmail’s terms, and existing Pobox addresses now use that service.
Alias and relay services: SimpleLogin, addy.io, Firefox Relay, DuckDuckGo Email Protection
These hand out a throwaway address per site and forward whatever arrives to a mailbox you already own. That makes them a complement to the providers scored above rather than an alternative: a relay controls who learns your real address, while your mailbox host still controls who can read the message. The rubric doesn’t transfer cleanly either, because a service that holds mail only in transit answers different questions than one storing it for years. Relays also move the trust problem rather than removing it. Every forwarded message crosses the relay’s servers, and the category has consolidated toward the same companies scored above: Proton owns SimpleLogin, and Firefox Relay is Mozilla’s. Run one on top of a provider from the ranking. Don’t run one instead of picking a provider, which is why this comparison scores mailbox hosts only.
Self-hosting: the attribute you cannot configure your way out of
Self-hosting makes you responsible for the mail server, its keys, updates and recovery. A hosting company can still control the underlying infrastructure. Full-disk encryption protects an offline disk; it does not make messages inaccessible to a running server or to an administrator who controls it.
SMTP retries can bridge a temporary outage when the recipient server returns a temporary failure and the sender retains the queued message. RFC 5321 recommends a retry period of at least four to five days, but that does not guarantee delivery after every storage or configuration failure. A permanent rejection, exhausted retry queue or undetected loss can still lose mail. Self-hosting is outside this provider comparison because those operational responsibilities need a separate assessment. Sources: RFC 5321 §4.5.4.1 [archive].
Functionality & pricing appendix
Functionality and pricing are decision factors but not privacy signals, kept separate so the comparison above stays honest. Click any column header to re-sort.
Compare plans, domains and client features
| Provider | Custom domain tier | Domains per mailbox | Catch-all | Aliases (scope stated) | IMAP/SMTP | Message encryption | Hardware-key 2FA | Storage (entry) | Price (entry) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proton Mail | Mail Plus | 1 Plus; 3 Unlimited; up to 15 Business | Yes, paid | 10 Plus; 15 extra Unlimited | Bridge; no POP | Bodies + attachments; subjects visible | FIDO2/U2F | 15 GB Plus | $3.99/mo, annual |
| Tuta | Revolutionary | 3 Revolutionary; 10 Legend; unlimited Business Unlimited | Yes | Unlimited custom-domain; 15 extra provider-domain | Own clients only | Includes stored subjects | U2F/FIDO2 | 20 GB Revolutionary | €3/mo, annual |
| cock.li | None | 0 | No | Not documented | IMAP/POP/SMTP, including Tor | External PGP only | Not documented | Not published | Free |
| Mailfence | Entry | 2 Entry; 7 Pro; 10 Ultra | Yes | 10/50/100/200 across Base/Entry/Pro/Ultra | Entry+; POP also | Optional browser OpenPGP | TOTP only | 1 GB free; 40 GB Entry | Entry €3.50/mo, annual |
| Neomailbox | Secure Email + domain add-on | Cap unstated; $15 setup/domain | Unlimited domain addresses, no pre-creation | Unlimited custom-domain/subdomain | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional browser OpenPGP | Not documented | 1 GB entry | $49.95/yr + $15 domain setup |
| Kolab Now | Just Email | First included; extras CHF 0.50/mo | Yes; manual domain alias | Cap unstated | IMAP/POP/SMTP; TOTP disables external protocols | Optional webmail OpenPGP | TOTP only | 5 GB | CHF 5/mo; groupware CHF 9.90/mo |
| Mailbox.org | Standard; Light in family/team | Alias quota limits use | Yes | 50 Standard; 250 Premium across custom domains | IMAP/SMTP | Optional server-side Guard | YubiKey OTP, not WebAuthn | 2 GB Light | Light €1/mo; custom-domain tier differs |
| CounterMail | Premium + domain add-on | Multiple; $15 setup/domain | No | 10 provider aliases; unlimited on owned domain | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | Bodies + attachments; headers visible | Proprietary USB keyfile; not FIDO | 4 GB | $49/yr + $15/domain; invitation |
| Eclipso | Business | 1 included; extras unstated | Not documented | 0/10/24/50 per account by tier | IMAP/POP/SMTP; tier restrictions apply | Optional device-side OpenPGP; S/MIME | TOTP only | 2 GB free mail; 100 GB Business | Connect €0.99; Premium €1.99; Business €4.99/mo equivalents, prepaid terms |
| Infomaniak kMail | Paid Mail Service | Multiple; cap unstated | Paid tiers except Starter | 50/address on eligible paid tiers; 1 Starter/free | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional server-side OpenPGP | YubiKey on account; client scope differs | Unlimited paid; 20 GB free | CHF 2.29/mo; kSuite Standard CHF 1.76/user/mo annual, ex-VAT |
| mail.de | Not documented | Not stated | Not documented | 0 FreeMail Zero; 1 FreeMail; 10 PlusMail | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional Mailvelope / inbound PGP or S/MIME | U2F/passkeys | 500 MB Zero; 1 GB FreeMail | Free; PureMail €0.99/mo; PlusMail €2.49/mo |
| Posteo | None | 0 | Not applicable | 2 included; up to 20 with paid extras | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional storage / inbound public-key encryption | TOTP confirmed; hardware not established | 2 GB | €1/mo |
| StartMail | Personal | 1 Personal; unlimited Business | Yes | Unlimited on custom domain | IMAP/SMTP; no POP | Password-protected vault; optional OpenPGP | TOTP only | 20 GB Personal; 30 GB Business | $59.88/yr Personal; $83.88/yr Business |
| Systemli | None | 0 | No | Plus-addressing; no separate aliases | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | Password-protected storage; external GnuPG | Mail 2FA not documented | Quota not published | Free; invitation |
| Vivaldi Mail | None | 0 | Not applicable | Plus-addressing only | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional server-side OpenPGP | FIDO2/WebAuthn | 10 GB | Free; community reputation required |
| GMX | German Domain & Mail add-on | International FreeMail has no custom domain | Not documented | Up to 10 provider-domain aliases | IMAP/POP/SMTP; must activate | Optional Mailvelope; metadata visible | TOTP only | 65 GB international FreeMail | Free; DE/CH/AT ProMail €3.99/mo; TopMail €6.49/mo |
| Hostpoint | Cloud Office Basic | Multiple; cap unstated | No | Same-domain; cap unstated | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Control-panel TOTP only | 15 GB Basic; 50 GB Plus; 100 GB Business | CHF 2/mo first year; CHF 3/mo renewal, VAT included |
| Inbox.eu | Business Premium | Multiple; cap unstated | Paid Business domains | 5/mailbox; same-domain | IMAP/POP/SMTP; must activate | Provider-readable; advertised feature is TLS | TOTP only | 100 GB/mailbox | €9.99/user/yr |
| Migadu | All paid plans | Unlimited | Yes | Unlimited within quotas | IMAP/POP/SMTP | External PGP only | No mailbox 2FA | Soft limits | Micro $19/yr |
| Murena Mail | No verified consumer tier | No consumer domains established | Not documented | Both provider-domain names; 5 Hide My Email on listed paid tiers | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | Optional Mailvelope / OpenKeychain | TOTP only (doc.e.foundation/support-topics/two-factor-authentication [archive]) | 1 GB free; 20 GB paid entry | 20 GB €1.99/mo or €19.90/yr |
| Runbox | Micro | 1/5/10/25 by tier | Yes | Unlimited owned-domain; 100 provider-domain | IMAP/POP/SMTP | External PGP only | TOTP/OTP; hardware feature unshipped in cited check | 2 GB Micro | Micro €19.95/yr |
| WEB.DE | Separate Homepage & Mail | Forwarding product; published limits conflict | Not documented | Paid provider-domain aliases; count unstated | IMAP/POP/SMTP; must activate | Optional Mailvelope; metadata visible | TOTP only | 1 GB FreeMail; 5 GB MailPlus | Free; MailPlus €3.99/mo; Club €6.49/mo |
| Disroot | Donation perk | Cap unstated | Not documented | Plus-addressing | IMAP/POP/SMTP | External PGP only | Mail 2FA not documented | 1 GB free mail | Free; storage upgrades from €11/yr |
| Mailo | Paid Mailo space | Several; cap unstated | Yes | 5 Free; 100 paid per mailbox | IMAP/SMTP; POP on Premium | Optional OpenPGP | TOTP only | 1 GB free; 20 GB Premium | Premium €1/mo; Pro Start €3/mo ex-VAT |
| Riseup | None | 0 | Not documented | Provider aliases; cap not published | IMAP/POP/SMTP, including Tor | Password-protected storage; server decryption | Mail 2FA not documented | 1 GB; increases by request | Free; invitation |
| Seeweb | Cloud Mail; domain required | Entry attaches one; account cap unstated | Not documented | Cap unstated; forwarding available | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Optional webmail PGP | Not documented | 5 GB entry | €10/yr + VAT reported by staff; public checkout price needs confirmation |
| Forward Email | Enhanced Protection for storage | Unlimited | Yes | Unlimited paid; wildcard/regex | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Password-encrypted SQLite; server decryption | WebAuthn/passkeys | 10 GB pooled | $3/mo; free tier is forwarding only |
| Gandi Mail | Any paid mailbox; domain at Gandi | One mailbox domain; forwarding across domains | Yes | Unlimited aliases; 1,000 forwards/domain | IMAP/SMTP | Customer-managed encryption | Not documented | 10 GB Standard | €4.99/mo |
| iCloud Mail | iCloud+ | 5/account | Yes; owner-controlled | 3 @icloud.com; up to 10/person/custom domain | IMAP/SMTP; no POP | Optional S/MIME in Apple Mail | At least two FIDO keys | 5 GB shared free; 50 GB entry paid | US iCloud+ $0.99/mo |
| Iroco | Collective | Cap unstated | Not documented | 50 plus-address variants Individual; Collective as needed | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | External PGP only | TOTP only | 5 GB Individual; 5 to 100 GB Collective | From €3.60/mo incl. tax; SEPA |
| Thexyz | All current Email plans | Multiple + domain aliases | Yes | 25 included; paid bundles up to unlimited/account | IMAP/POP/SMTP; other sync options vary | Scored Classic: optional Mailvelope; current Email key handling unverified | Client-area YubiKey; mailbox hardware not established | 10 GB entry | $2.95/mo; two months free annually; USD/CAD checkout |
| Zoho Mail | Free single domain; paid multi-domain | Up to 30/organization on eligible plans | Yes | 30/primary mailbox | Paid IMAP/POP/SMTP; free web/app only | Scored Mail Premium: optional S/MIME | Hardware keys not established here | 5 GB free; 5 to 10 GB Lite; 50 GB Premium mail | Lite $1; scored Premium $4/user/mo, annual billing |
| Combell | Basic Professional | Multiple; aliases stay same-domain | Yes | Unlimited per domain | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Control-panel TOTP | 5 GB Basic; 50 GB Expert+; 100 GB Ultimate | Basic €2.99/mo first year; €4.49 renewal, ex-VAT, annual |
| Fastmail | Eligible paid plan | Up to 100 | Yes | 600 total across domains | IMAP/SMTP | External PGP/S/MIME only | Security keys | 6 GB Basic; 60 GB Individual | $4/mo Basic; $6/mo Individual |
| Gmail | Separate Workspace product | None in consumer Gmail | No | Plus-addressing | IMAP/SMTP; OAuth or eligible app password | Provider-readable | Security keys | 15 GB shared | Free |
| Raidboxes | Mail Mini | 1 | Yes | 5/10/15 per mailbox by tier | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | PGP optional; custody unverified | No hardware keys documented | 3/10/25 GB shared by tier | €3/€5/€7 per month, ex-VAT; prepayment discounts |
| Soverin | Standard paid product | Multiple; cap unstated | Yes | Unlimited on owned domain | IMAP/SMTP; POP unstated | Provider-readable live mailbox | TOTP only | 25 GB | €39/yr mailbox; about €52/yr with .nl domain |
| HEY | HEY for Domains | 1/account | Yes on Domains | Unlimited domain extensions; no personal aliases | No IMAP/POP; own clients | Provider-held keys | WebAuthn/FIDO2 | 100 GB | $99/yr personal; Domains $12/user/mo, first user $10 |
| Lavabit | Contact-based; tier unstated | Not stated | Not stated | Not stated | IMAP/POP/SMTP in Trustful mode | Optional password-based storage | Not stated | Not stated | Not published |
| Outlook.com | Legacy only; new hosting needs business service | Legacy configurations | Not documented | Account aliases + plus-addressing; cap unverified | IMAP/POP/SMTP; OAuth | Provider-managed paid protection | Microsoft account security keys | 15 GB mail; separate 5 GB cloud allowance | Free |
| PrivateMail | Business plans | Cap unstated | Not documented | 5 Standard; 20 Pro/Business | Business only; personal web/app | Optional client-side OpenPGP | Not documented | 10 GB mail + 10 GB files Standard | $8.95/mo Standard; $64.95/mo Business Pro |
| Rackspace Email | All plans; domain required | Multiple; cap unstated | Discontinued | API: 50 domain + 4 external recipients/alias | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Webmail TOTP/SMS; no hardware keys documented | 25 GB mail + 30 GB files | $10/mailbox/mo; add-ons extra |
| Titan | Required; bought through partner | Cap partner-dependent | Yes | 10/mailbox | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | TOTP only | Partner-dependent | Partner-dependent |
| Hushmail | Business/healthcare/law plans | Cap not documented | Yes | Unlimited | IMAP/SMTP | Server-side PGP in webmail | No hardware keys documented | 10 to 15 GB | Personal $5.99/mo; Healthcare Starter $11.99/mo |
| MXroute | All plans | Unlimited | Yes; discouraged | Unlimited | IMAP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Not documented | 10 GB entry | $59/yr |
| Mythic Beasts | Email only | Unlimited | Wildcard/routing configuration | Unlimited | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable; subjects logged | Control panel only; mailbox has no 2FA | 2 GB | £1.67/mo ex-VAT |
| Namecheap Private Email | Launch / Expand / Scale | Cap unstated | Yes | 10/50/unlimited per mailbox | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Customer-account U2F; mailbox scope unverified | 5/10/15 GB per mailbox | $14.88/$41.88/$71.88 yearly; 1/3/5 mailboxes |
| PolarisMail | Basic | Domain aliases; cap unstated | Yes | Cap unstated | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Enhanced: optional server-side S/MIME | TOTP; hardware not documented | 25 GB | Basic C$1.49/mo; Enhanced C$2.49/mo |
| Purelymail | Any account | Unlimited | Routing rule | No hard cap; plus-addressing | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Conditional password-protected storage | Security keys | No hard simple-plan limit | $10/yr simple; metered option + $4/yr base |
| Yahoo Mail | No current consumer setup documented | Not established | Not documented | 3 temporary free; 500 Plus | IMAP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Physical security keys | US page: 20 GB free; 200 GB Plus; global help differs | Free; Plus $5/mo US |
| AOL Mail | No current consumer setup documented | Not established | Not documented | Limits unverified | IMAP/POP/SMTP | Provider-readable | Hardware unverified; TOTP/phone documented | Quota unverified | Free; ad removal $7.99/mo |
Notes:
Plan restrictions and feature notes
The table lists entry prices and upgrade requirements. Those plans can differ from the configuration scored for privacy, especially Zoho Mail Premium and Thexyz Classic Email. The linked profiles contain the plan documentation and dated checks.
- Mailbox.org: Light excludes standalone custom-domain hosting; Standard includes it. Family and team accounts have different rules.
- Hushmail: Personal excludes custom domains. Healthcare Starter is the documented entry point for a custom domain and catch-all; the number of domains per mailbox is not established.
- Tuta: use its own apps. It has no IMAP, POP3 or SMTP access for third-party clients.
- Zoho Mail: the Free tier has regional availability restrictions and lacks IMAP, POP and ActiveSync. Mail Lite adds client access; the S/MIME configuration assessed here requires Mail Premium.
- StartMail: Personal supports one custom domain; Business supports unlimited domains. Bitcoin is available on annual plans, excluding group subscriptions.
- Mailfence: alias limits apply across the account’s custom domains. They are not a separate allowance for each domain.
- Kolab Now: turning on TOTP restricts the account to webmail and blocks IMAP, POP, ActiveSync, CalDAV, CardDAV and WebDAV clients.
- Namecheap Private Email: Launch, Expand and Scale have per-mailbox alias caps. Namecheap account hardware-key support does not establish the same protection for mailbox login.
- Hostpoint: catch-all is unsupported. The documented TOTP protects the control panel, not individual IMAP or SMTP sessions.
- Infomaniak kMail: the free offer has country and European-phone requirements. Manager authentication and mailbox-client authentication have different scopes.
- Raidboxes: the documented plans allow one connected domain, with same-domain aliases. Forwarding to another inbox does not add a domain for sending.
- Thexyz: hardware tokens are documented for the client area. Its older webmail MFA guide [archive] offers an authenticator app or SMS; the current Email login handles TOTP. Neither source establishes hardware-key authentication for the mailbox. Treat the client-area YubiKey option and mailbox authentication as separate features.
Privacy Impact Framework
Lower scores reflect the preferences in this rubric. The component scores matter more than small differences in the total.
- HQ jurisdiction: 5-Eyes member (US, UK, CA, AU, NZ), China or Russia (+3); other 9/14-Eyes member covered by GDPR or EEA data-protection rules (+1); outside those groups (0). Apply the named exceptions before the outside-alliance category.
- Hosting jurisdiction: Same scale as HQ. For a service spanning multiple countries, include replicas and backups and use the highest applicable penalty. A selectable region needs its own stated configuration; inferred locations are provisional.
- Zero-access encryption: Built-in, provider holds no key for at least the stored message body, with decryption on the user’s device (0); opt-in PGP/S/MIME the provider integrates into its own webmail or apps, or a user-password-derived key unwrapped server-side per session (+1); server-side PGP where the provider can briefly access plaintext (+1); none built in, with at most external PGP tooling the provider does not integrate (+3)
- Government-access posture: Published transparency report + user-notification commitment + warrant canary (0); two of three (+1); one of three (typically just a transparency report) (+2); none (+3). Notification by authorities does not count as a provider commitment. Add OK+1 more for an explicit non-notification policy; a legal prohibition on notice alone does not trigger it.
- Anonymous signup: Tor explicitly supported and an anonymous payment route (cash or crypto) (0); one of the two (+1); neither stated (+2). A free mailbox requiring no billing identity or mandatory real name/phone satisfies the payment criterion. State the tier; crypto alone does not guarantee anonymity.
- Funding stability: Independent, family-owned, employee-owned or nonprofit operation for more than ten years of continuous independent operation (0); other stable private ownership or an established company that is publicly listed (+1); a privately held company backed by institutional venture/private-equity funding, or a controlling acquisition within the preceding five years (+2). Use the latest dated assessment, not the page build date, to measure that window. A public listing uses the listed-company category even when a foundation retains voting control. A conversion to nonprofit ownership without a controlling outside buyer does not restart the operating-history clock. Crowdfunding alone is not institutional VC/PE funding; a price change is not an ownership event.
The weights are editorial choices. Alliance membership is a rough jurisdiction proxy, not a complete analysis of surveillance law or international cooperation. Funding measures ownership history, not solvency; advertising alone does not qualify as a recent acquisition. The accountability attribute counts published artifacts, including older reports and canaries flagged as stale in profiles; it does not establish their current coverage. Unknown or inferred facts can change a result and should not be read as verified protections. For a location without a mail-specific provider statement, the profile names its working assumption and marks it provisional. Network registration supports an inference, not physical-storage verification. If neither hosting evidence nor a useful network inference exists, the operator’s country is the provisional fallback. An undisclosed operator’s stated governing law is a provisional jurisdiction proxy, not proof of incorporation.
The score does not separately measure IP-log retention, content analysis for advertising, AI data use, account security or breach history. Those findings remain relevant to choosing a provider. Optional encryption and contractual notification duties receive credit only for the configuration identified in the profile. A higher-tier feature or a transfer-specific clause does not apply to every account.
Bands: LOW0-3; MEDIUM4-8; HIGH9-14; CRITICAL15+.
Audit a provider yourself
Paste this prompt into your research AI of choice (Perplexity, ChatGPT with web search, Claude with web search, etc.) to score any provider not listed here against the same rubric. The prompt is self-contained. Fill in <PROVIDER NAME> and <URL>; extra research fields can be appended to the end of its field list without disturbing the rest.
Start by checking the product and its operator. A free or invitation-only mailbox can be assessed, while a closed service cannot be recommended for a new account. A brand may name its parent company in its terms without being a duplicate product. Shared infrastructure needs investigation because both the reseller and the upstream host may process mail.
Folding a scored provider back into this article takes four edits, each ordered ascending by Privacy Impact score: a row in
Ranking, a row in
Comparison, a ### section under
Provider profiles, and a row in the
functionality appendix. The six attribute deltas in the profile must sum to the score shown in both score tables. A provider that can’t be scored at all belongs in
Out of scope, where entries simply append.
Prompt
Fill these in before starting. If either is still a placeholder, stop and ask.
PROVIDER: <PROVIDER NAME>
WEBSITE: <URL>
You are researching an email provider for a privacy comparison article that
scores providers 0 to 17 on six attributes.
## Step 0: gating. Answer all four before researching anything else.
1. Is this a hosted mailbox? Free, paid, invitation-only and community-gated
services qualify. If it is only a client, alias relay or bundled web-hosting
feature with no separate mailbox offering, report OUT OF SCOPE and explain.
2. Does the mailbox service still operate? If it has shut down, report OUT OF
SCOPE with a dated shutdown source. If it serves existing users but has
closed registration, it may be scored; mark it unavailable to new customers.
3. Identify the legal operator, parent and product. A brand differing from its
company name is normal and is not a reason to stop. A discontinued brand
migrated completely into an already-covered product is a duplicate.
4. Identify any reseller or upstream mail host. Compare documented contracts,
MX/IMAP/SMTP hostnames and network evidence with these existing profiles:
Proton Mail, Tuta, cock.li, Mailfence, Neomailbox, Kolab Now,
Mailbox.org, CounterMail, Eclipso, Infomaniak kMail, mail.de, Posteo,
StartMail, Systemli, Vivaldi Mail, GMX, Hostpoint, Inbox.eu, Migadu,
Murena Mail, Runbox, WEB.DE, Disroot, Mailo, Riseup, Seeweb, Forward
Email, Gandi Mail, iCloud Mail, Iroco, Thexyz, Zoho Mail, Combell,
Fastmail, Gmail, Raidboxes, Soverin, HEY, Lavabit, Outlook.com,
PrivateMail, Rackspace Email, Titan, Hushmail, MXroute, Mythic Beasts,
Namecheap Private Email, PolarisMail, Purelymail, Yahoo Mail, AOL Mail.
Shared IP space, cloud hosting or software alone does not prove resale.
If a reseller adds its own terms or data processing, assess those obligations
as well as the upstream service. Do not call two products duplicates solely
because they share a parent or infrastructure.
Answer all four. Explain any exclusion with evidence. For an operating service,
state whether a new reader can actually obtain the configuration being scored.
## Rules for every claim
Use the provider's Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, DPA, transparency report,
knowledge base and pricing pages. Support factual claims with short verbatim
excerpts where useful, preserving their scope and exceptions. Give each source
URL and fetch date. Attribute technical inferences separately.
Quote verbatim and contiguously. Do not join a heading to the paragraph under
it, do not join separate bullets or table cells with a period or a slash, do
not reflow a multi-line address into one line, and never put your own wording
inside quotation marks. If you need two spans from one page, quote them as two
separate spans.
If a fact is not stated in the provider's own documents, write "Not stated"
rather than inferring. Where an umbrella ToS and a product ToS disagree, quote
both and say they disagree. Where marketing and technical docs disagree, quote
both; the contradiction is itself a finding.
Third-party technical evidence is admissible and often better than marketing.
Resolve MX, IMAP and SMTP hostnames and record dated RIPE/ARIN and TLS evidence.
A netblock country, ASN owner or certificate subject is not proof of physical
storage location, backup location or legal control. Label such hosting
assignments provisional and show the effect of plausible alternatives.
For every URL you cite, retrieve a Wayback snapshot via
http://archive.org/wayback/available?url=<URL> and give the full
https://web.archive.org/web/<TIMESTAMP>/<URL> string. That API rate-limits
hard and returns HTTP 429 under rapid queries. Pace requests about 7 seconds
apart with retries and a longer backoff on failure. Do not report "no
snapshot" for a page that is merely rate-limited; if a URL genuinely has no
capture, say so and try variants with and without www and a trailing slash.
Verify time-sensitive claims against current primary sources regardless of your
knowledge cutoff. Never invent a source, quote, fetch date or archive timestamp.
## Scoring conventions
Apply the same rules as the printed rubric. State the service tier and
configuration; do not silently mix the protections of different plans.
HQ jurisdiction and hosting jurisdiction, scored separately on the same scale.
Include replicas and backups; use the highest applicable hosting penalty across
locations the scored configuration can use. Score a selectable region separately
when its boundaries are established. If mail-specific location evidence is
missing, label any network-based inference provisional. With no useful network
evidence, use the operator country only as a provisional fallback. An unknown
operator's governing-law clause is a provisional proxy, not incorporation proof.
Do not equate overseas territories with
their administering country without a stated rule and supporting evidence:
Apply the named +3 exceptions before the outside-alliance category.
0 = outside all alliances, except China and Russia. Used so far: Switzerland, Iceland, Seychelles,
Latvia, Finland, Romania, Serbia, Cayman Islands.
+1 = 9/14 Eyes member with GDPR/EEA protection: Germany, France, Belgium,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy.
+3 = 5 Eyes (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) or a high-surveillance
jurisdiction (China, Russia).
Zero-access encryption:
0 = the provider holds no usable key for the stored message body and
decryption happens on the user's device. Metadata scope is separate.
+1 = a key derived from the user password but unwrapped server-side each
session, OR an opt-in PGP/S/MIME path the provider integrates into
its own webmail or native apps.
+3 = mail stored in plaintext, with at most third-party PGP the provider
does not integrate. Disk-level or at-rest encryption where the provider
holds the keys is +3, not 0. Say so explicitly.
State the scope: body only, body plus subject, or metadata too. Distinguish
storage protection from E2EE between correspondents, and defaults from opt-in
settings. Guard-style server-side decryption belongs in +1.
Government-access posture: count three independent artifacts, a published
transparency report, a commitment to notify users of lawful requests, and a
warrant canary. All three = 0, two = +1, one = +2, none = +3. Add +1 more for
an explicit non-notification clause. Check whether each artifact is current
against its own stated cadence, and say when one has lapsed. The current table
counts published artifacts even if stale; this is not proof of current coverage.
Notification by authorities is not a provider notification commitment. Credit
contractual notification duties only for the data and account configuration they
cover; read the transfer clauses in DPAs before declaring notice absent. An
ordinary legal prohibition on notice is not an explicit policy never to notify.
Anonymous signup: Tor explicitly supported AND an anonymous payment route
(cash or crypto) = 0; one = +1; neither = +2. A free mailbox requiring no billing
identity or mandatory real name/phone also satisfies the payment criterion.
State whether this applies only to the free tier. Crypto acceptance alone is
not a guarantee of anonymity; identify processors and identity checks.
Funding stability: independent, family-owned, employee-owned or nonprofit for
more than ten years of continuous independent operation = 0; other stable private
ownership or an established company that is publicly listed = +1; a private company backed by
institutional VC/PE funding, or a controlling acquisition in the preceding five
years = +2. Measure the window at the assessment date. Crowdfunding alone is
not institutional VC/PE funding. Advertising and price changes do not establish
an ownership change. A public listing uses the listed-company category even
when a foundation retains control. A conversion to nonprofit ownership without a
controlling outside buyer does not restart the operating-history clock. State
uncertainty when ownership is undisclosed.
## Fields to cover
### Identity and jurisdiction
- Legal entity name, registration number, country of incorporation
- Parent company and ownership chain if disclosed, with dates of any sale
- Countries where mail servers physically sit, from their docs and from DNS
- Governing law and dispute jurisdiction, from the ToS
### Privacy posture
- Encryption at rest, and who holds the keys
- Zero-access or end-to-end encryption, per the calibration above
- IP logging policy and retention period
- Data retention after account deletion
- Content analysis for advertising or product features; opt-out controls
- AI-provider sharing and model-training permissions, distinguishing explicit
policy language from inference. These findings do not change the six scores.
- Government access: transparency report (URL, frequency, date last updated),
user-notification commitment or the non-notification clause, warrant canary
(URL, date of last signature, stated maximum interval between signatures)
- Anonymous signup: Tor supported, blocked or not stated; anonymous payment
methods, naming which; whether real identifying details are required
- DPA available, and GDPR controller/processor stance
### Functionality
- Custom domains: which tier, and the maximum number of separate domains on
one mailbox. Check whether aliases can span domains or are same-domain only,
whether a forwarding workaround exists and its limit, and whether adding a
domain requires taking over its whole MX or can host individual addresses.
- Catch-all: supported or not, custom domain only. If "catch-all" returns
nothing, search "wildcard alias" and *@domain before concluding it is
unsupported.
- Aliases at the provider's own domains: how many, free or paid
- IMAP, SMTP, POP3
- Storage at the entry paid tier and at the first tier with custom domains
- Migration tools
- 2FA, listing TOTP, WebAuthn/FIDO2 hardware key and SMS separately, and
saying whether each protects the mailbox or only the billing account
- Native mobile apps
### Pricing
- Lowest paid tier including both a custom domain and catch-all
- Monthly and yearly price, with currency
- Free tier, and whether it is a real tier or a time-limited trial
- Payment methods, and the date of any recent change to them
### Stability signals
- Year founded
- Funding model: bootstrapped, VC-backed, non-profit, family-owned, acquired
- Published uptime commitment or SLA, quoted, and any status-page history
- Prior shutdowns, acquisitions, breaches or incidents, and how the provider
disclosed them
## Deliverables
Give content, not markup. Do not attempt article formatting.
1. The six attribute deltas, each with the one quote that decides it, and the
sum. Say which band the sum falls in: LOW 0-3, MEDIUM 4-8, HIGH 9-14,
CRITICAL 15+.
2. If any delta is arguable, give the alternative reading and the total it
would produce.
3. A one-line summary of what makes this provider unusual.
4. A "Gaps" section listing what you could not determine from primary sources,
with the exact URL you tried for each.
5. A "Corrections" section listing anything that contradicts the provider's own
marketing, and anything you could not verify. Say "none" rather than
omitting the section.
